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Tuesday, August 01, 2006

Yeah. Like Strategypage Says

I was thinking of pulling together a lot of posts that summarize my thinking on the Israeli campaign inside Lebanon against Hizbollah, but Strategypage posted a piece that really did it all for me. First, the basics of my worry about Israel's actions:


Rather than conduct carefully focused air and commando strikes directly against Hezbollah's leaders, forces, and infrastructure, the Israelis went in loaded for bear. It's not clear just what the Israeli objective was. If the intent was to break Hezbollah, then why were most of the targets struck not directly connected with Hezbollah, and most not even in the Hezbollah-dominated south? Some policy analysts seem to think Israel may have been hoping to force the Lebanese government to initiate its own action against Hezbollah. Perhaps, but might that have been more likely if the Israelis inflicted grievous injury to Hezbollah while leaving the rest of Lebanon relatively unscathed?

And then the caveat:


While Israeli actions are understandable, given frustration over years of violent attacks by genocidal enemies, and although in the circumstance civilian losses are legitimately Hezbollah's responsibility, a more carefully crafted response would likely have paid off better. A Machiavellian strategy is needed, not a kinetic one. Then again, Israel does understand the neighborhood, and may have gauged Lebanese public opinion, in the long term, better than outsiders give credit for.

Exactly. I want Israel to defeat Hizbollah. I think Israel is screwing up. But I may not be giving Israel enough credit.

As Israel seems to be ramping up ground operations, I can only ask if this is a two- or three-day effort prior to a ceasefire or an open-ended effort that holds southern Lebanon until an acceptable international/Lebanese force comes to disarm Hizbollah. And Israel could be under the view that they can do the latter when they really only have days to fight.

But really, if Israel had started a major ground operation two weeks ago without the "strategic" air campaign, the good guys would be in a much better position. Even with Israel operating across Lebanon and even deep inside Lebanon at Baalbek, television reports say that this is still only about 3,000 troops despite the breadth of the operations. When one recalls that three Israeli divisions reached Beirut in six days in 1982 while smashing a Syrian brigade, ripping up the PLO, and shooting down the cream of the Syrian air force in the process, the unfocused flailing of the Israelis today is astounding. When one considers that in 1973 the Israelis were taken by surprise and hurt badly by the Egyptian and Syrian surprise offensives yet still managed in 18 days to put Damascus in artillery range and cut off an entire Egyptian corps, placing Cairo in their sights, the dithering today is depressing. And let's not even discuss what Israel did in six days in 1967.

Even better, if Israel had operated as Strategpage notes (and as I hoped they might have), it could be even more successful.

Or maybe my arm chair is just really too comfy. Perhaps the recent surge in ground activity is the first sign of real Israeli success. I doubt it. It all depends on how long Israel has and how much Israel commits to the fight. Even if Israel pulls a win out of the current losing effort, Israel will need to do some serious analysis about why they flailed about so much for so long against Hizbollah.

UPDATE: This says 8,000 troops in Lebanon:

Israel pressed the first full day of a massive new ground attack, sending 8,000 troops into southern Lebanon on Wednesday and seizing five people it said were Hezbollah fighters in a dramatic airborne raid on a northeastern town. Hezbollah retaliated with its deepest strikes yet into Israel, firing a record number of more than 160 rockets.

Assuming support troops are still inside Israel for what is so far a shallow penetration, we could be talking the line elements of four brigades or so. Earlier reports said a number of brigades were operating in Lebanon but the "helpful" report said each brigade has 500 to 700 troops. That's a battalion, actually. Three or four battalions to a brigade. So I assumed 3,000 based on the number of reported "brigades."

This is troops strength that could do real harm to Hizbollah. If Israel has the time to hammer them, of course. If only Israel had done this several weeks ago.

Plus a successful raid on Baalbek. Kudos on that one.

Further, for all the talk of "interdicting" Hizbollah supplies, rockets keep falling at a fast clip. Just what did Israel get for the bad press of a strategic bombing campaign? Because they've lost that most precious commodity of all because of the campaign--time.

So kill as many Hizbollah as they can and pull back. Occupation won't work. Israel had to pull out six years ago, so nobody will believe Israel can't be forced out again.

ANOTHER UPDATE: This post argues Israel is hammering Hizbollah severely. I have no doubt this is true. I assume it and have assumed that fact from the beginning. But what I don't know is whether it is enough to give Israel a victory in the larger sense given the outrage over civilian casualties and given the amount of time Hizbollah is still fighting.

But as for the air attacks cutting off Hizbollah from Syria, I just don't see that at all. Rockets keep falling and if Hizbollah could stockpile 13,000 rockets, they have plenty of bullets and RPGs, too.

Israel needed to either fight for a long time at low levels with special forces, paratroopers, and occasional fire missions from the air or artillery that operated under the radar, so to speak; or at high levels for a short period of time. Either way could have killed lots of Hizbollah without drawing out the Arab street on Hizbollah's side. Instead, Israel is going in at high levels for a long period of time.