Second War

Countdown to Invasion: 5 days late.

For most of the 1990s and until 9/11, critics of the US military condemned our force structure as too large for the post-Cold War world. They thought it silly that anybody could possibly worry about the unlikely chance that we would face war with Iraq and North Korea simultaneously.

Indeed.

As we forcefully prepare to end the threat of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and free the Iraqi people, we must adopt a "European" management strategy for North Korea's latest threats. While this article notes that Rumsfeld says we could fight two wars, Cordesman says we would have problems. Which is true? The article misleads. Neither said anything contradictory. They merely emphasized two points of what is obviously true: fighting more than one major theater war (essentially a Desert Storm equivalent conflict) would entail risks because we do not have enough of our critical "low density" assets needed to maximize American technological prowess. That is why our "two-war" strategy is not a two-war strategy. To be fair, the military never claimed it had that capability-reporting on it has, however, called it a two war strategy. The military has always said it has the capability of fighting two wars "nearly simultaneously." The last QDR restated the capability as having the ability to decisively win in one war (marching on the enemy capital and imposing victory) while holding the enemy short of their objectives in the second war. Winning the second war must wait for the assets from the first war critical to victory to be moved to the second war.

But critics who decry our acquiescence to North Korea's nukes mistake a short term accommodation with our ultimate objective. I dare say that North Korea's short term "gains" in openly defying America will backfire. (And I'm not even clear how they have gained as some claim) Once our military is freed of the Iraq scenario, our tough diplomacy will have more force behind it. Our temporary "European" phase will end. I'm amazed critics are willing to call this tougher policy a failure after the several months since we called Pyongyang on their violations of the 1994 Agreed Framework, yet are all too happy to keep talking with North Korea despite the long history of failure on this track. Go figure.

We must destroy the Iraqi regime in January 2003 and clear the decks for addressing our other problems-including North Korea.

In the long run, we must expand our military. Our active/reserve structure is still based on the notion that there is a strong distinction between an extensive peace and short periods of war requiring large but infrequent mobilization. If we are to be engaged in a long-term low level war with occasional major theater wars, we must have more of our war assets in the active component.

Now that will be an interesting debate.

We have many problems. But for now, on to Baghdad.

Oh, and happy new year!