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Thursday, February 02, 2006

Divisions in the Rank

Strategypage notes that the Iranian regime is divided. Some would like to loudly proclaim their intention to incinerate us. Other moderates would prefer to proceed toward that goal quietly lest the dhimmi get alarmed and wise up:

There appears to be a serious rift in the cabinet of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Some of his supporters are urging a hard-line against the US and adventurism abroad, while others believes that war with the US is not inevitable and that Iran can benefit from maintaining a low profile.

And the Iranian public is caught in the middle:

[M]any Iranians are getting nervous, because Ahmadinejad is talking war and not getting anything done for the poor and oppressed (by the corrupt clergy who control the government and much of the mismanaged economy). Iranian Internet chatter is full of such misgivings. But Ahmadinejad's playing of the nationalism card makes open demonstrations of opposition dangerous.

This is really the important part. Our pressure now is making the opposition worry about what kind of trouble their regime might get them into. But conventional wisdom has it that if we attack Iran, the opposition will rally to the regime. Perhaps. I have my doubts about the ability of the government to rally Iranians who normally hate the regime.

But just in case, perhaps we really should calibrate our actions to navigate the gray area of nervousness and nationalism. I am coming around to more firmly concluding that some type of siege against the regime to overthrow the mullahs is superior to a full aerial/special forces campaign against Iran's nuclear, military, and leadership targets (although either choice is superior to doing nothing, I think).

There is just too much I don't know to really come down on a solid course of action. An internal revolution would be ideal, but I don't think we're that lucky. An attack the length and breadth of Iran to defang them is risky. An invasion is out of the question. A full siege while occupying Khuzestan may risk provoking nationalism. And a blockade that lays siege to Iran without securing Khuzestan risks long-term oil shortages even if we overthrow the mullahs successfully as a result.

In this light, a siege that does not include an invasion of Khuzestan but instead blockades Iran with ground forces occupying Kharg and islands in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf makes more sense. Still, this leaves the oil fields open to destruction by the mullahs and risks a long drawn out confrontation that could escalate at the choice of our enemies.