Multiply-Up

The announced "plus-up" of the Army and Marine Corps end strengths will provide a welcome cushion of forces given the tempo of operations in Iraq. For years, the military and administration have not wanted more forces on the assumption that the stress caused by Iraq is temporary and that any increase would not take place in time to affect Iraq and that after Iraq Congress might not fund the added troops adequately, leading to a "hollow" army.

So now that we will have 92,000 more ground forces than authorized prior to 9/11, are we going to build up troops too late to affect the current war and just create forces inappropriate for the next one?

The crucial deficiency was inadequate efforts to deal with the foreseeable future’s most likely threat: the failed state. Ungoverned areas—the detritus of failed states, such as Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq—provide discontent and chaos that fuel violence. Having more forces to address failed states could be worthwhile, but allowing the military to expand into roles and missions normally reserved for other parts of the interagency might produce better forces, prepared for the tasks at hand and part of an improved national security apparatus that could avoid future post-hostilities challenges.

This is an excellent point. Military force is but one component of counter-insurgency. And the military has relied on non-military portions of the government that have not stepped up. Shouldn't the military use this opportunity to expand capabilities into areas that are not covered by civilian agencies?

The expansion will only result in six more Army combat brigades and one more Marine regiment, so there is room for other types of units. Not a lot, since some of the increase already took place to fill out existing structure.

The military has noted that it plans more support units with the increase. So I guess that part of the solution to stability operations will be building military police, engineer, and other support units that can do the non-combat tasks that we now know other branches of the government will not or cannot provide.

Really, the expansion of our combat forces will be too late to affect Iraq. Either we win and the stress on the ground forces is reduced (which I think we will achieve); or we lose the will to fight before victory and we withdraw, reducing the stress of tempo that way (and adding the stress of defeat, however).

So let's look at what we'd want if this was March 2003 and we were crossing the berm for the first time.