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Monday, December 11, 2006

To Be or Not to Be?

Although we are having problems training Iraqis for the new security forces, this does not mean the enemy in Iraq would win if we leave.

Our current training effort is 2-1/2 years old and is going much better than the initial effort that saw Iraqi security forces fold in the spring 2004 Fallujah and Sadr uprisings. Back then we were focused on creating a small 3-division regular army and relying on less trained forces for policing the Iraqis. Since then we've focused on light infantry while we provide the combat support and logistical support. Iraqi combat forces have held up much better from the current training.

So, if we leave, rather than the Sunnis marching back into power, the Shias and perhaps Kurds (if they don't withdraw into their mountains) will simply go postal on the Sunni Arabs:



If American troops suddenly disappeared by the end of 2006, the Iraqi security forces would be able to cope. The Sunni Arab terrorists never really had a chance of regaining control. What chance they did have, went down steadily over the past three years. Currently, the Sunni Arabs are outnumbered, in terms of population, by about eight-to-one. In terms of people with guns, they are outnumbered about five to one. The Sunni Arabs still have an edge in skills (and education), and attitude. Many Sunni Arabs still believe they will prevail because, well, because they believe Sunni Arabs are simply superior to those Kurd and Shia scum. But in a fight-to-the-death, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq are a very long shot to win.


It is always gratifying when Strategypage is on the same page. The stupidity of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs is mind boggling.

I have no idea if we can stop the momentum of the ethnic cleansing that the Sunni Arabs have invited with centuries of dominating the Shias, decades of slaughtering the Shias and Kurds under Saddam, and years of car bombing Shias and Kurds since we destroyed the Saddam regime.

The Iraqi Sunni Arabs once has a choice between a smaller role in a democratic Iraq or fighting to regain control of Iraq. They chose to fight. The Shias were amazingly patient with the Sunni-led killings of Shias until the February 2006 Samarra Golden Dome bombing. Because of that event, the Shias are burning with hatred and a desire for revenge. Once aroused, the Shias are not lacking for historical grievances to motivate them.

Now the Sunni Arabs have a choice between being driven from central Iraq or being slaughtered in central Iraq. They seem to be deciding on fleeing central Iraq.

But with no sign they will stop killing Shias, the next choice when most Sunnis are driven into Anbar province will be to decide between fleeing Iraq and being slaughtered in Iraq. When you consider that provoking Shia anger is what the Sunnis figured was a winning strategy for them, you really have to wonder if they have any functioning brain synapses to rub together.

The suspense is killing me. Oh what will Iraq's Sunni Arabs choose?