1) Does the mission help the Iraqis fight more effectively after our surge ends? This can mean either a weaker enemy or a stronger government. Relative strength is the important consideration.
2) Does the surge provide a visible and measurable gain? If we surge and leave but can't tell if we did any good, it will hurt morale at home and encourage retreat whether we gained or not.
3) Does the mission reflect the new stage of the war we are in or just reflect stale arguments over what we should have done in 2003, 2004, or 2005? The Baathists can't win, now. Neither can the the Sunni jihadis or Sunni Arab nationalists. Sadr is the main problem. He is a threat despite being supported or admired by only a minority of the Shias only because Iran stands behind him. So ideally we address Sadr or his Iranian backers.
I personally would rather have more patience in Iraq than more troops, but I work with the war we have and not the war I want. If we surge, I won't throw up my hands and say, "Screw you, you ignored my wise advice, so I can't support this war!" One, there is no expiration date on my war support, since our troops don't have the option of not fighting. Two, I'm humble enough not to think I know it all. And three, I've read enough history to see that even good ideas can fail and bad ideas can succeed (The Kosovo War of 1999 provides a good example of both if you switch perspectives). You want to go with the odds, obviously, but war is two sides (at least) trying to win. Nothing is a sure thing.The President eases my mind by stating clearly:
"One thing is for certain, I will want to make sure that the mission is clear and specific and can be accomplished," Bush said on Thursday when asked about a troop increase.
And this story speaks of 9,000 troops being prepared to be sent above the rotation plan:
The reports said up to 9,000 troops would be added, with about 7,000 going into Baghdad, and roughly 1,500 slated for Anbar province.
This could be 2-3 combat brigades, including the brigade of the 82nd AB already scheduled to serve as a reserve force in Kuwait.
If the surge is to be larger than this, we'd have to extend troops and bring troops in early. So the surge would be an increase of only 9,000 troops for a full year and an increase based on overlap for only the amount of time that the extended troops stay. This could be another 3 brigades, or about 11,000 troops. I don't think we've extended any troops beyond three months, so the surge is not going to be that much or last that long. I really don't want us pinning too much on this so-called surge.
But, if a surge is to be done, what might we do with the troops and how many would be needed?
I. We Could Take Down Specific Targets.
1) Moqtada Sadr and other Shia militias are the obvious target. But we should send special forces and spooks backed by Rangers and conventional Army units for security. Conventional Army units could secure a corridor and a wide perimeter around a site targeted for a raid by special forces while Rangers provide the close-in perimeter.
We'd need a battalion of Rangers, special forces, and perhaps a new brigade with heavy armor. Call it 5,000 troops.
Success would be judged by arresting or killing the militia leaders, gaining defections by less-bloody militias, and purging the government and security forces of Sadr loyalists or sympathizers.
2) We could use extra forces to hammer jihadi strongholds in Anbar cities. At the end of the surge, ideally we'd be able to spread our forces out a little more to back up Iraqi forces brought in to hold the gains.
Several combat brigades or Marine equivalents should suffice for this plus Iraqi forces. Call it up to 12,000 US troops.
We'd know if the jihadis didn't succeed in scaring away newly installed Iraqi governments and security forces.
II. We Could Improve Iraqi Security Forces.
1) We could attach American combat teams (company-sized task forces) to Iraqi army battalions in an effort to make the Iraqi unit more deployable. Right now, too many Iraqi army units are really regional or local defense forces. When we need to shift troops, we can't readily move Iraqi units and so American units are the default force. This is why we couldn't flood Baghdad this last summer despite the large numbers of Iraqi security forces in existence. Not all Iraqi units need this help. And it isn't important that all Iraqi security units be mobile across the country. Let's say that we need to improve 30 battalions (this is fairly arbitrary, based on 113 Iraqi army combat battalions and assuming some are already mobile and others don't need to be since they are always needed locally).
We'd need 30 American line companies. Each brigade combat team has 8 companies in two battalions (4 each) plus a lighter recon battalion. We could take 3-4 brigades and use the line battalions to provide the combat teams to be attached to Iraqi battalions. Our presence should boost Iraqi confidence and make Iraqi soldiers more responsive to moving long distances to fight. We'd use the remainder of the brigades' troops as reserves, a source of fire support, and to handle logistics and what-not for the scattered units. Call this at 15,000 US troops.
We'd know we are successful if we can deploy these bolstered Iraqi units without debilitating desertions and remaining capable of taking on battalion missions. Judging the fighting quality would be more subjective but still important.
2) We could add training teams to Iraqi units down to the company level.
Assuming 400 companies in the Iraqi military, and assuming a squad per unit, we'd need 4,000 troops. These would likely be skimmed from units rather than breaking down an entire brigade. We already have training teams so the actual surge might only need 2,000. But I'll assume that one combat brigade is essentially broken up for this option.
Again, if Iraqi units could successfully deploy long distances while remaining effective we would know we are successful. Judging the fighting quality would be more subjective but still important.
III. We Could Protect Specific Locations Until Some Event or Date Certain Passes.
1) We could deploy to protect Sunni Arab neighborhoods and let the Sunnis know they have until a certain date to come to an agreement with the government to stop supporting the insurgency and actively help fight the insurgents, or we are leaving those neighborhoods after that date.
Other plans call on three combat brigades for Baghdad for offensive missions. I'll assume that three brigades will work for Baghdad and some other locations since they would be defensive in nature. Call it 12,000 troops.
Once that date arrives, we start drawing down. More slowly, perhaps, if an agreement is reached in order to provide time for the Sunni Arabs to prove they are actually halting their support for the insurgents while retaining more reliable American protection.
If there is no agreement, we should probably fall back on the 80% solution of fully backing the Shias and Kurds to suppress the Sunni Arab insurgencies and tell the Sunni Arabs good luck in your pure Anbar paradise.
2) We could convene national and provincial reconciliation meetings on a certain date (perhaps lasting a month). We would provide troops to guard these meetings much like we helped with election security. The purpose would be to agree to end the fighting by terrorists and death squads.
This would be very labor intensive. Assuming 20 locations to guard (18 provinces plus a national site and one spare for good measure), if 1,000 troops were needed to secure each site for a month, with reserves thrown in we could need 24,000 troops.
Once the meetings break up, we'd start sending units home. Successfully holding the meetings would be the measure of success not the results.
We'd have major decisions to make if the meetings failed.
IV. Engineering Projects With Force Protection.
1) We could bolster city defenses by bisecting cities with internal obstacles to obstruct movement within a city and surrounding obstacles to keep terrorists out. We would build check points to cover these obstacles and control movement. We'd work with Iraqi units as the engineeers constructed the security systems and then turn them over to the Iraqis.
Let's call it at 3 combat brigades and 3 separate engineer battalions, or about 14,000 troops.
The completion of the city defenses and the transfer to Iraqis would signify the completion of the mission. In time we'd see if this tamped down violence, but it would be an Iraqi mission.
2) We could send engineer and troops to the borders to build obstacles and defenses as well as crossing points that we'd turn over to Iraqis after we completed construction and training. And then move on to the next stretch of border.
Let's also call it at 3 combat brigades and 3 separate engineer battalions, or about 14,000 troops.
The completion of the border defenses and the transfer to Iraqis would signify the completion of the mission. Over time, we'd see if this disrupted Iranian support for Shia death squads and al Qaeda jihadis. But this would be an Iraqi mission.
3) We could construct defenses for critical infrastructure. Pipelines, ports, and power plants seem to get hit a lot. Not as much as before but enough to hurt the economic reconstruction. Perhaps building obstacles and defenses to be used by the Iraqis could help.
Let's say 2 combat brigades and 2 separate engineer battalions, or 8,500 troops.
V. Oh, And One More Reason for a Surge.
There is one more thing we could do with a troop surge that would help us in Iraq.
That would be using the extra combat brigades to either shield Iraq while we launch a military campaign against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, other WMD, leadership, and offensive weapons.
Or even better, use them to invade Iran in support of a revolt by the Iranian military or people against the mullahs.
If successful we'd end Iranian support for promoting chaos in Iraq and support for Syrian efforts to do the same.
There is no way we can hide a troop buildup in the region and so all we can do is have a plausible reason for doing so that doesn't tip our hand to the Iranians.
We'd want at least five Army brigades and two Marine Expeditionary Unit, plus supporting units. Let's call it 30,000 more troops.
End.
So there are my purely amateur number crunchings of options. And they can certainly be combined.
I don't much like the options outlined in III, but they could do some good. But they are more risky. They might violate my second criteria.
Options in I are probably the best--and especially the anti-Sadr option.
Options in IV would be the easiest to measure. I don't know if these options are better than II.
Option V is risky, too. But promises to cut the Gordion Knot of our multiple challenges in the Middle East if we win. Have we been twiddling our thumbs the last four years over Iran. Is Negroponte moving from DCI to State because he spent the last two years preparing for a revolution in Iran and will be needed to defend it to the world? That would eliminate the need to brief somebody in State who might leak it to the New York Times. Hmm.
All could help the Iraqis fight until victory once we end the surge.
And again, stop thinking of this as our "last chance" for victory. It is an attempt to defeat the most recent threat after having success over previous threats. If the surge doesn't work, we need to try something else.
Remember, "staying the course" really just means focusing on victory.
I am eager to hear what the President announces next week.
UPDATE: Victor Hanson has his own criteria. And they do not hinge on how many troops are in Iraq:
So, yes, send more troops to Iraq — but only if they are going to be allowed to hunt down and kill vicious and sectarians in a manner that they have not been allowed to previously.
So there. More troops could do better with a better mission. But with a better mission, our current number of troops would do better, too.
Our problem is that we haven't adapted to the new phase of the war that began with the February Golden Mosque bombing. Last summer I wrote:
Iran remains the last major obstacle to securing Iraq and handing over the security tasks to Iraqis in full. The trend is for other threats to decline, leaving Iran increasingly as the last enemy inside Iraq.
We hoped the Iraqi government on its own could control Sadr and blunt Iran's efforts to defeat us. We clearly hoped for too long and now we must do the job. So I hope our surge makes sense in this light.
