Red Team Analysis

Graham T. Allison has given a red team analysis of Saddam deterring an attack. For Saddam, deterring an attack is the best course. Why? Because once the American military machine is set and ready to attack, Iraq's military will be steamrolled. So what if we are not deterred? If I was in charge of the Iraqi program to fight an American invasion, I'd defend against an invasion with several efforts. Most are what the experts call "asymmetric" approaches. That is, don't fight us where we are strongest.

The first element would be disrupting American deployment. Covert forces and special forces would be detailed to attack American pre-positioned material in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Diego Garcia. I don't know what kind of civilian shipping travels to Diego Garcia, but I'd lease a few. Use of persistent chemical weapons with short-range missiles are an option for Kuwait. Aircraft might sneak in for a quick surprise strike on the Gulf sites. Chemical weapons and covert attacks should also be used against port and airfield facilities in the Gulf. Mines around the Gulf and a ship sunk in the Suez Canal would also round out the effort to deny the ability of America to deploy ground forces rapidly into the Gulf and inflict casualties in the early stages of war.

The second element would be digging in loyal infantry in Baghdad and other major cities, well stocked with ammunition, food, and water. And mines, lots of them. These troops would be the Special Republican Guards, Republican Guards, and other loyal security personnel. The civilians can starve--as long as CNN and al Jazeera can film it. This hard core of resistance will be meant to deter final assaults by guaranteeing a lengthy fight, heavy American casualties, and heavy civilian casualties.

The third element would be a screen of infantry divisions on the border dug in with, of course, lots of mines. With uncertain loyalties, they would better serve as a trip wire that would die early in the war. If they surrender, so what? They will hinder the invasion more as POWs to be transported, fed, and housed then they will as Iraqi soldiers. Commando brigades will deploy behind them to kill deserters.

The fourth element would be forces outside the cities. Mainly, I'm referring to the Republican Guard and regular heavy divisions. Based in villages and next to mosques and hospitals, these forces would hunker down to absorb the aerial assault. Air defenses would emulate the Serbs and husband their forces, looking for opportunities to shoot down American planes. Their very existence will hinder the air effort to pummel the main force units. These force could deter mass defections by the regular infantry divisions and serve to counter-attack small American attacks or to hunt American special forces teams trying to target Iraqi units. They would also slow down the attackers as they approach the cities. I did mention mines, right? Lots of them. Defending barriers and never in the open, they are to delay and cause casualties against a major invasion. Use of chemicals is pretty likely. They are scary and say, "I'm friggin' serious about killing Americans." These forces could also make a lunge to capture Kuwait. Anthony Cordesman cites a horrible possibility that the Iraqis might then begin slaughtering Kuwaitis until America backs off. You'd also want to slowly begin destroying oil fields in Kuwait and maybe Iraq. Fear of oil shortages will make oil prices skyrocket.

The fifth element is missile attacks against Israel. While a long shot, mobilizing the Arab "street" by drawing Israel in might, with everything else, tip the balance in Iraq's favor. Related to this is another element to mobilize the street. Bodies. Lots of bodies. The Iraqis should freeze every natural death or industrial accident victim. They did this in the war with Iran in the 80s after particularly bloody battles in order to space out the casualties being sent home for burial at a more "decent" rate. Plus, just make it up. The claims don't have to stand up to the test of time. Who cares if historians in a year or ten years conclude you lied?

Overall, the idea is to delay American deployment, inflict casualties, and publicize Iraqi casualties whether they exist or not. You want to influence American, European and Japanese, and Arab opinion. Only time can save Baghdad. Time to sow anger and fear to a degree that America will stop the war. Once America is stopped, Saddam Hussein and his sons will be safely entrenched. There just won't be a third try absent use of nuclear weapons against us.

It's pretty scary, but war always is. If you look at our ideal scenarios of Hyper-Desert Storm II or Expanded Afghanistan, those work pretty well on paper too. Shoot, even the inside-out strategy looks good if you assume Iraq sits and takes it. A lot of elements in the Iraqi counter-measures have to work to buy the time needed to make America flinch. The probability that America's war plans will work as anticipated are most assuredly higher. And remember, in the summer of 1990, some respected analysts at the Army War College concluded that America could not deploy and sustain a ground force large enough to defeat Iraq (this was before the invasion of Kuwait). We will beat him.

Still, we have to plan against what Saddam might do. We can't count on him to just sit and take it like he did in the First Desert Storm. He might think it will work this time around. I just wouldn't count on it. That being the case, what do we do to thwart Saddam's asymmetric options?

Counter-measures against the first element, delaying American deployment, are possible. First of all, security needs to be tight as heck, with Patriots guarding the skies and soldiers guarding the perimeters. I'd be shipping in troops a company at a time to marry up with the equipment and deploy into the field. This will be slow enough to avoid undue attention and with a little luck, timed with a troop rotation that doesn't actually rotate any troops--just adds them--we'll have three brigades of heavy Army armor in Kuwait plus a Marine Expeditionary Brigade before anyone really notices. Troops from the 101st Airborne could quietly move in as well under cover of troop rotations from Afghanistan. Then a surge of airlift to get killing power to the Gulf fast; and a massive sealift for the offensive power provided by more heavy armor. Air Force expeditionary wings will fly in under a rotation cover and aircraft carriers, at least three initially, will converge on the region. Carriers will be needed in case some air bases are attacked. Air Force planes will be needed for the volume, but secure floating airfields are a must just in case. They carried the initial burden in Afghanistan before the Air Force could deploy and will again. Indeed, the proliferation of precision weapons will make carriers more valuable than in the past since limited ammunition stowage won't limit their operations as much. Intense surveillance to prevent the Iraqis from dropping mines in the Gulf will be necessary too. Chemical clean-up gear and engineer units/contractors to repair port and airfield facilities will minimize the effect of Iraqi attacks. Combined, these efforts should blunt efforts to foil American deployment to the Gulf.

The second element, defending in the cities with loyal infantry. First, just because Saddam thinks his Republican Guards are loyal doesn't mean they will be. The Special Republican Guards will probably stay loyal, but maybe some will defect. Psychological operations to undermine their will be necessary. Targeting the headquarters of the Republican Guards to leave the lower echelons leaderless may make them more open to defection. We will need civilian contractors with lots of humanitarian MREs, water purification equipment, and tents following in our Army's wake. Civilians in the cities will need to know they have someplace to go. We need to get them out of the way. If our allies are wary of fighting, they will do critical work by keeping Iraqi civilians alive through taking the lead in this humanitarian effort. Our media offensive must show our efforts to minimize civilian suffering and place the blame squarely on Saddam for the suffering he compels his people to endure. Also, there is probably no need to go into every city. Baghdad will likely be Saddam's last stand so every other city can probably be sealed off. Maybe we could be really daring and drop small arms and food into the cities and see if the population will revolt. Be worth looking into anyway.

The third element, the front line infantry divisions, are the easiest to cope with. We can pound them and destroy their offensive capacity. When necessary, we will plow through them just as easily as we did in 1991. Our special forces and Iraqi exiles must be ready to organize light infantry battalions of defectors to throw them into the city fighting, which will also undercut the second element by having Iraqis fighting Iraqis. We can turn these guys to our advantage. Just as special forces gave Northern Alliance forces an air force, our special forces will provide firepower to the light infantry battalions of Iraqi defectors. They can be the cannon fodder to shield our own infantry. Watch out for infiltrators though! The Iraqis could put loyal enforcers into the rabble infantry units with orders to get captured with them. That's how the North Koreans caused problems in POW camps during the Korean War. Separate out anybody that the lower ranks seem to be afraid of.

The fourth element to take on is the main force heavy elements of the Republican Guards and regular army. Dispersed to ride out an air offensive that will be far better than what they endured in 1991, the conventional forces of Iraq will fall prey to American heavy brigades buttressed by air mobile infantry and Marines who will be used to breach water barriers and other bad terrain. When the heavy stuff tries to move, air power, tube artillery, and rocket artillery will decimate them. Our heavy armor will cut apart what is left. Moving fast and engaging the Iraqis will also make it difficult for the Iraqis to target our forces with chemical agents. If we are hit with them, we are better trained to cope with chemicals and continue fighting than they are. We might have to consider using our own small nukes if chemical use is large enough and if we don't win in 100 hours. If we are basically besieging the remnants of the Iraqi army in the cities four days after we cross the border, the pressure to respond with nukes will dissipate. If the war is looking tough? I sure hope we have some neutron weapons in our stockpile. Little radioactive fallout, great against massed armor. And it is scary, too, since it is a nuclear weapon. The biggest challenge would be holding if the Iraqis strike first and drive on Kuwait City again. We could be driven back if we don't get enough stuff on the ground first; but if we do get four brigades on the ground backed by air power plus the small Kuwaiti army, we could most likely hold them short of the objective. Lots of disinformation to stall an Iraqi attack as we deploy will be necessary (does this explain "inside-out" and "we can just contain them" leaks?) A Turkish corps attacking down toward Mosul would help us too by threatening their rear. If we have to pull a Dunkirk, that would be "bad." Assuming we hold, once we counter-attack, the Iraqis will be more vulnerable to air attack. If we can hold them in place as they batter against our defenses trying to break us, our air power can slam them, and the counter-attack back north would be into a virtual vacuum. An aerial Inchon with the 101st and light armor might bag a whole lot of the most loyal survivors. As to the slaughter of civilians, I guess we better not lose the first battle. Same with the issue of Kuwait oil fields. Iraqi oil fields would need to be captured to save them. The solution for these problems is basically to move fast and win fast. We can't afford to waste time. We need to endure casualties to purchase speed.

The last element will require us to lean on Israel to stand down. They may not after they did so in 1991. They think they let a bad precedent stand by doing nothing. They may even be right. Still, I'd rather they stayed quiet. The best remedy for this last problem of coping with the "street" is speed. Do it fast and win decisively and the Israelis won't need to retaliate. Win fast and the protesters will have lost their reason for protesting. Cheering Iraqis freed from Saddam's grip will make this problem vanish.

Overall, the antidote to Iraqi defenses is speed. We may not be able to afford a leisurely 37-day bombardment before we send the troops into Iraq. It all depends on whether the Iraqis actually do just sit and take it or manage some surprises as I've suggested. If they really do fight dumb, we can afford a little more time to soften them up. Still, it would be better to get it over fast. A lot of things can happen if enough time passes. A lot of those things can be bad for us. Push north, bypassing resistance and pummeling those bypassed with artillery and air power. Drive on Baghdad and try to bounce it before the Iraqis get set to defend it. I know the 2001 QDR says we no longer need to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, but do the North Koreans agree? Let's not give them the time to mull that one over.

To paraphrase Napoleon, if we're going to take Baghdad, take Baghdad.