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Friday, November 09, 2007

Why We Must Stay

The long-term American presence is under debate. Some want us out fast and never mind the consequences. But even as we win on the battlefield, we will be needed for years to complete the battlefield victories and fight the governing battles:

Iraq is a unique experiment. Democracy has never worked for the Arabs. Past attempts have quickly turned into dictatorships, kept in power with terror and violence. Iraq is already headed in the same direction, with several Shia warlords seeking to gain total power. While the Sunni Arab groups are the most vicious, they are also greatly outnumbered. Only about ten percent of the population is now Sunni Arab, versus 20 percent in 2003. Most Sunni Arabs agree that they are beaten, and are seeking to make a deal, or to flee. But a minority will fight on, and die, along with any civilians in the vicinity. There are many Iraqis who realize that a working democracy is the best path to peace and prosperity. But to make that happen, all the fanatics with guns have to be killed or disarmed. Then you have to do something about the corruption. Again, many Iraqis know, by experience in the West, or looking at the statistics, that the less corrupt a society is, the more prosperity it has. If the democrats lose, Iraqi slides back into the muck. Will that happen? No one knows for sure.


Given that our refusal to stay engaged in Europe after 1918 may have doomed us to another world war, you'd think that we wouldn't risk the results of our troop sacrifice by leaving Iraq too fast.

Given that our presence in Europe after 1945 contributed to the peace on that violent continent, you'd think staying in Iraq would be a no-brainer.

Given that just a little more effort in 1974 and 1975 could have likely saved South Vietnam from a North Vietnamese invasion, you'd think that we'd recognize that starting to fight a war should mean a commitment to finishing it with victory.

Given that many of the critics of the Iraq War also say we should have stayed engaged in Afghanistan after we helped drive the Soviets out, and kept the Taliban from winning control (and providing a safe haven for al Qaeda to launch the 9/11 attacks, you'd think staying in Iraq would be an easy call to make.

Given that those same critics also say we've paid insufficient attention to Afghanistan since the successful 2001 campaign to overthrow the Taliban/al Qaeda regime, committing sufficient resources to hold Iraq would not even be a question.

Instead, the administration must still battle those who would run from a victory in Iraq just as fast as their stubby little legs can carry them.

We might not get a free and democratic Iraq even if we stay in Iraq. We might get a free and democratic Iraq if we leave.

Heck, even a non-Saddam authoritarian regime friendly to us would be a minimal victory.

But the gains to be realized from relatively little additional effort if we can bolster real democracy in Iraq should mean we will decide to stay in Iraq for at least another decade to try and instill the habits of rule of law.