This is nonsense:
Putin’s threat assessment, like its Soviet predecessors, derives from a false appreciation of reality on several fronts. First, since 1991 Russia has enjoyed the most benign threat environment in its history. This benign security environment is in large measure due to the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe that is both a precondition and a product of both NATO and European Union (EU) enlargement. Russian leaders know this because otherwise they would have spent much more on defense than has been the case. Second, as Alexei Arbatov’s analysis and Putin’s and Sergei Ivanov’s own past statements indicate, neither U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe nor bases in Bulgaria nd Romania can threaten Russia or were previously regarded as threats.
The question is, why is Putin spouting off nonsense when he and the rest of the Russian leaders know better?
Is it to prepare the people for a more aggressive posture toward the West or simply to justify autocracy by raising a false threat? Certainly, complaining about a false threat that is not actually a threat makes it easier for the Russians to get away with this nonsense.
Sadly, it will take another generation for the Russians to get over their superpower nostalgia. Unless the Russians unexpectedly become aggressive, we'll need to put up with Russian bluster until the ex-Soviet generation passes from the scene.
UPDATE: Via Instapundit, a reminder that it is foolish to describe every policy move by foreign countries as a reaction to something we do or fail to do:
RUSSIA'S sense of self-esteem has long been inseparable from its relationship with America. To have America as an enemy during the Cold War gave the Soviet Union a sense of urgency and of purpose: America took Russia seriously!
The end of the cold war deprived Russia briefly of a vital adversary. It is only logical now that, as Russia tries to reassert itself on the world stage, and restore its sense of greatness, it is returning to the sort of sparring with America that it found—perversely—so comforting before.
Really, this is a good reminder that nations do things for their own reasons or impulses without weighing our latest white paper on radio spectrum sharing or whatever. I've often complained of this tendency of people around the world and here to blame us for what other countries do. Other nations in fact are not just passive actors reacting to the input of the only actor with the power to affect the world (America). This view that seeks to blame America for everything trivializes foreigners.
And while Russia picks a non-existent fight with America, smaller nations react to the Russian noises:
Ukraine's national experience has taught its citizens to regard peace as fragile and fleeting, its roots too shallow to bear the strain of constant social and political upheaval. We Ukrainians accept the lessons of our history and work toward solutions that relieve the sources of this strain, lest neglect allow war to overtake peace and authority to subvert freedom. This is why we see our future in the European Union: the goal of the EU is to confront instability and insecurity with a lasting structure of peace and prosperity in which all of Europe's nations and neighbors have a stake.
To ensure that Europe's structure of peace is secure in the former Soviet East, a clear understanding of the existing power dynamic is needed. Much like the periods following the treaties of Westphalia and Versailles, the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse features a powerful country confronting a group of smaller and unprotected new states. Given the economic and institutional links that arose in the decades of Soviet misrule, Russia's influence in the region was bound to be strong. This is a fact of life that I, as a practicing politician in Ukraine, live with every day.
Our State Department has quite the job to manage this Kremlin tantrum so that the old Soviets pass from the scene without provoking a new Cold War based on Russian insecurity.
