When reading A Better War, a 1999 book by Lewis Sorley that focuses on the post-Tet Vietnam War, I was struck by the demonstration of my position. After years of big unit operations under Westmoreland, Abrams turned our efforts on a dime after he took command in June 1968:
"The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," affirmed General Fred Weyand, who was in a position to know. ...
What Weyand saw was a dramatic shift in concept of the nature and conduct of the war, in the appropriate measrues of merit, and in the tactics to be applied. ...
[Abrams understood that the] "object was not destruction but control, and in this case particularly control of the population.
There was no retraining of our forces. No creation of new COIN units. Just a determination to use our existing soldiers trained and experienced in the big unit fight for COIN to protect the people while still fighting the big units. It worked.
And of course, it worked in Iraq without bringing in a new army. When instructed to secure the population instead of relying on Iraqi forces to do the job, our forces secured the population.
Stop creating a problem where there is none. We have good soldiers and Marines. Lead them and tell them how to fight and they will fight that way. Our troops are disciplined enough to kill or protect. Just make sure those doing the leading know what the hell they are talking about.
