GEN. ODIERNO: Based on -- I don't have August figures, but based on July figures, across Iraq -- again, this is vague, but al Qaeda/Sunni insurgents, which we believe most of them still operating in the Sunni insurgency are moving towards al Qaeda -- created about 52 percent of the violence across Iraq, and Shi'a extremists created about 48 percent of the violence across Iraq, based on our figures for July. And that varies by region, obviously. So I mean yes, they still -- they still have some capability. Now, if you compare that to January, when they were up about 70 percent of violence was associated with al Qaeda, we've clearly had a -- and I think that's a combination of two things, as I've said before -- we have degredated (sic:
degraded) al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations in Iraq.
But in addition, I think we've seen a little bit of a surge in Shi'a violence based on support from Iran. So it's a combination of both of those factors.
Exactly. Sunni threats--whether Baathist, nationalist, or jihadi--are declining as Iran's Shia pawns take up the slack. This decision by Iran to escalate has masked the victory we are achieving over the Sunni Arabs of Iraq--both jihadis, Baathists, and nationalists. The Sunni Arabs have lost and only the terms of their loss are up in the air.
And Odierno explains the increased strength of al Qaeda over the last year even as Sunni Arabs defected to the government's side:
GEN. ODIERNO: My assessment is -- I think I said this last month also -- my assessment is, with the Sunni insurgency, for the most part, in my mind -- and again, there's probably a few examples where this isn't true, but for the most part, they have made a decision. They have decided that "we're going to go with al Qaeda" or they have decided "we want to reconcile with the government of Iraq" and they're reaching out to coalition forces, like in Al Anbar, like in Abu Ghraib, like we're seeing in southern -- in Mahmudiyah, in Yusufiya, south of Baghdad, as well as we're starting to see now in Salahuddin province, in Tikrit, and how we're seeing now in Diyala province. So we're seeing it around the northern Sunni belts that in fact they're reaching out to us.
So I think it's becoming more and more clear: either you go to al Qaeda, or you come over and you want to reconcile with the government. I think that's where we are today.
That is, Iraqi Sunni Arabs either switched to supporting al Qaeda in Iraq or switched to the government's side. That weakened the Sunni non-jihadi resistance even as the jihadis gained strength from the movement of fanatical Sunni Arabs to them.
We continue to hammer al Qaeda even as we begin to turn focus to the Iranian-backed Shia thugs.
It is a complicated war. A war we are winning. Have patience.
