So our surge in Baghdad has to be all about protecting the Shias from Sunni terrorists. It is a delicate mission that requires us to disarm the Shia death squads and protect the Shias at the same time. That is why I've wanted targetted missions that hit Sadr and related death squads without targetting Shias and risking the loss of Shia support.
This BBC article (tip to Stand-To!) about our move into Sadr City highlights what I have written about. We can't target the Shias generally:
This is no full frontal assault though. The arrival of US forces was negotiated with local leaders and the Iraqi government. And Mehdi Army fighters who are still there have been told not to confront the Americans.
But like Col Mcree and his military police, other American units are trying to tread carefully.
In effect, this is a credibility test - for the Mehdi Army as well as the Americans and their Iraqi government allies. It is about who can be best trusted to provide for the people here.
The militia won support in Sadr City because they provided some protection against the constant onslaught from Sunni insurgents. It became a state within a state. The police may have had official uniforms but they answered to the militia.
Like another Shia organisation, the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Mehdi army has also become a kind of local government - providing cooking gas and services such as fixing drains.
The links go further. Although it is the stern face of Moqtadr Sadr who is the most common sight in Sadr City, you will also see many posters of Hassan Nasrallah, the Hezbollah leader.
But the Mehdi Army has also been blamed for fuelling much of the sectarian violence over the past year, killing hundreds of Sunnis its death squads have rounded up across Baghdad.
The Americans have wanted to go in harder against these death squads before, but have been held back by the government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, who is dependent on Mr Sadr politically.
But many believe Mr Sadr is now much weaker.
The Shia death squads must be eliminated, but the Shia militias that protected the Shia neighborhoods actually did provide a vital security role. That's why for years I counted militias when I added up security personnel in Iraq fighting the Sunni Arab insurgents and terrorists. We face a big burden trying to replace the protection role of the Shia militias.
This is why I'd rather organize these militias as official local defense forces with our supervision and oversight. Not only does it continue their legitimate role as local defenders, it helps keep them from branching out into death squad activities. And most importantly, it relieves us of the sole responsibility for the success or failure of providing local security.
Oh, and the Iraqi government must provide the services that Sadr provided in order to shift loyalty to the government.
I still worry that the Shias will lose patience with these terrorist attacks (as they did a year ago after the Samarra mosquie bombing) before we can make sufficient progress in knocking out the Sunni terrorists. But Strategypage doesn't seem as worried:
Having lost many of their bomb factories (where care bombs were assembled) and safe houses (where suicide bombers were trained and indoctrinated) in Baghdad, Sunni terrorists are rushing in teams from the suburbs to try and make enough mess to force the Shia militia to come out and fight. The Shia militia saw that the American surge campaign in Baghdad would be directed mostly at the Sunni terrorists. Thus the Shia militiamen simply put their weapons away and took off their black uniforms for a while, and let the Americans do their thing. The Iraqi police, controlled by Shia politicians, and largely staffed by Shia, was believed sufficient to guard key Shia targets (religious shrines and headquarters for Shia militia and politicians).
Despite the continued terror bombings, most Sunnis don't believe the Shia militia would be dumb enough to come out now and draw the Americans away from their campaign against Sunni terrorists. Thus the Sunni Arabs of Iraq believe they are doomed. Officially, the government is willing to make peace with the Sunni Arab community, if they will quiet down and just become, well, a harmless minority. But too many Sunni Arabs would rather die than give up hope of regaining control of the country they have run for centuries. So the terrorism continues.
So the Shias may not be as shaky in their ability to hold back, as I worry. And we may not need the militias to protect Shias as much as I think. The Shias in Sadr City may see that we will go after the Sunni terrorists as long as we aren't distracted by Sadr's thugs, and so refuse to be goaded.
The Sunni terrorists can't possibly win control of Iraq again, and I am constantly amazed that people here think we will of course lose this war. The Sunnis have a choice between being a minority safe in a democratic and propserous Iraq or becoming the new Palestinians in their miserable exile after being driven from Iraq by Shias and Kurds tired of dying at the hands of Sunni Arabs.
The Sunni Arabs of Anbar who have switched sides to fight the jihadis show they can see the writing on the wall. The Sunni Arabs of central Iraq continue to be stupid. While the surge targets Sunni terrorists, it is also an opportunity for Sunni Arabs to finally surrender and come to terms with the Shia and Kurdish majorities.
This is perhaps their last chance. The Sunnis need to surrender while they are still in central Iraq and while we still have the stomach to restrain the Shias and Kurds (to a lesser degree) who would wipe out the Sunni Arabs in retaliation for centuries of abuse.
