Good Enough for Government Work

The recommendations of the Baker commission are acceptable for the morst part though the assessment by the Baker commission of Iraq as grave and deteriorating is wrong. The Sunnis are doomed and only the Shias of the Sadrist variety backed by Iran can defeat us. We have not won but we are not with our backs to the sea hoping for evacuation.

But in our political environment, failing to say we are losing up front means the anti-war side will raise such a stink that few in the middle could support the report. Much of the report is banal and some is simply idiotic. But by divine writ it will be the basis of our policy for the next two years along with two internal reports by the Pentagon and National Security Council.

So what of the details of the Baker commission (Iraq Study Group) report?

1. New Diplomatic Initiative. Despite the capitalization, this is just another version of the old pre-war "we have to solve the Palestinian issue first" diplomatic initiative some favored. REJECT.

2. The Iraq International Support Group. The idea that our enemies will help us is ludicrous. We don't need neighbor help as much as we need them to let the Iraqis sort this out behind our military shield. We especially don't need Iran's and Syria's help to stabilize Iraq--we just need them to stop fueling the killing by supporting jihadis and Shia extremists! And maybe get the Arab world to stop shipping their jihadi wannabees to Iraq in order to die. REJECT.

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria. As with number 2, we don't need their help. Talking to them is complete rot and repulsive. Now if "deal" with them means a combination of economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to overthrow their regimes or make them fear us, then I support "dealing" with Iran and Syria. ACCEPT, BUT WITH CHANGES.

4. The Wider Regional Context. This looks like number one but is broader in scope. That is, instead of just betraying the Israelis over the Palestinian territories, we need to betray them over Golan and betray the Lebanese, too. However, if we accept that Iraq is part of a wider regional conflict that we must win as well, we can certainly address the wider regional context. As for adding American troops to Afghanistan, won't this just discourage NATO from taking on responsibilities? Too many NATO forces won't fight. Why add our troops when NATO troops already there could take on the burden? Isn't this the basic complaint about Iraq? Maybe we should embed American troops in German infantry units? And remember that deploying a soldier to Afghanistan costs four times as much as deploying one to Iraq. Even stripping Iraq of all our troops would let us send only 35,000 to Afghanistan and result in no reductions in our war costs. Still, if we adjust this point to fighting the wider war--including the "good war" in Afghanistan, we can work with this. ACCEPT, BUT WITH CHANGES.

5. Performance Milestones. Good grief, fine. We should say we don't want their oil or permanent military bases. What drivel to put in a big-brained report. And to be safe let's tell them we won't steal their air and their date palm production is safe, too. As for the milestones of governance? Fine. This is consistent with the basic goal of turning over the fight to the Iraqis over time. No deadlines, since this part admits deadlines may not be realistic. So as long as we don't have a drop-dead date, fine. ACCEPT.

6. National Reconciliation by Iraqis. The Iraqi government has been trying very hard to get the Sunnis to accept a de-Baathified role in Iraq as a free minority under rule of law. They have been trying very hard to get the Shias to not respond too harshly to continued Sunni mass murders. They've failed thus far in this area. We should continue to support Iraqi efforts here but reconciliation must never mean reversing part of the Baathist defeat. The Sunnis must accept they have lost and accept their chances as a minority in a democratic government. Baathists of higher rank must not be allowed into the government except in rare cases. Amnesty is fine. But the Baathists lost--that must be the basis for reconciliation. ACCEPT, BUT WITH CHANGES.

7. National Reconciliation Help We Can Provide. Yes, we can help the Iraqis pursue reconciliation. But the status of our military's presence or role can never be on the table. We must hunt the enemy while we talk to them and let the enemy decide whether they want to be killed or be included. ACCEPT, BUT WITH CHANGES.

8. Militias and National Reconciliation. Since the commission recognizes that military force is part of the solution, I have no problem with having international advisors and a central office to promote demilitarization of militias. ACCEPT.

9. A Military Strategy for Iraq. Seeding many more advisors throughout the Iraqi military is an excellent idea. Supporting the Iraqi military with capabilities they do not have is what we are doing and appropriate for the future. Getting better equipment such as armored vehicles to the Iraqis is necessary but I wouldn't leave behind our heavy armor--we need it, and it is too complicated for a new Iraqi military. Let them procure weaponry--perhaps with our and allied assistance--from other more appropriate sources. Pulling our troops back from routine offensive and presence missions is appropriate and as long as we take this section's caveat about conditions affecting the pace, I have no problem with this section. But pulling our troops back or out can't precede time for training Iraqis. As for making sure the Iraqis know they don't have an open-ended commitment from us, all I have to say is haven't they watched CNN for the last three years? This is a dopey suggestion. I think the fact that our commitment to fighting in Iraq isn't open-ended is apparent from the very fact we have a Baker commission. Consider this message sent. And as our forces pull back into Iraqi bases as an interim step to leaving some years in the future, while in Iraq they will be able to reconfigure for major combat operation which will have the effect of worrying Iran and Syria and strengthening our efforts to get them to stop supporting terrorism in Iraq. I think the administration could drive a truck to victory through this section's loopholes, so accept them with pro-war assumptions. ACCEPT.

10. Restoring the U.S. Military. This is a money issue. Let's see if the new Congress responds. ACCEPT.

11. Police and Criminal Justice: Iraqi Actions. All good ideas, I think. Some of it is reconfiguring reporting lines in true bureaucratic fashion. I hope the Iraqis do them. ACCEPT.

12. Police and Criminal Justice: US Actions. These are all reasonable goals and in line with the general approach we already have. I've long called for FBI help for the Iraqis. Rule of law is as important as voting for Iraq to succeed. ACCEPT.

13. The Oil Sector: Short Term. All reasonable ideas. ACCEPT.

14. The Oil Sector: Long Term. As another highly technical area, this seems to be more in line with the expertise of the commission's members. Reasonable ideas. ACCEPT.

15. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance. Getting the international community to help is fine and getting Iraqis to move forward is fine, but I disagree with making sure we donate $5 billion per year in economic assistance. With a lot of the Saddam-era debt forgiven, we should encourage more to be forgiven. And then Iraq can borrow money for reconstruction. This will make them more conscious of using the money wisely. How carefully is "found money" spent? Loans will also make the international community more interested in Iraq's success so they get their loans repaid. Any US money should be to combat unit commanders for quick and small projects in their areas of operation. REJECT, UNLESS CHANGED.

16. Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs. These seem fine assuming they don't undercut the changes required for number 15 to be acceptable. ACCEPT.

17. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review. Fine. With a change in party control this will happen anyway so even if I disagreed it would be pointless. It will happen. ACCEPT.

18. U.S. Personnel. Now this is good stuff. Our military shoulders the burden of stability operations and our civilian agencies should do more of the non-fighting stuff. ACCEPT.

19. Intelligence: US Actions. Like mom and apple pie, tough to be against these recommendations. Intellignece must be better. Banality does not make their recommendation any less good. ACCEPT.

20. Intelligence: Iraqi Actions. Um, yes, the Iraqis should be better at this too and we should help out. ACCEPT.

So that's my evaluation of the 79 recommendations in 20 groupings. I reject two outright and reject one unless changed. I accept thirteen and accept four but only if certain changes or assumptions are made. I'm feeling downright bipartisany with such a ratio of acceptance!

Really, that's pretty good for a report I expected to be nothing more than crud. With a little tweaking and sufficient courage to reject the idiotic parts (using the other two forthcoming reports to justify rejection), if this Baker report can provide some rough consensus it will be good enough for government work.

So let's move forward as the report claims it wants, shall we?

UPDATE: Back Talk thinks we can live with this report, too.