Scoblete says no:
No one in their right mind would argue that the Iranian regime is a peaceful and beneficial force in Middle Eastern affairs, but are they therefore willing to start World War III, as President Bush suggested in a recent news conference? Are they prepared, as a nation, to become a nuclear suicide bomb just to deal a grievous blow to the United States?
No one can know for sure, but we do have a precedent here. After all, Islamic fundamentalists have ruled Iran for more than a generation, more than enough time to take the measure of their behavior. Here's what we know: since seizing power, the Mullahs ruling Iran have been aggressive. Their first act upon taking power was the seizing of American hostages. They have violently lashed out against America's influence in the region, using their Hezbollah surrogate to attack a Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and a housing complex occupied by U.S. airmen in Saudi Arabia in 1996.
The fact that Iran has wielded force through proxies and not through its conventional military, however, is a strong indication that the regime understands its strengths and weaknesses.
The problem is that speaking of Iran as a unitary actor is a mistake:
Many of Iran's neighbors are not as worried about Iranian nukes as they are concerned about a more aggressive Iran attempting to seize bits of disputed terrain throughout the region (as it has already been doing with small islands in the Persian Gulf), and asserting its traditional role as the regional superpower. Iran already has weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons developed during the 1980s war with Iraq), but has never put them in play. Iran has never let terrorist groups have any of their chemical weapons, nor has it openly threatened to use this stuff against its neighbors. This is consistent with past behavior of Iranian leaders, who are not known for rashness. Iranian extremists, especially the Islamic militants, are another matter. They are kept under control, just barely. They are the wildcard that makes everyone, including many Iranians, nervous.
Has Iran been cautious? It all depends. Was it reckless or cautious to attack Jews in Argentina or Israel and Americans in Tehran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq? I'd say attacking nuclear-armed nations is reckless. Of course, they've gotten away with it, so perhaps we aren't the best judges of what is reckless.
But we never know who will make the decision over using Iranian nukes. If god is on their side, is anything truly reckless?
Another problem is that Scoblete says that Iran has never used its conventional military aggressively. This just isn't so.
During the Iran-Iraq War, when Iraqi aircraft struck Iranian oil tankers in an effort to strangle Iranian oil exports, Iran refrained from striking neutral shipping that supplied Iraq. That was the rational thing to do. Iran even managed to stay rational while the United States led a Western naval armada that essentially protected Iraqi trade by escorting neutral shipping.
But eventually, Iran lashed out in frustration during the Iran-Iraq War:
Iran's response was limited to two attacks on Iraqi civilians in October, including a two-missile strike against Baghdad on October 5, 1987. In addition to striking her enemy of seven years, Iran lashed out at others in October 1987. The frustration of failing to crush Iraq, of witnessing America lead the West into the Gulf in force, of enduring air attacks against her oil lifeline, and of seeing the militarily weak but wealth Arab Gulf states funnel money to prop up Iraq's military pushed Iran to the brink of irrationality. When Iraq was the country that had invaded Iran in the first place back in 1980 this seemed too unjust and proof that the world was against their revolution. On top of this, Iran received no sympathy when, in July, Saudi security forces bloodily suppressed Iranian "pilgrims" after they tried to mobilize a pro-Iranian demonstration in the heart of Saudi Arabia. On October 3, 1987, Iran crossed the line into irrationality. Unable to defeat her one enemy Iraq, Iran massed between 30 and 50 speedboats for an attack on Saudi Arabia's off-shore oil terminal at Khafji--the one used by the Kuwaitis and Saudis to sell oil in Iraq's name. Saudi Arabia responded by deploying warships and fighter aircraft. Iran pulled back but five days later in another confrontation the Saudis sank three speedboats.
Iran, apparently not satisfied with defeat at the hands of Iraq and then Saudi Arabia, even struck an American flagged tanker, Sea Isle City, with a Silkworm missile while it lay in Kuwaiti waters. The United States retaliated with Operation Nimble Archer on October 19, 1987, during which three Iranian oil platform bases were attacked. Many Iranians knew that a course of confrontation with America was foolish but the short term satisfaction of striking out at those who helped Iraq--even the United States--was beginning to win out over reason.
In October, the Iranians claimed to have troops massed for another try at Basra and on November 1, 1987, Rafsanjani stated that no settlement with Iraq was possible until Iran struck a decisive blow. Three days later, Iran declared a week of mobilization and issued demands that Iraq be labeled the aggressor in the war and that Iraq pay reparations. Iran added that she might keep some of the Iraqi land she held at that point. Given the nearly ten months that had passed since the most recent final offensive, these were strong words indeed.
The naval war continued amidst the Western naval presence. On January 15, 1988, Iraqi warplanes struck three more tankers engaged in the Iranian oil trade. Iraq had what she needed now--a naval shield for shipping traffic that supported the Iraqi war effort through neutral Kuwait. From behind that shield Iraqi planes struck Iranian tankers. In addition, another war of the cities began on February 29, 1988. The attacks included an Iraqi missile strike against Tehran, a first for the war.
While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.
At the same time that Iran was losing on the ground, Iran's navy sailed on its death ride. The naval battle was prompted by the mining of U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts on April 14, 1988 in the first mine incident since November 1987. Five days later, America responded with Operation Praying Mantis. Designed as a proportional response to the damaged U.S. frigate, the operation involved the destruction of two Iranian oil platform bases. The Sassan platform was demolished by a Marine landing team while the Sirri platform was destroyed by naval gunfire. During this operation, an Iranian patrol boat was sunk and F-4 Phantom fighter bombers were driven off by American surface to air missile fire. Iran's response set off a chain of events that left perhaps three of her patrol boats at the bottom of the Gulf and two modern frigates smashed. American forces dodged more Iranian attacks including the impressive evasion of five Silkworms by Jack Williams. The Only American loss, a Sea Cobra attack helicopter, was lost by accident and not hostile action. The final insult to Iran took place on April 26, 1988, when the cautious Saudis broke diplomatic relations with Iran.
Iran is a broken society, wrecked by three decades of jihadi insanity. It is not an Iran sitting on a record of centuries of Persian caution.
A mullah minority rules an empire of foreigners and a majority that despises mullah rule. The mullahs themselves are divided with some displaying at least some traditional Persian caution and others with a messianic conviction that they are on a mission from god.
We'd like to empower the majority of Iranians who like America and want nothing to do with expansion or national suicide. Unfortunately, our State Department appears to be ruling that out.
If the majority of Iranians ran Iran, I wouldn't be happy about another case of nuclear proliferation (which would likely lead Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to go nuclear), but I wouldn't worry about Iran using them irrationally--so wouldn't think about war to stop them--any more than I worry about France using them on us--even under Chirac.
Heck, Iran under the majority might very well decide having nukes is too expensive. Talking really could work under those circumstances.
National suicide is not an Iranian goal. It is not even a mullahcracy goal. Most would rather win with terror and nuclear blackmail. But there are madmen in Iran who would sacrifice those unworthy Moslems in the majority in order to rid the world of Israel and possibly, if they can cripple the global economy, America too. And some of the mullahs who don't now support using nukes only because they think god will grant them victory without nukes, might change their mind and go along with the extremists.
What really scares me, is that so many Westerners find the idea that Iran poses a threat to us and that we might need to use force to protect ourselves unthinkable.
Is a path to national suicide unthinkable for Iran? Or the West?
Depends on who is doing the thinking, now doesn't it?
