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Saturday, December 28, 2002

North Korea

North Korea is pushing us as we prepare to invade Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld said we are capable of fighting two wars. He is right, the question is not whether we can but how much risk do we want to run and do we use nukes. Clearly, if nukes are on the table we could fight a whole lot of North Korea-size states. Without nukes, we would be stuck within the confines of our "two" war strategy. On paper, we can fight two major theater wars, "nearly simultaneously." (Every commentator forgets that important provision) That is, we can march on the enemy capital in one war (Iraq) while successfully defending in a second (Korea). Winning decisively in the second must await victory in the first so that air, naval, and ground forces can be shifted to the second war to carry out the counter-offensive. (And don't say the war on terror is a "third" war-even with the troops in Afghanistan, that is less than a division-the rest is intelligence and police work)

North Korea should know that they cannot defeat the South Korean military even if we are occupied with Iraq now. The problem is, Seoul is right on the border and has a quarter of the South's population not to mention the lion's share of GDP. The North may not be able to win but they could seriously wound the South in an attempted murder-suicide pact.
This is what our strategy will be:

Administration officials said the threat of growing isolation was the best way to force North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions and, if it refused, to bring down the government. Officials say that under their plan, which they call "tailored containment," they are willing to negotiate with North Korea but only if it first dismantles its nuclear weapons program.

To offer new incentives, officials say, would be to reward the North Korean government for failing to live up to earlier commitments.

"It is called `tailored containment' because this is an entirely different situation than Iraq or Iran," a senior administration official said. "It is a lot about putting political stress and putting economic stress. It also requires maximum multinational cooperation."


This seems reasonable. Critics say it is risky and that our allies won't go along.

So what. Talking and shipping oil didn't get us cooperation, just a slower push toward nuclear capability and missile tests over Japan. Any action regarding North Korea will have risks.

Should we invade like we are going to do to Iraq? Some critics claim we are hypocrites for not threatening invasion. But the costs of war are surely part of the equation. First consider that given the forward deployment of the North Korean army, we are not going to invade. If we start shipping in troops to invade (and convince South Korea to invade with us), North Korea will see it and attack first. If that happens, no matter what scenario you use, whether it ends up with nukes used, our forces marching on Pyonyang, or stalemate, one constant will be there-Seoul will be destroyed.

That's a pretty high price to pay. There are certainly circumstances where that might be the preferable course but we are not there.

So do we launch air strikes to knock out North Korean nuclear and missile facilities? We could probably do it. At best we buy time until the North Koreans can dig deeper and start again. At worst, the North invades the South in response. Seoul will be destroyed.

Do we talk and come to an agreement? I'll trade you Carter's Nobel peace prize for another one of those. We can't trust them to count on an agreement. Talk? Sure. Actually agree to something? Nope. We are just asking for nukes and a North Korean economy strong enough to keep stumbling forward.

Then there is that old standby that so many want us to take with Iraq-containment. At least here, we have successfully contained action greater than terrorism for fifty years. We do have a track record of keeping them at bay. It has not, however, resulted in the defeat of the North, only slowing its nuclear arsenal development. We need something more.

Isolate them. Choke them off. Will our allies cooperate? Not likely. But probably enough. And having them be the good cop to our bad cop may keep the North from going to war in desperation. A completely united front by Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, and America might just freak them out completely. But squeeze them until they collapse.

One advantage to us is that any war will smash up our allies rather than us. Sorry to be so cynical but there it is. Yes, our military will take losses as long as we are on the peninsula, but the South is probably capable of holding off the North without our ground forces there. If the South Koreans continue to complain too much about our troops, we could withdraw them to the south to be a counter-attack force rather than taking the first shot on the chin. This actually makes more sense militarily than the politically motivated deployment north of Seoul more suited to the days when the North had conventional superiority and our troops represented a trip wire to massive nuclear retaliation.

And if North Korea uses its nukes? Well, the South and Japan have more to worry about. We will soon have a rudimentary missile defense system to defend Alaska; and in time our sea-based interceptors will be able to reliably knock off the North Korean rockets as they launch, if we park our ships off their coasts. Already we can defeat their conventional invasion and in time we will be able to nullify their nuclear threat. You can bet the Japanese and South Koreans will cooperate with our missile defense efforts.

We can contain their military threat-even nukes-and in time, by mostly isolating them, the North will collapse.

It is not a pleasant situation to contemplate, however.

Countdown to Invasion: 1 day late. Beats me why we are waiting. Do we really think we need four heavy division to invade? Are we really waiting for the Blix report? I still can't make myself believe that is so. My December 27 date was fairly arbitrary. But I'm still holding to an invasion before the year is out before my logic for this time frame fails me. Ok, I'll even stretch it to January 2 before I start to consider whether we really might be waiting until February.

Go. Go. Go. Time is not our friend.