Q Sir, Jonathan Karl with NBC News. What are you seeing in terms of the influence currently of Muqtada al-Sadr? Is he personally as much of a factor as he had been in the past. And as you see the Mahdi Army in your area, do you get the sense that he has real operational control over what they're doing, or not?
COL. CASTLES: That's an interesting question, and it's one that we talk about quite often, in particular as it relates to Sadr City. I think he is now in Iran, so just based on his location, you know, that implies that some of his control is not direct. And we certainly haven't seen him in Sadr City operating specifically, you know, since -- at least since I've been here. But I think he certainly exudes some influence just by the fact that the office of Muqtada al-Sadr is very strong within Sadr City and he has a direct influence over that. In relation to the Mahdi Army, though, it's hard to tell. I personally think it's fractured somewhat, that they don't get a whole lot of direct guidelines from him and that some of these divisions of it are operating on their own; and, you know, whether they be receiving guidance from him or just, you know, guidance from a rogue leader that's out here operating in the area, some of which we've seen have been more dangerous than others.
COL. KECK: Jeff.
Q Colonel, Jeff Schogol with Stars and Stripes. How many combat outposts and joint security centers do you have in Sadr City?
COL. CASTLES: Jeff, we've got one joint security station in Sadr City, and it's -- we are in only a very small part of Sadr City, and it's kind of a different approach that we've been taking with it, a much more indirect approach in terms of how we're working in terms of Sadr City. You know, the leadership has been a challenge, to engage with them and to try to provide assistance and tie them in to what we're doing both in provision of security, working on governance and essential services and that sort of stuff. We've got a very close relationship with the Iraqi security forces that operate throughout Sadr City.We work with them daily. That's co-joined there in the joint security station. We're starting to see some cracks in terms of having an opportunity to meet with leadership, whether it's members of the council or whether it's just sheikh tribal leadership that has now shown interest in meeting with us to try to aid in some of these situations within there, because, you know, that is an area
that needs a lot of help. You know, there's services they're suffering from a lack of in there. I think they would love to see more security in there. I think that many people within Sadr City are threatened by the Mahdi Army, and are doing what they're doing strictly because they don't want to suffer the impacts of speaking out against them.
Q If I could follow up quickly. Would you -- is there any less of a U.S. troop presence in Sadr City than in the rest of Baghdad?And if so, could you explain why?
COL. CASTLES:There is less of a troop presence in Sadr City. And again, it really goes back to this indirect approach that we determined we take on Sadr City. Our focus in the -- within our area of operations, predominantly it's been on al Qaeda, which has been within the area of Adhamiya Proper is where we've seen them operate, and then some of the special groups that operate in and around both the Adhamiya and Sadr City security district. But this -- you know, there are a couple reasons. One is that Sadr City is a very large area -- 2 1/2 million people, and it requires a lot to kind of get in there and to work. But the other thing is, is that we are seeing progress in this indirect approach, in the fact that the Iraqi security forces are -- have a very good ability within Sadr City, as well as we're starting to see the leadership being more responsive in this indirect approach than if we just went right back into there full force into Sadr City.
Clearly, the reports from earlier in the year that several thousand Iraqi Shias had gone to Iran for training were accurate as we see an upsurge in Iranian-supported Shia attacks on our forces in the Baghdad region.
We are still approaching the Shias with kid gloves. Which is good. We can't lose the Shias even when only a minority of Shias support Sadr. Unfortunately, that minority is mostly in Baghdad.
We are cautiously going after Sadr's radical militias and their Iranian sponsors without a heavy troop presence (as I advocated in the pre-surge days as a goal of any surge). One brigade is not enough to police a couple million people. I hope that we are able to break apart the Shias who once looked to Sadr for leadership.
The question is why has Sadr gone back to Iran? He lost some prestige by his last stay in Iran which showed him to be a Persian sock puppet. Sadr apparently doesn't care since he's gone back. It appears that Sadr has chosen sides and we will in the end have to kill this guy. If the Iranians go for broke and unleash their Shia pawns in the next month, Sadr will not survive it. Hopefully we've split apart the Shias of Sadr City enough that when the Iranians strike, despite the images of a revolt, that we will remain calm and put down the astro-turf revolt of Iranian puppets. Which would gut the last real foreign-based threat to success in Iraq.
Third uprising and you're out. Right?
