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Saturday, June 25, 2005

Fighting to Win

Our enemies are fighting to win. So while I think we are winning in Iraq, we have to consider how our enemies think they can achieve victory rather than just accepting our inevitable victory.

I wrote recently that I think Syria is too weak to defeat us in Iraq and that this might be part of a Syrian-Iranian alliance to divert us from the looming Iranian offensive in the east. Iran may stage a mock Shia revolt in Iraq to buy time for Iran to go nuclear and secure their regime. Breaking Iraq would also save Syria's Baathists from following the path of their Iraqi brethren.

This comment by Secretary Rumsfeld highlights Syrian weakness despite the havoc they are wreaking right now by supporting the jihadis in Iraq:

Let me say one other thing about Syria. Syria lives next door to Iraq. The Iraqis don’t like what’s going on and they’re going to be in that neighborhood for a long time. And they’re bigger and they’re wealthier and they’re going to be unhappy because Iraqis are being killed because terrorist and jihadists are coming across those borders and being allowed to do that. And it is notably unhelpful what Syria is doing, let there be no doubt.

Exactly. Even if we don't do something about Syria directly, in time Iraqis will be capable of dealing with Syria on their own. And the memory of the death and destruction that Syria is creating in Iraq will be a powerful motivating factor for Iraq to use force.

And what can Syria do? They will be unable to deploy much of their decaying military away from the Turkish and Israeli fronts to cope with an angry Iraqi military response. Iraq, by contrast, will have American backing to keep their rear safe from Iranian military adventures in support of their Syrian ally.

So Syrian support for the jihadis in Iraq makes little sense in isolation. The jihadis can't win and the price Syria could pay for a doomed strategy could be high.

That's why I think Iran will play a role in the Iraq fight before too long.

Part of the problem I face in blogging is posting about what is going on based on press reports versus posting about predictions of what I think will happen or what I would do if I was pushing the pieces around the board. I've seen no articles discussing Iranian preparation for the strategy I describe. Just bits here and there that could support my assumption. Or I could be connecting dots that arent even aware of each other. My posts on this are almost purely hunch based on what I would do and based on my assessment that what appears to be going on does not make sense at face value.

And while I think a Tehran-engineered pretend revolt could be instigated in Iraq as I outlined, I wouldn't rule out a conventional military offensive by Iran.

If I was ordered to go conventional, I'd send Iranian forces into southern Iraq to capture Basra. Held by a handful of British battalions and odds and sods of allied troops, these forces would be incapable of calling in US air power like US Army or Marines would. Our allies might fold quickly under these circumstances. Then announce a puppet regime under al-Sadr to make it look like a Shia revolt. Then I'd set up blocking positions to the west of Basra to block US forces from coming down from the north easily. And I'd turn south as soon as possible to hit the American and Coalition support troops in Kuwait.

If done right, hundreds if not thousands of Americans could be killed, delivering a shock to our public that we might not endure. Add in a major effort to block the Strait of Hormuz to stop reinforcements from coming to the rescue and we would have a major defeat on our hands.

Of course, the regulars of Iran may not be reliable. Maybe the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) aren't either. This strategy could blow up in Tehran's face. Or they could obey orders to march.

Remember, we are at war against an enemy that is fighting for victory. They believe they can win, that's why they still fight. Victory is not our birthright and we can't act on the assumption that our enemies will fight according to our plans and timetables for victory.

Sometimes I think I worry too much. Sometimes I think we don't worry enough.