The Chinese believe a rapid conquest of Taiwan before we can intervene will present us with a choice of liberating Taiwan or accepting the new status quo. The Chinese seem to believe we may fight to defend a still resisting Taiwan but that we won't liberate a conquered Taiwan.
As time passes, the military balance is tilting more toward the Chinese as the Chinese expand their military capabilities and the Taiwanese stagnate in many important areas. Greater Chinese capabilities also introduce uncertainty to the question of how fast we can respond. If the Chinese can deploy assets that can attack our forces as they approach the Taiwan area of operations, we will need to debate the risks of intervening more and be more cautious in approaching Taiwan. These factors will delay our intervention. Perhaps fatally if the Chinese are right.
Despite China's growing strength, we are still far more powerful than China and will be for decades more. China may never actually catch up with us given that we increase our power, too. But this isn't entirely relevant to the question at hand. Keeping Taiwan resisting long enough for us to concentrate our power to fight at their side is the key problem.
The situation that our military faced in the Philippines in 1941 is remarkably similar. Our Navy was far from the theater, the Japanese were close, some hoped air power (with new B-17s located in the Philippines) would savage the Japanese invasion force, and our Navy would lunge across the Pacific to rescue the defenders by engaging and defeating the Japanese navy.
The key then to allow this train of events to unfold was for the American ground forces to hold the critical Manila Bay to deny Japan the primary strategic asset of the islands until our forces could arrive. This was the heart of our War Plan Orange:
Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. (See Map 4.) The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the "last extremity."
The Americans would need to hold for six months, for by then:
... the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line of communications. The men and supplies collected on the west coast during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counter-attack and drive the enemy into the sea.
In practice, our top leaders knew we couldn't just lunge across the Pacific in less than a couple years time. But our Navy today could lunge across the Pacific in short order, so the theoretical assumption of 1941 is fine to retain for today's comparison purposes.
Our pre-war war plans in actually called for abandoning the Philippines to focus on defeating Germany first. But General MacArthur hoped to defend the islands without necessarily having to fall back on Bataan. He trained more Filipino troops, gathered supplies, had a small fleet, and had brand new B-17 long range bombers. He hoped to win with what he had.
But the Japanese knocked out our B-17s and our Asiatic Fleet bugged out rather than get sunk by the locally superior Japanese navy. The poorly trained and ill-equipped Philippine army could not face the Japanese, and the Japanese--despite having little in the way of specialized amphibious warfare assets--landed in strength and advanced off the beachheads quickly. It was back to War Plan Orange concepts of holding a toe hold until relieved.
Of course, despite the bravery of the American and Filipino defenders, Bataan could not hold until our fleet arrived--it was broken at Pearl Harbor and so there was no opportunity to even consider a relief expedition. And even without Japanese success at Pearl Harbor, our fleet could not have rescued our forces in the Philippines. Those forces were doomed. The island fortress of Corregidor fell to a Japanes assault a month after Bataan fell.
Today, Taiwan's air force and navy could share the fate of our Philippines-based forces in 1941. Like the Japanese who technically lacked dedicated amphibious warfare assets, the Chinese might make it ashore with a combination of naval and impressed civilian assets. Perhaps the Taiwanese army will be unable to stop the Chinese from carving out beachheads and airheads.
The one big difference is that our Navy certainly can respond in weeks rather than the months MacArthur hoped for or the two years our 1941 Navy assumed were needed.
So if the Taiwanese can't stop the PLAN from hitting Taiwan and coming ashore, what are Taiwan's Bataan and Corregidor that will let them keep the flame of Taiwanese democracy lit until help can arrive? And frankly, to possibly shame us into acting by denying China a quick victory and nullifying our peace movement the ability to argue that it is too late to do anything about the tragic but inevitable loss.
Could the Taiwanese replicate Bataan and build a fortress around one of their east coast ports? There, the Taiwanese could attempt to hold until US and Japanese forces could arrive in force. Our naval forces could counter-blockade Taiwan to keep the Chinese from supplying their occupation forces and let them wither until joint US and Taiwanese ground forces could counter-attack. With the Taiwanese drawing down their forces uselessly deployed to Quemoy and Matsu back to the main island, there would be additional forces to commit to the defense of a last-ditch bastion.
Taiwanese and American special forces acting as stay-behind forces could organize resistance on the remainder of the island, conduct attacks on PLAN rear areas that call in precision missiles from high flying bombers and submarines, and provide intelligence for the eventual counter-offensive.
Further, could the Taiwanese replicate Corregidor and use a small island further east as a last bastion for a remnant of a free Taiwan in case even this Bataan fell before help arrived? I don't even know if Taiwan has anything out east (the Pescadores to the west are unsuitable since they would likely be an early target for the Chinese. If not, Taiwan has money. They could buy a small island from somebody and equip it to hold and defend a shadow government of lower level officials (it should never be a haven for the top leadership which might tempt them to flee rather than fight).
And this concept shouldn't mean that the Taiwanese abandon efforts to sink the invasion force, shoot down the airborne forces, and rapidly (this is key) counter-attack any Chinese footholds in the early hours of entry when the enemy will be most vulnerable. Honestly, this is my main worry. The Taiwanese navy and air force will fight well, I think. But the army has to have the training, morale, and equipment to hit the Chinese fast. There should be no leisurely build up before counter-attacking--the Taiwanese need to strike early with whatever they have available to eliminate and not just contain PLAN footholds. But if Taiwan's defenses do crack early, they have to do what it takes to keep China from occupying the whole island.
I don't know nearly enough about Taiwan's geography to say where their Bataan should be other than to argue it should be on the east coast. But if the question is whether Taiwan can hold out long enough for American help to arrive, I think the concept is worthy of consideration.
