The issue of the size and composition of a ground component of an invasion and the overall size of our Army and Marine Corps will be based on the just unofficially concluded Iraq War as a point of evidence. Both sides will use it. This is my take on it.
First of all, the size of the invasion force and whether it constituted overwhelming force is contested. The size of the invasion force was debated long before the war. Some favored a tiny force basically mimicking the Afghanistan campaign of special operations forces helping locals with a small amount of conventional forces to spearhead the advance. The inside-out strategy of heading for Baghdad first in an airborne attack was an extreme form of this strategy. Others wanted a near-replay of Desert Storm. We ended up with a British division, a large American heavy division, a large American air assault division, a huge Marine "division," and a couple parachute brigades. Plus Military Police and separate line battalions, presumably for security purposes. I wonder if in the battle between Franks and Rumsfeld (ok, I am assuming they tugged in the opposite direction for how many troops could go), at some point Rumsfeld put a cap on the invasion force, saying no more than three American divisions could be sent to Kuwait. (I'm also discounting 4th ID's cancelled Turkish front. I never considered it vital for the invasion and possibly counter-productive) If so, did the uniformed Pentagon then deploy enough Marines for more than two divisions into one MEF; put four heavy brigades under one Army division, and beef up the air assault division to get around that limit? (I'm assuming it was beefed up since it is often said it has 20,000 troops in it) And then the separate brigades and battalions don't count. Nor did the MPs. If so, we must make sure that we don't think we can replicate this war with three American divisions and one allied division as the heart of the invasion force. This certainly was a cakewalk by any stretch of the term but it was achieved with an iron fist and not a small force. We really had 2+ Marines divisions, 3+ Army divisions, and 1 British division. Again, I would rather have added a second Army heavy division in place of a Marine division-equivalent to guard against a setback in the main armored drive to Baghdad, but since we did not face such a setback I can't complain too much—I just hope the next time, should another war come, we send more heavy armor to provide us with a margin of error.
So, it is established to my satisfaction that we had overwhelming ground power. The second question we must ask is whether we can do this again in other circumstances. Yes, our superb air power could do this again in another war, but I think we must be very careful in assuming this size force could win as easily in a different country. We had overwhelming ground power in Iraq because we could keep most of our ground combat power up front. Despite all the press the supply line attacks received, they were gnats. They did not represent a true guerrilla war by the Iraqis angry with our invasion. We really did rely on the Iraqis wanting Saddam out so badly that they would not think of us as invaders. Had the Iraqi people felt we were invaders, like any other invading army, we would have had to strip substantial combat forces to garrison our rear areas. (Then, my idea of supplying through Jordan would have reduced the need for this by avoiding supply lines through populated areas) This restricts what our military can do since we invade a unified, hostile state at our peril. Firepower and speed can replace numbers but only if we do not face a hostile population. Police work is labor intensive. Keep that in mind when people suggest who should be next. If we face a united enemy, we may need years of work to undermine their loyalty to the regime to prepare the battlefield. Otherwise, we'll need more troops from our own resources or from allies.
So, like any other war, this war may or may not be a prototype of our future wars. They are all different and so it would be better to get used to that now.
Having established (again, to my satisfaction) that the overwhelming force used in Iraq may or may not be overwhelming in other circumstances, it is clear to me that the Iraq War should not lead to the conclusion that we can cut a couple Army divisions and scrap a Marine Expeditionary Force, placing all our trust in our awesome air power. We need at least as many troops as we have today at a barely acceptable minimum. Shoot, we need 40,000 more just to man the force structure. And we may need more support troops on active duty just in case rather than putting so many in the reserves. But most important, we must figure out what type of troops should be in our military. Transformation is supposed to create the light and lethal Objective Force. The Crusader is gone. That I don't mind, since Paladin is damned good. What does bother me is the impending demise of the Abrams and Bradley in a couple decades with nothing similar to replace them planned. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are the prototype of the lighter Army of the future, with the Future Combat System yet to be developed not much heavier than the Strykers, yet far more lethal and far more survivable. Yeah, right.
The Iraq War showed the value of our heavy armor in no uncertain terms. They mostly shrugged off RPG hits and kept going, smashing anything in their way. Even our lighter forces needed Abrams tanks. The Marines adopted them after Desert Storm. We airlifted some in to 173rd AB brigade this war. We left tanks to back up our paratroopers and air assault troops in city combat as the rest of 3rd ID marched north. Nor did time constraints prevent us from getting lots of heavy armor to the war. One reason for wanting lighter armor is to be able to airlift them into a war to repel an invasion with little notice. How often will this happen? I'm glad we didn't airlift a bunch of light stuff in record time back in September 2002 and then just waited for March 2003 to start the war because we thought heavy armor was not deployable. We had the time, sent our heavy armor, and reaped the benefit of this "Cold War" relic on the battlefield.
This war, far from being an argument for lightening our Army, argues for heavying up our light forces. Sure, we can still experiment with the Stryker brigades, since technology may yet make heavy armor obsolete (but we've heard that before). But for the near term, listen to what we learned in the streets of Iraq. The Abrams/Bradley team is awesome. Attach a tank battalion or a tank heavy task force to each of our light brigades. Perhaps they can be National Guard separate battalions for the most part. Give them to the light infantry, paratrooper, and air assault divisions. Depending on the war, they can be left behind or sent along as appropriate. Then, our spearhead heavy divisions won't need to strip armor to support supply line battles or urban combat. It sure worked for us in World War II when every American "infantry" division had a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion attached—making them the equivalent of German armored infantry divisions.
For the ground component of a joint force, heavy armor rules for now.
[NOTE: This is from the former Defense Issues category from my original blog.]
Tuesday, April 15, 2003
Sunday, April 06, 2003
Marine Expeditionary Force
In the current war, the Marines are acting like a second Army. The Marines need new equipment for their new role.
The Marines should have the role of reacting fast to a threat where we do not already place Army troops and/or equipment. Where possible, they should be able to defeat small local threats, deploying battalions, regiments, and maybe an entire division, before calling on the Army for help. If a division is unable to win, we have reached the level of a war and the Army is needed. This rapid reaction Marine Corps role does not require amphibious capabilities.
In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, I argued that the Marine Corps should focus on an expeditionary role and urban warfare role instead of amphibious warfare. The traditional storming of the beaches, even updated with deep inland assault in V-22s, should be downgraded (although not abandoned). This expeditionary role, I argued, would allow the Army to avoid being lightened up too much as the current plans call for, in order to get troops to a theater quickly. Transformation apparently has no place for the Army M-1A2s that have crushed their opponents while heavily outnumbered on the road to Baghdad. The sight of Alpha Company of 3-7 Cavalry crushing an Iraqi armored battalion a couple days ago in ten minutes with just its organic weapons-and suffering no losses-should be instructive of the value of our heavy armor. We discard it at our peril.
Let the Marines focus on the smaller threats and retain the Army for high intensity warfare.
So how should the Marines equip themselves for this role?
First of all, the armored amphibious vehicles (AAVs) of the Marines are being stressed in the deepest inland advance in Marine Corps history. They are designed to get Marines ashore under armor and then get them off the beaches. They are large, too. Why shouldn't the Marines have Bradleys? Against a tougher opponent, the AAVs might be large casualty generators-more vulnerable, with more infantry capacity, and just plain not designed to advance a few hundred miles. Since 1991, the Marines have already adopted the M-1 based on their non-amphibious role in that war. In the Persian Gulf War, the Marine M-60s were deemed too old, and the Army loaned the Marines a tank brigade to bolster them in their non-amphibious mission of pinning the Iraqis in Kuwait.
Perhaps the lesson of this second major non-amphibious mission-this time deep inland driving all the way to Baghdad-is that the time to replace the AAV has arrived. The AAVs should be kept in case they are needed for an amphibious assault-you never know-but a drive inland like the '03 campaign calls for different and better equipment. The Marines need another infantry carrier
Plus, the role of the Marines has probably been less than ideal. The Army has had to use 82nd AB and 101st AB troops to secure their supply lines. If a Marine Corps focused on urban warfare had been used with the Army instead of next to the Army, V Corps could have marched north with a 2-division strike force of the 3rd ID and 101st AB while Marine regiments secured Najaf and Samawah and Karbala after the Army bypassed them. Marine infantry with armor, helicopters, and organic air support would have been ideal. If the Air Force and Navy air had also been striking the Republican Guards mercilessly as V Corps drove north, west of the Euphrates, maybe the Army pause to regroup would not have been as long. (I freely grant that even if we did have to pause longer than necessary, we are doing great to be at the Battle for Baghdad stage as we start the third week of war.)
This line of supply, urban role still would have left another Marine division equivalent of mechanized forces able to push north in a diversionary thrust. Equipped with M-1s, Bradleys for the riflemen, and LAVs for the recon elements as they have now, this force would have been better prepared to push north.
The British Basra role would remain unchanged.
Perhaps the Marines fear looking too much like a second, redundant, Army, if they adopt too much Army equipment. But the difference would be that in ordinary circumstances, the Marines would have the lead in responding to small crises (with Army airborne forces supporting) and in the early stages of a major war (again, supported by Army light forces and Stryker units). The Army would use the time purchased to move its heavy forces into place to be supported by the Air Force. Once the Army was in place, it would take the lead in winning the war. The Marines would then have the modern equipment to support the Army in a war of maneuver and firepower, able to deliver riflemen deep inland to battle in the cities or in supporting attacks as the Army knifes its way toward the ultimate objective to win the war.
The Marines have Abrams tanks already. Give them the Bradley too. If the Marines feel guilty, they can draw comfort from the fact that the Army took their LAVs (and added lots of nifty, expensive stuff).
As long as the Army and Marines take on complementary roles that create a potent combined force, there is no reason not to use the best equipment available.
[NOTE: This is from the former Defense Issues category from my original blog.]
The Marines should have the role of reacting fast to a threat where we do not already place Army troops and/or equipment. Where possible, they should be able to defeat small local threats, deploying battalions, regiments, and maybe an entire division, before calling on the Army for help. If a division is unable to win, we have reached the level of a war and the Army is needed. This rapid reaction Marine Corps role does not require amphibious capabilities.
In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, I argued that the Marine Corps should focus on an expeditionary role and urban warfare role instead of amphibious warfare. The traditional storming of the beaches, even updated with deep inland assault in V-22s, should be downgraded (although not abandoned). This expeditionary role, I argued, would allow the Army to avoid being lightened up too much as the current plans call for, in order to get troops to a theater quickly. Transformation apparently has no place for the Army M-1A2s that have crushed their opponents while heavily outnumbered on the road to Baghdad. The sight of Alpha Company of 3-7 Cavalry crushing an Iraqi armored battalion a couple days ago in ten minutes with just its organic weapons-and suffering no losses-should be instructive of the value of our heavy armor. We discard it at our peril.
Let the Marines focus on the smaller threats and retain the Army for high intensity warfare.
So how should the Marines equip themselves for this role?
First of all, the armored amphibious vehicles (AAVs) of the Marines are being stressed in the deepest inland advance in Marine Corps history. They are designed to get Marines ashore under armor and then get them off the beaches. They are large, too. Why shouldn't the Marines have Bradleys? Against a tougher opponent, the AAVs might be large casualty generators-more vulnerable, with more infantry capacity, and just plain not designed to advance a few hundred miles. Since 1991, the Marines have already adopted the M-1 based on their non-amphibious role in that war. In the Persian Gulf War, the Marine M-60s were deemed too old, and the Army loaned the Marines a tank brigade to bolster them in their non-amphibious mission of pinning the Iraqis in Kuwait.
Perhaps the lesson of this second major non-amphibious mission-this time deep inland driving all the way to Baghdad-is that the time to replace the AAV has arrived. The AAVs should be kept in case they are needed for an amphibious assault-you never know-but a drive inland like the '03 campaign calls for different and better equipment. The Marines need another infantry carrier
Plus, the role of the Marines has probably been less than ideal. The Army has had to use 82nd AB and 101st AB troops to secure their supply lines. If a Marine Corps focused on urban warfare had been used with the Army instead of next to the Army, V Corps could have marched north with a 2-division strike force of the 3rd ID and 101st AB while Marine regiments secured Najaf and Samawah and Karbala after the Army bypassed them. Marine infantry with armor, helicopters, and organic air support would have been ideal. If the Air Force and Navy air had also been striking the Republican Guards mercilessly as V Corps drove north, west of the Euphrates, maybe the Army pause to regroup would not have been as long. (I freely grant that even if we did have to pause longer than necessary, we are doing great to be at the Battle for Baghdad stage as we start the third week of war.)
This line of supply, urban role still would have left another Marine division equivalent of mechanized forces able to push north in a diversionary thrust. Equipped with M-1s, Bradleys for the riflemen, and LAVs for the recon elements as they have now, this force would have been better prepared to push north.
The British Basra role would remain unchanged.
Perhaps the Marines fear looking too much like a second, redundant, Army, if they adopt too much Army equipment. But the difference would be that in ordinary circumstances, the Marines would have the lead in responding to small crises (with Army airborne forces supporting) and in the early stages of a major war (again, supported by Army light forces and Stryker units). The Army would use the time purchased to move its heavy forces into place to be supported by the Air Force. Once the Army was in place, it would take the lead in winning the war. The Marines would then have the modern equipment to support the Army in a war of maneuver and firepower, able to deliver riflemen deep inland to battle in the cities or in supporting attacks as the Army knifes its way toward the ultimate objective to win the war.
The Marines have Abrams tanks already. Give them the Bradley too. If the Marines feel guilty, they can draw comfort from the fact that the Army took their LAVs (and added lots of nifty, expensive stuff).
As long as the Army and Marines take on complementary roles that create a potent combined force, there is no reason not to use the best equipment available.
[NOTE: This is from the former Defense Issues category from my original blog.]
Tuesday, April 01, 2003
Old Defense Issues Posts Recovered From My Email
I had saved post archives in my email before the old Yahoo!Geocities died. But years ago they seemed to be gibberish. A number were not available on the Internet Archives and I thought they were lost.
I recently checked my email archive of pre-Blogger posts and they were all legible. So I am restoring the gaps in my archives. Obviously all of the post permalinks are dead and artifacts of my ersatz-blog format back then. These were what I had formerly categorized as "defense issues."
"Overwhelming Ground Power" (Posted April 15, 2003)
The issue of the size and composition of a ground component of an invasion and the overall size of our Army and Marine Corps will be based on the just unofficially concluded Iraq War as a point of evidence. Both sides will use it. This is my take on it.
First of all, the size of the invasion force and whether it constituted overwhelming force is contested. The size of the invasion force was debated long before the war. Some favored a tiny force basically mimicking the Afghanistan campaign of special operations forces helping locals with a small amount of conventional forces to spearhead the advance. The inside-out strategy of heading for Baghdad first in an airborne attack was an extreme form of this strategy. Others wanted a near-replay of Desert Storm. We ended up with a British division, a large American heavy division, a large American air assault division, a huge Marine "division," and a couple parachute brigades. Plus Military Police and separate line battalions, presumably for security purposes. I wonder if in the battle between Franks and Rumsfeld (ok, I am assuming they tugged in the opposite direction for how many troops could go), at some point Rumsfeld put a cap on the invasion force, saying no more than three American divisions could be sent to Kuwait. (I'm also discounting 4th ID's cancelled Turkish front. I never considered it vital for the invasion and possibly counter-productive) If so, did the uniformed Pentagon then deploy enough Marines for more than two divisions into one MEF; put four heavy brigades under one Army division, and beef up the air assault division to get around that limit? (I'm assuming it was beefed up since it is often said it has 20,000 troops in it) And then the separate brigades and battalions don't count. Nor did the MPs. If so, we must make sure that we don't think we can replicate this war with three American divisions and one allied division as the heart of the invasion force. This certainly was a cakewalk by any stretch of the term but it was achieved with an iron fist and not a small force. We really had 2+ Marines divisions, 3+ Army divisions, and 1 British division. Again, I would rather have added a second Army heavy division in place of a Marine division-equivalent to guard against a setback in the main armored drive to Baghdad, but since we did not face such a setback I can't complain too much—I just hope the next time, should another war come, we send more heavy armor to provide us with a margin of error.
So, it is established to my satisfaction that we had overwhelming ground power. The second question we must ask is whether we can do this again in other circumstances. Yes, our superb air power could do this again in another war, but I think we must be very careful in assuming this size force could win as easily in a different country. We had overwhelming ground power in Iraq because we could keep most of our ground combat power up front. Despite all the press the supply line attacks received, they were gnats. They did not represent a true guerrilla war by the Iraqis angry with our invasion. We really did rely on the Iraqis wanting Saddam out so badly that they would not think of us as invaders. Had the Iraqi people felt we were invaders, like any other invading army, we would have had to strip substantial combat forces to garrison our rear areas. (Then, my idea of supplying through Jordan would have reduced the need for this by avoiding supply lines through populated areas) This restricts what our military can do since we invade a unified, hostile state at our peril. Firepower and speed can replace numbers but only if we do not face a hostile population. Police work is labor intensive. Keep that in mind when people suggest who should be next. If we face a united enemy, we may need years of work to undermine their loyalty to the regime to prepare the battlefield. Otherwise, we'll need more troops from our own resources or from allies.
So, like any other war, this war may or may not be a prototype of our future wars. They are all different and so it would be better to get used to that now.
Having established (again, to my satisfaction) that the overwhelming force used in Iraq may or may not be overwhelming in other circumstances, it is clear to me that the Iraq War should not lead to the conclusion that we can cut a couple Army divisions and scrap a Marine Expeditionary Force, placing all our trust in our awesome air power. We need at least as many troops as we have today at a barely acceptable minimum. Shoot, we need 40,000 more just to man the force structure. And we may need more support troops on active duty just in case rather than putting so many in the reserves. But most important, we must figure out what type of troops should be in our military. Transformation is supposed to create the light and lethal Objective Force. The Crusader is gone. That I don't mind, since Paladin is damned good. What does bother me is the impending demise of the Abrams and Bradley in a couple decades with nothing similar to replace them planned. The Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are the prototype of the lighter Army of the future, with the Future Combat System yet to be developed not much heavier than the Strykers, yet far more lethal and far more survivable. Yeah, right.
The Iraq War showed the value of our heavy armor in no uncertain terms. They mostly shrugged off RPG hits and kept going, smashing anything in their way. Even our lighter forces needed Abrams tanks. The Marines adopted them after Desert Storm. We airlifted some in to 173rd AB brigade this war. We left tanks to back up our paratroopers and air assault troops in city combat as the rest of 3rd ID marched north. Nor did time constraints prevent us from getting lots of heavy armor to the war. One reason for wanting lighter armor is to be able to airlift them into a war to repel an invasion with little notice. How often will this happen? I'm glad we didn't airlift a bunch of light stuff in record time back in September 2002 and then just waited for March 2003 to start the war because we thought heavy armor was not deployable. We had the time, sent our heavy armor, and reaped the benefit of this "Cold War" relic on the battlefield.
This war, far from being an argument for lightening our Army, argues for heavying up our light forces. Sure, we can still experiment with the Stryker brigades, since technology may yet make heavy armor obsolete (but we've heard that before). But for the near term, listen to what we learned in the streets of Iraq. The Abrams/Bradley team is awesome. Attach a tank battalion or a tank heavy task force to each of our light brigades. Perhaps they can be National Guard separate battalions for the most part. Give them to the light infantry, paratrooper, and air assault divisions. Depending on the war, they can be left behind or sent along as appropriate. Then, our spearhead heavy divisions won't need to strip armor to support supply line battles or urban combat. It sure worked for us in World War II when every American "infantry" division had a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion attached—making them the equivalent of German armored infantry divisions.
For the ground component of a joint force, heavy armor rules for now.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRDIarchives.html#TDRDI15APR03A
"Marine Expeditionary Force" (Posted April 6, 2003)
In the current war, the Marines are acting like a second Army. The Marines need new equipment for their new role.
The Marines should have the role of reacting fast to a threat where we do not already place Army troops and/or equipment. Where possible, they should be able to defeat small local threats, deploying battalions, regiments, and maybe an entire division, before calling on the Army for help. If a division is unable to win, we have reached the level of a war and the Army is needed. This rapid reaction Marine Corps role does not require amphibious capabilities.
In an article in Joint Force Quarterly, I argued that the Marine Corps should focus on an expeditionary role and urban warfare role instead of amphibious warfare. The traditional storming of the beaches, even updated with deep inland assault in V-22s, should be downgraded (although not abandoned). This expeditionary role, I argued, would allow the Army to avoid being lightened up too much as the current plans call for, in order to get troops to a theater quickly. Transformation apparently has no place for the Army M-1A2s that have crushed their opponents while heavily outnumbered on the road to Baghdad. The sight of Alpha Company of 3-7 Cavalry crushing an Iraqi armored battalion a couple days ago in ten minutes with just its organic weapons-and suffering no losses-should be instructive of the value of our heavy armor. We discard it at our peril.
Let the Marines focus on the smaller threats and retain the Army for high intensity warfare.
So how should the Marines equip themselves for this role?
First of all, the armored amphibious vehicles (AAVs) of the Marines are being stressed in the deepest inland advance in Marine Corps history. They are designed to get Marines ashore under armor and then get them off the beaches. They are large, too. Why shouldn't the Marines have Bradleys? Against a tougher opponent, the AAVs might be large casualty generators-more vulnerable, with more infantry capacity, and just plain not designed to advance a few hundred miles. Since 1991, the Marines have already adopted the M-1 based on their non-amphibious role in that war. In the Persian Gulf War, the Marine M-60s were deemed too old, and the Army loaned the Marines a tank brigade to bolster them in their non-amphibious mission of pinning the Iraqis in Kuwait.
Perhaps the lesson of this second major non-amphibious mission-this time deep inland driving all the way to Baghdad-is that the time to replace the AAV has arrived. The AAVs should be kept in case they are needed for an amphibious assault-you never know-but a drive inland like the '03 campaign calls for different and better equipment. The Marines need another infantry carrier
Plus, the role of the Marines has probably been less than ideal. The Army has had to use 82nd AB and 101st AB troops to secure their supply lines. If a Marine Corps focused on urban warfare had been used with the Army instead of next to the Army, V Corps could have marched north with a 2-division strike force of the 3rd ID and 101st AB while Marine regiments secured Najaf and Samawah and Karbala after the Army bypassed them. Marine infantry with armor, helicopters, and organic air support would have been ideal. If the Air Force and Navy air had also been striking the Republican Guards mercilessly as V Corps drove north, west of the Euphrates, maybe the Army pause to regroup would not have been as long. (I freely grant that even if we did have to pause longer than necessary, we are doing great to be at the Battle for Baghdad stage as we start the third week of war.)
This line of supply, urban role still would have left another Marine division equivalent of mechanized forces able to push north in a diversionary thrust. Equipped with M-1s, Bradleys for the riflemen, and LAVs for the recon elements as they have now, this force would have been better prepared to push north.
The British Basra role would remain unchanged.
Perhaps the Marines fear looking too much like a second, redundant, Army, if they adopt too much Army equipment. But the difference would be that in ordinary circumstances, the Marines would have the lead in responding to small crises (with Army airborne forces supporting) and in the early stages of a major war (again, supported by Army light forces and Stryker units). The Army would use the time purchased to move its heavy forces into place to be supported by the Air Force. Once the Army was in place, it would take the lead in winning the war. The Marines would then have the modern equipment to support the Army in a war of maneuver and firepower, able to deliver riflemen deep inland to battle in the cities or in supporting attacks as the Army knifes its way toward the ultimate objective to win the war.
The Marines have Abrams tanks already. Give them the Bradley too. If the Marines feel guilty, they can draw comfort from the fact that the Army took their LAVs (and added lots of nifty, expensive stuff).
As long as the Army and Marines take on complementary roles that create a potent combined force, there is no reason not to use the best equipment available.
Permalink to this post: http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRDIarchives.html#TDRDI06APR03A
"The Army and Marines Flow to the Gulf" (Posted March 4, 2003)
We are about to start a major theater war (MTW), the building block war around which we determine what is 'enough' to defend America. The second MTW, North Korea, looms over us even as we flow to the Gulf.
So we really have enough ground troops?
First Cav and 1st Armored divisions are alerted to move. Plus 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Light). Clearly, we do not need these units to invade Iraq. Still, it is good to have them in the pipeline ("flowing") just in case we run into difficulties. It would not do to have an invasion force run into problems, request reinforcements, and then wait six weeks while the units ship to the Gulf. I imagine the two heavy divisions will fall in on equipment in the Gulf and be in action quickly if needed.
An article in the Washington Post today says this latest announcement commits 5 of our 10 active divisions. Let's see, 82nd AB is in Afghanistan and Kuwait; 3rd ID is in Kuwait. 101st AB is in Kuwait. 1st ID is in Kosovo and heading for the Gulf. 4th ID has its equipment floating off of Turkey; 1st CAV is going to the Gulf; 1st Armored Division is going to the Gulf; 10th Mountain Division will probably go the Gulf. I count eight. That leaves 2nd ID to watch the North Koreans and 25th Infantry (Light) (part of both are transitioning to Stryker Brigades, I believe). That's ten. I sure hope the Guard getting called up includes combat divisions. Nor do we have many Marine line units outside of Kuwait, it seems. So how small do we want our ground components to be? Will Rumsfeld really kill two Army divisions?
When we went to ten active Army divisions, people scoffed that we'd need to fight Iraq and North Korea at the (nearly) same time. That doesn't seem so ridiculous now. Plus we have to babysit the Balkans. Sure, people said we could just bug out if more important needs arose, but does that seem so wise now? When in one crisis we should pull out of another area and risk it exploding too? Nor does the established force of five Army divisions and 1 or 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces seem so assured of quick and decisive victory now that we go to war. Now, all or elements of eight Army divisions are heading to the Gulf plus three other brigade-sized separate units (2nd and 3rd ACRs and 173 AB Brigade), plus 24 Marine line battalions—eight brigade equivalents!
Quantity has a quality all its own, the old saw goes. We can't rely on technology and lightness to send small units of super troopers against masses of the enemy. Numbers matter. Remember the British Expeditionary Force in 1914? A superb force to be sure, it blistered the Germans as they advanced toward Paris. But at the end of the campaign, the German army stood while the British army was decimated. Just what would we do if we faced dedicated enemy soldiers and not the demoralized Iraqi conscripts?
What if we faced the North Korean, for example? How many American divisions would be flowing into the Korean peninsula to overcome adversity and still fight on to victory?
Or are we really willing to use nukes? That's a Hell of a choice to have. Let's not ever get to that point.
Enlarge the Army. There are no shortages of missions for our troops. And this will be true for quite some time.
Draft Note (Posted January 3, 2003)
Just a note with two U.S. Representatives calling for a draft because they believe African American military personnel will die in disproportionate numbers. Actually, they oppose war and hope that highlighting their belief will derail the war. Actually, as the article buries deep in the story, whites and Hispanics are clustered in combat units where the great majority of casualties will be endured. And even in Vietnam, based on simple percentages of the population, it was at most, 20% more than their percentage of the population. If I remember my demographics correctly, if you consider the draft-age population only (and counting white grandmothers to make it seem that young African American men were dying at higher rates does seem rather unfair), African Americans were actually under-represented in deaths during Vietnam.
Just writing that galls me. Especially now when the military is voluntary. I cant imagine poring over demographics of dead soldiers and looking for slights: how many left-handers? How many Michiganians? Gee, did too many whites die in Somalia? I cant imagine anyone getting away with asserting they dont want Irish soldiers dying for this or Italian soldiers dying for that. Sending our military to fight and die is a serious business and I value them all.
For those claiming that the Iraq war debate is suppressed they sure have difficulty arguing against the war. If they are against liberating Iraq, they should say so. And stop hiding behind pacifying and rebuilding Afghanistan, or bin Laden, or Kim Jong Il, or the budget deficit, or the false prospect of their own community dying in disproportionate numbers in war.
Maybe a draft of some sort is needed. But it certainly isnt needed to staff the military for the most part. This draft proposal is just the latest in the string of things we supposedly must do first before we strike Iraq.
I certainly hope that these two Representatives wont be relieved that their concerns on race are false. Im disturbed enough that it is a concern. Remember, our soldiers are all green. I value them for that color.
"A New Draft?" (Posted January 1, 2003)
I have not been terribly sympathetic to the idea of a new draft. Yes, I value my (limited) military experience. There is merit to having people of varying socio-economic groups get their lumps together in the cause of defending America. I'd say the most interesting example was me-the white Detroit "old man" of the platoon sparring with Frear-the son (or was it nephew) of a Motown star. For the life of me I can no longer remember who she is. He had graduated from Brown University. I was a University of Michigan graduate. We each claimed superiority and belittled the other's school. He carried his silver spoon in his mess kit! (I liked him, actually. I have to respect someone who had no reason to join, yet still did) A lot of people could benefit from Army Basic Training.
Yet our volunteer military does not need conscripts. We are an information age military and not an industrial age mass production military. Our military does not need massive numbers of cannon fodder.
Nor am I persuaded by our war on terror to support conscription for the sole reason of calling on our people for "sacrifice." If even the modest efforts our government has made thus far lead critics to cry "police state!" how would they react to a needless draft? I think we are fortunate to live in an age when going to war does not require us to eat beans and put off all major purchases until after the war because every factory has to produce war material. Why do advocates of sacrifice think we have to mimic World war II conditions in the twenty-first century?
Yet maybe conscription would be a good idea. Oh, not to staff our regular military-unless we must fight a peer competitor like China (if Chinese power and hostility grow over the decades-neither are guaranteed, however) or anything like that-we just don't need masses of infantry for our high tech wars against small powers.
But in a decades-long war on terror, mass conscription could serve valuable purposes. The fact that we do not need conscripts to wage the war actually makes it easier to start universal conscription. If we wanted to use a draft to man our actual fighting military, we would need to take only a small percentage and exemptions would undermine the leveling effect. Making a draft nearly universal is a key to providing the socializing aspect a reality.
So how would we use draftees in a Homeland Defense Corps?
We could train medics whose skills are obviously of use in coping with a terror attack even before they are mobilized. Such skills diffused throughout the population would save lives.
We could train security personnel who could augment military police type formations guarding our borders, bases, or civilian infrastructure in their communities during emergencies. This might be a pool of reservists available to the military services and the new Homeland Defense Department.
We could also train draftees in basic squad-level infantry skills so that there is always a pool of troops who may be mobilized for additional training should we need infantry for war or peace operations.
Recruits would need basic training, some advanced schooling for their skills, and civics education. This should take no more than four or five months. This will hardly be an onerous duty of citizenship. Of course, anybody could volunteer for any of the services as civilians do now for the higher pay and benefits of those services instead of doing the minimum draftee service.
Other skills might also be of use such as vehicle drivers, supply specialists, and other jobs that would allow individuals to fill out active units or augment them for war tasks.
For their term of Homeland Defense Corps reserve service, we could exploit online or distance learning for refresher training every three months to validate their training.
We could require two years duty maximum in the homeland defense reserves, or four or more for medic duty (if you get the easier, less dangerous duty, you should serve longer). Nor should such service be considered the equivalent of military service for benefits unless the troops are mobilized by a military service. We don't want this easier service to draw away recruits from the traditional services.
Establishing a new draft would mean we would have to gear up the training establishment to crank out graduates at a high rate without interfering with traditional force training. I don't know whether basic training should be integrated or done separately.
A draft with these attributes might have merit. It avoids foisting unwilling draftees on the military yet provides citizenship training with reasonable sacrifice and trains our people with actual useful skills should they be needed by the nation. Establishing such a draft-filled Homeland Defense Corps is worth a thought, anyway. And given that many of those calling for a draft are on the left, maybe it will silence those others on their side who bemoan the idea that our military recruiters visit high schools.
"Carriers" (Posted December 25, 2002)
Hanson had a nice piece on our aircraft carriers. It is a stirring piece yet misses the impact of the changing environment. A few years ago, in '99 I believe, Naval Institute Proceedings purchased an article I wrote about the role of carriers in a network-centric environment. Basically, I wrote that as our network-centric navy is built, the value of carriers will decline; and as enemy networks are built, our carriers' value will decline. The very logic of the network will inevitably lead to their demise. Sadly, Proceedings has not actually published this article (or another one they bought earlier on Army-Marine Corps cross-attachment). On a personal note, for an author still trying to get my published works into double digits, having two bought but unpublished is frustrating. I've stopped even submitting to them (although part of that is my general focus on landpower issues).
Before carrier fans can write hate mail (and I actually count myself as a fan), I did not say they are obsolete. I did note that even as they became obsolete against networks, they would retain niche roles for use against enemies without networks (an Afghanistan scenario for example). In addition, since '99, the ability of Navy aviation to use precision weapons has leaped, making carriers more useful in the short run though they still are not immune to the logic of the network.
To explain, without rewriting the article here (and with some reflection looking back three years), network-centric warfare is a term that describes creating a sensor net that sees every enemy platform and instantly transmits their locations to the entire fleet's ships, submarines, and aircraft. The communications network allows this information sharing and allows the commander to allocate firepower distributed throughout the fleet to destroy targets. While firepower may be concentrated on a single target, their launch points are scattered. This is far different from the platform-centric fleet we have historically had. That is, to concentrate firepower, we needed to concentrate the firepower on a platform. Today that platform is the carrier and its battle group with its air wing, able to send massed missiles and aircraft against a target. It is the peak of the platform's development, surpassing the line of battleships that had dominated naval warfare for centuries.
The ramifications of fighting in a network-centric environment will kill the carrier. Most obviously, on the offense, with the ability to scatter launchers without diluting the ability to concentrate firepower, we no longer need the expensive platform of the large carrier. Yet operations like Afghanistan show that even in the missile age, carrier aviation is quite useful against an enemy without air and naval power. Indeed, even with a network-centric Navy, the usefulness of the carrier's air wing would have diminished little for this scenario. So what's my point, you may ask. If carriers remain potent concentrations of platform-centric power even in a network-centric force, why say they are obsolete?
The real challenge to carriers comes not from our network, where carriers become huge albeit needlessly expensive concentrations of power whose firepower is not diminished by the existence of the network; but on the defense against other networks. What happens when an enemy develops a network? The Taliban couldn't monitor their own airspace, but when an enemy builds a sensor and attack network that reaches out hundreds of miles, how will our Navy penetrate that grid, survive, and attack? Assuming we have scattered assets, losing some of them will not harm our fleet as a whole-other parts will fill in the gaps.
It may well be that a sensor/attack grid race will develop, with both sides (and this is hypothetical since no Navy appears able to challenge our Navy in the near future) engaged in a race to extend the range of their grids as we strive to be able to identify and attack the enemy before our own assets get hit. But if we cannot maintain such superiority and face a similar grid, any concentration of firepower becomes a priority target for the enemy. Our carriers will be hit and lost. The prestige value of losing them will offset the firepower that they carry on a single hull. The firepower can be distributed to smaller hulls and end the propaganda value to the enemy of killing carriers (egad, the Iraqis trumpeted their shooting down of an unmanned drone for heaven's sake).
Carrier defenders will counter that carriers have not been lost since World War II and that others sounded the death knell of the carrier when anti-ship missiles were deployed. They also note that airbases are subject to foreign government whims and regime changes while carriers can always be used.
But not losing any carriers in over 50 years is due to not fighting another navy, not from the invulnerability of carriers. Similarly, the advent of anti-ship missiles in a platform-centric environment limited the amount of firepower that the Soviets could mass against a single carrier had it come to war. Even with that limitation, our carriers were vulnerable though I would not have said missiles made carriers obsolete. But against a network-centric enemy, an enemy's ability to mass firepower against our carriers will not be a limiting factor that saves us. Unless defensive anti-missiles have the ability to defend a single target from all over the net, enemy offense will overwhelm a single platform's ability to defend itself. And even if we can use networked defenses to defend a carrier, why expend the huge sums of money to do it when such concentrated assets are not needed for offensive uses?
As to the sovereignty argument, how many times can we actually use that advantage of carriers--that they are sovereign assets and require no approval from host nations? First, except against coastal targets, we still need permission for overflight rights. Second, given the need for international support that even the obvious danger of addressing the Iraq problem imposes on us, how many times will we have just carriers? If we have allies, we will have Air Force bases. If we don't have enough support for the use of foreign air bases, will we really strike from the sea alone? And I'm talking about a sustained campaign, not a single retaliatory strike. If that is what we want to do, B-2s and Navy cruise missiles can handle those quick strikes. And if we do need a sustained campaign, carrier ammunition stowage isn't that great (although precision weapons do lessen this problem, aviation fuel is still a limiting factor). We'd need to rotate carriers to avoid stress accidents and to replenish carrier stores. Plus, even in Afghanistan where the Navy very impressively struck deep inland, the Navy strike aircraft relied on Air Force aerial refueling to carry out those missions--which required allies who let us use their air bases.
So, while the firepower that carriers have will not diminish as we build a network, the ability to have the same firepower on distributed hulls means that they are not crucial to generating offensive firepower. Against enemy networks, they will be tempting and irresistible targets. Although in such an environment we wouldn't build carriers, since we already have them it makes sense to keep them but to limit their use to environments that do not pose a threat to them. Like battleships before them, they will occupy a niche that will gradually narrow over the decades as our network and enemy networks develop and mature. Carrier defenders may not like to hear this, but the logic of networks spells their doom. Indeed, we will soon stop commissioning Nimitz-class behemoths, and the Navy is trying to figure out what the next carrier should look like.
Yet carrier defenders should not be disheartened. The Navy will always be crucial no matter what the main asset is. Navies have gone through ships of the line, pre-dreadnoughts, battleships, and carriers as the main platforms that defined a Navy's power. We do not mourn their passing. The new measure of power will be the network that joins scattered firepower from submarines, surface ships, land-based aircraft, and even Army and Marine Corps artillery (missile, rocket, and tube) and aviation assets into a seamless force. Nobody will care where the asset is located and what uniform is firing it-killing the target will be all that matters. Perhaps even small carriers will be part of the mix.
Large carriers will become part of the Navy's history. Keeping them beyond their usefulness will risk that glorious record and the lives of many sailors to hang on to legends. Our security is not well served by nostalgia.
“Transformation” (Posted December 12, 2002)
A couple interesting developments on the Army reorganization front. In one article, the Defense Department is on track to pay for four Stryker brigades. However, the problem of the organization is being noticed—it isn’t a heavy force and never will be. Even as some complain that the units are too heavy and that the Stryker vehicle itself can’t fit on a C-130, the Army has noticed the brigade lacks combat power. As to the Stryker being too heavy, hogwash. Yes, the Stryker vehicle has to have some of its protruding parts removed to get on the plane, and requires some time once offloaded to put together again, but so what? If those units have to fight their way off the plane onto the tarmac when they land, we’ve got more serious problems. As to the lack of combat power issue, well yeah. Take away the Abrams and Bradleys and load up with souped-up LAVs and what do you expect?
The article says the Department of Defense may take the money for brigades five and six and instead use it to add attack helicopters, more recon and targeting assets, and more firepower! Given enough time, DOD will start adding Abrams and Bradleys, I imagine. And why not? While there is a role for a medium weight force to bridge the gap between heavy forces that take weeks to arrive and light forces that can fly in days. But can the Air Force really airlift six of these brigades in faster time than it would take to start shipping heavy brigades? There are only limited scenarios for their use. If we don’t need to rush anti-tank forces to stop an invasion of an ally that catches us unaware and with no heavy forces in the area, why keep units too light to have staying power? But after adding more firepower, the unit will be too heavy to be airlifted rapidly anyway. It is already pretty darn heavy and it will get heavier even as the individual units remain light and vulnerable Strykers. I really have to ask, might it not be better to airlift a battalion task force of Abrams and Bradleys? Would the combat power suffer? Would that option be just as strategically mobile as an entire Stryker Brigade? Certainly, the smaller unit would be more survivable since its individual vehicles would be superbly protected and armed.
A related issue is the move to make the Army National Guard give up some of its heavy brigades to reconfigure four brigades to mobile light brigades—essentially motorized infantry outfits that have Humvees and 2-1/2-ton trucks to move the troops and towed artillery.
This Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative is intended to make the Guard a more relevant reserve force given that conventional foes are fewer these days and given 9/11. These units will be better suited to guard duty in homeland defense and will be able to carry out base defense overseas as well as peace-keeping, occupation, or rear area security missions. But unlike Stryker brigades, they will be far easier to airlift. In addition, they will have the infantry to take over the peacekeeping role that the infantry-heavy Stryker brigades are supposed to fill. Yet the Stryker brigade’s armored vehicles are probably excessively heavy for relatively benign peace operations. But on the other hand, they are too light to survive even RPGs in a combat environment so what real improvement would they provide over armored Humvees in peace ops?
Several years ago in an article, I argued that we should keep the Guard heavy units as is to guard against an unanticipated threat that is larger than an Iraq or North Korea scenario or an anticipated threat that turns out to be tougher than we expect. (I also wanted a warfighting orientation to counter the peacekeeping mentality that seemed rampant) See the synopsis if you like. But given that we are about to get rid of one of our two anticipated regional threats by taking down Iraq, and given the lack of other significant conventional threats (and given that fighting China outside of the Korean peninsula or on Taiwan would require massive mobilization on the scale of World War II if we hoped to have land forces able to enter the mainland and win), I have to admit this makes sense post-9/11. Previously I’d argued that if we need Bosnia-type occupation forces, we should expand the Military Police. Since Rumsfeld is resisting expanding the Army, we aren’t going to get more MPs. Motorized infantry will have to do, yet I worry about such a force in the reserves. Will we maintain 40,000 Army reservist mobilized indefinitely?
So, even with the two restructuring initiatives, we’ll still have heavy units. They will be around for twenty or thirty years even with no replacements for the Abrams and Bradleys. War with Iraq will again show their power. We’ll have mobile light brigades that will provide motorized infantry for peace operations, occupation duties, and homeland security, and we’ll have Stryker brigades that in theory provide a force that can arrive soon after light paratroopers or foot infantry arrive (as a tripwire) to give them some firepower and (hopefully) hold until the heavy stuff arrives. But the Stryker brigades may get heavier, killing that role. I still say a light, infantry-poor but anti-tank rich Stryker brigade makes more sense for this role. (see Defense Issue archives)
These brigades are also supposed to test how a light but lethal unit will operate paving the way for the wonder “tank” (the future combat system”) that will equip the Objective Force. Here’s my take in Military Review on that project if you are interested. I understand the FCS will have depleted-pixie-dust-armor that is light yet as solid as Abrams armor. Pretty cool, huh? Needless to say, I do worry about trying to abandon heavy forces prematurely as the Objective Force foresees. I hope DOD is right on this. I really hope a replacement for the Abrams main battle tank is on a drawing board somewhere in America just in case. We are appropriately building strategically deployable units but I don’t think the age of survivable heavy units is over yet.
Go Army!
"Stryker Brigades" (Posted October 23, 2002)
I'm not comfortable with the organization of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (formerly Interim Brigade Combat Teams: IBCTs). Yes, we need something between walking infantry that is strategically mobile yet tactically immobile with little combat power and heavy armor that is strategically immobile but tactically mobile and highly lethal and survivable. The Stryker Brigades are the medium forces we are fielding that are supposed to bridge that gap.
Essentially a light mechanized brigade, a Stryker Brigade is more strategically mobile than a heavy brigade and has good tactical mobility. It has good firepower too, but lacks the survivability of heavy forces. It has lots of infantry for peace operations. Designed to be flown in after other forces have seized an airhead, the Stryker Brigades will provide significant firepower quickly; but will hand off the main battle to heavy forces when they finally arrive. How quickly is a question of debate since they are fairly heavy despite being lighter than a heavy brigade. And just how much Air Force airlift can the Army count on to get one overseas in a crisis? They will also be test beds for operating concepts for the Objective Force, the future army that will use light, lethal, and survivable combat platforms not even designed yet. I’ve already offered my thoughts at Military Review on this subject.
One problem is the different requirements for different operations foreseen for the brigades. Peace operations can be done at our leisure. We can basically ship over what we want on our time frame. The lightness of the Stryker Brigade is largely irrelevant to this mission. The wheeled vehicles and large infantry component are great for patrolling and will not stress the local roads and bridges, so this is one advantage. Yet the lightness is meant to allow the brigade to be rushed to a theater to deter or halt an invasion when paratroopers are the only alternative (which are just trip wires incapable of mounting serious resistance to an armored attack). Part of the problem of getting somewhere fast is sustainment. All that infantry has to be fed and provided with medical assistance, not to mention potable water, showers, ammunition, etc.
If we are trying to halt an armored assault with the Stryker Brigade, the high infantry component makes less sense. Why not add more of the 105mm-armed Strykers at the expense of the infantry carriers? Put TOWs on them too and now we're talking. Build the brigades with three battalion task forces each containing two 105mm companies and one infantry company. Or perhaps two smaller companies of each to allow each battalion to fight with two balanced task forces. Add the other recon and targeting, artillery, and support stuff already there, and we have a unit that can be airlifted fast yet better suited to stopping armor. I'd still rather have heavy armor but if we have to be there tomorrow, the heavy stuff just won't be there (unless we park it there well before the conflict).
The factors that make the brigades useful for peacekeeping could also be useful for urban combat. Lots of infantry, wheeled vehicles, superior communications and recon abilities, all are suited for city fighting. Indeed I’m wondering if one or two will debut in Iraq.
Still, long term we might want mix and match Stryker Brigades with anti-tank and infantry versions. I’m just not satisfied with the current unit.
“Enlarge the Army” (Posted September 4, 2002)
Mr. Webb is concerned that we could be in Iraq for thirty years and that we would be unable to respond to other threats, such as China.
What a bizarre argument. And I don’t think it is possible to have drawn a more wrong conclusion.
The German and Japanese occupation forces he spoke of were not combat formations initially. They were really constabulary forces ill-suited to large-scale combat. The poor initial showing of these American forces as they were rushed to Korea to stem the North Korean invasion clearly shows this. As for Germany-based troops, they did not become heavy combat forces until the post-North Korean invasion military build up by the United States. The forces in Japan never did become a potent combat force like the German-based military force. The difference lies in the external threat. No land threat against Japan, so the force was a logistics and air power-based force. A major land threat against West Germany, so the Army was beefed up considerably with large Air Force support. Within ten years of winning the Second World War, Japan and Germany were our allies. Mr. Webb takes the course of saying since it did work out, it was easy. Was it really easy to turn fanatical enemies who only succumbed to Atomic bombs or bunker-to-bunker combat in Berlin into friends? I dare say there will be few fanatics in Iraq who will fight to preserve Saddam’s regime.
What of external threats that could keep us in Iraq in significant strength for more than a decade? Certainly, external threats could do that. The external threat of Iraq has kept us in Saudi Arabia for more than a decade, annoying bin Laden in the process. So first of all, occupying Iraq will end our need to deploy in Saudi Arabia. So let’s not just talk about the additional duties. Second, what external threats are there? Kuwait? Saudi Arabia? Jordan? Syria? Turkey? There is Iran, but a revolution in that component of the axis of evil will likely end that threat. So, we will have to occupy Iraq with significant land power, gradually drawing down as in Bosnia over the course of the last seven years. Our allies should help too. Without an external threat, we could be down to a token force in a decade.
But what if an occupation really does hurt our ability to fight the Chinese? Or somebody else? Such is the folly of having only enough force to fight and beat one regional threat (a major theater war: MTW) such as North Korea or Iraq. The last quadrennial review in 2001 ended the much-mocked “two-MTW” standard. We never had an actual two war strategy since most people forgot the “nearly simultaneous” caveat in the pre-2001 post-Cold War strategy. The old theoretical standard at least stopped ridiculous arguments as Mr. Webb makes. With the ability to fight more than one MTW, we were not deterred from fighting one out of fear it was not the really threatening one! Just how secure did the South Koreans feel knowing they were under the lesser threat compared to Kuwait? If North Korea had invaded, we would have been hard pressed with the so-called two-war standard military to fight in Korea and still have enough to defeat Iraq. Now what would we do with a military judged so small that we count on only our most pressing potential enemy attacking us?
If we are deterred from going into Iraq, a state that is undoubtedly a threat to us, the proper response is to enlarge our military. Modernization is no substitute for numbers after a certain point. If we don’t have enough Army troops to occupy Iraq and still be prepared to fight another enemy on the ground, we’d better enlarge our Army. That is the correct conclusion to reach. Not that we should be frozen into inaction at anything larger than Grenada. And I guess I might as well pile on. If Mr. Webb’s contention is that by avoiding all combat we have enough land power to fight China now, he is sadly mistaken.
And further, is he seriously saying defeating Iraq would benefit China? I’d stack up our record in the Moslem world against China’s any day. Mr. Webb’s examples of Chinese success in courting the Islamic world are perplexing (Just what religious group is rebelling against China in the western part of that country?) First, who does Pakistan look to now? And what exactly has China gotten out of Libya? And finally, just how is sponsoring a failed coup against Moslem Indonesia considered courting the Moslem world? Honestly, hand wringers see any foe’s actions as part of an intricate long-term plan that will overwhelm us; and any action on our part as falling into their hands.
Expand the Army.
Take Baghdad.
"Air Supremacy" (Posted July 31, 2002)
I think the United States Air Force is far and away the best air force in the world. (Our Navy comes in second). Nobody else comes close. Our F-15 and F-16 aircraft are aging but they are still in the same league as the newest of anybody else's, and combined with command and control, training, targeting, electronics, and armament, are head and shoulders above the rest. The power of the Air Force is far greater than the sum of all its parts.
Which makes it difficult to see why the F-22 is needed. The high tech stealth fighter was supposed to fight the next generations of Soviet fighters and make them wet their pants at the thought of going up against Americans in the air. We're also building the F-35, the Joint Strike Fighter, which will be the low cost (relatively speaking) fighter-bomber that will have a world-wide appeal as other nations seek to replace F-16s. Now, I support the JSF. We'll build thousands of them. We need some new stuff. But the F-22? I'm not convinced we need it. Maybe in very limited numbers but even that is a hard sell for me. While the Air Force has been singing the praises of air power's ability to do it all, from Desert Storm through two campaigns in the Balkans, to Afghanistan, it has never faced more than token opposition in the air. If we need a high end fighter, why not reopen the F-15 line for the Air Force? That solves the aging airframe problem. Brand new F-15s. Shoot, the South Koreans just decided to buy them, they can't be that bad. It would sure undercut their accusations that they were unduly pressured to buy the F-15. With updated avionics and missiles, the F-15 will still be a hell of a fighter for another twenty years.
I suppose what really convinced me that the F-22 fighter is not desperately needed to own the skies is the article I read that said the prime contractors (Boeing and Lockheed Martin) argued they could configure the F-22 to carry bombs internally (so it won't mess up the stealth) so it can bomb stuff. First of all, this seems like an admission that air-to-air combat is not likely to be a strain on the F-22. Second, perhaps unfairly, I immediately recalled the Me-262 rolled out for Hitler, who was very impressed with this jet. He then said to make it a bomber. The world's first operational jet fighter was to be made a bomber. That would have been a waste had it been ultimately done (although to our benefit, it delayed the fighter) in World War II; and it would be a waste now to turn the latest fighter into a very expensive substitute for what our fifty-year-old B-52s are--bomb haulers. Plus, I hate to bank so much on stealth. It's been around a while and others claim to have built radar to detect it (and it still emits sound, who knows what you can do with that?). Maybe we've overcome that and are ahead in the game, but we no longer have the element of surprise with stealth. Shoot, in 1999 we inexplicably failed to bomb one into oblivion when it went down in Serbia. Who knows what we lost there? And what did they know that let them shoot it down? Was it just dumb luck? And if we are ahead in the stealth game, the F-22 is one plane that will not be sold to anybody else for a long time. It would be ridiculous to let that technology loose. So we're the only customer for it and it will be very expensive.
I do want an Air force second to none. Air power is indeed critical to success. But when we are head and shoulders more powerful than anybody else, why spend the money? Bottom line, as a hedge against the future I'd want some F-22s, but more than a couple wings would be a waste of resources. To be fair, here's the Air Force Association's arguments for these planes.
"The Future Army" (Posted on July 12, 2002)
I want the United States Army of 2025 to be able to march on an enemy capital and impose peace on our terms.
The Army's post-Cold War identity crisis seems to have hindered this goal. During the Cold War, the Army's very clear and very difficult role was to halt the Red Army in West Germany and stop the North Koreans from marching to Seoul. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the residual mission of keeping the North Koreans at bay but the confrontation lacks the urgency of Fulda Gap due to the s maller stakes and because increasingly South Korea is capable of defending itself even without our help. The Gulf War of 1991 was like the last hurrah for the warfighting mission. Its very success, routing a large foe in 100 hours with amazingly few casualties, undermined its value as a war winner.
Clearly, for way too many observers, the Army was over-prepared for likely threats. The Army was called on to intervene in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo where major ground threats did not exist. Actual fighting was done with airpower and missiles, with the Air Force and Navy arguing over who did that mission better. The Army dealt with the less glamorous mission of suppressing disorder. Simply resisting employment as peacekeepers and the siren song of embracing such missions to remain "relevant" were full time jobs. The Marines at least had the warrior mystique of the Corps to sustain it despite occasional questions about why we have a "second army." With heavy armor viewed as a relic, and war apparently unlikely, the Army set forth to build medium brigades that could be airlifted into a conflict zone to quickly put under-armor forces on the scene to back up the painfully light yet strategically mobile paratroopers or light infantry. Heavy armor, if we even need it anymore, could be provided quickly in small numbers by prepositioning; and in larger numbers more slowly by sea. The Marines, of course, saw turf encroachment on their own specialty--placing small numbers of troops on the ground with more firepower than Army light infantry. Even Army paratroopers seemed to threaten the amphibious warfare mission. As the Army moved toward an expeditionary role as the Army shrugged off the old Cold War role in West Germany, the Army planned to abandon heavy armor completely in about 30 years as it develops and builds a "future combat system" that combines low weight with lethality and survivability.
Much of what the Army and Marines do or are planning to do make perfect sense if done in appropriate doses and if the services see themselves as complementing one another rather than competing with one another. The Army does war. The Marines do battle. For brush fires that will likely not need more than a brigade of troops, the Marines should take the lead. Organizing the Ma r ine Corps to place a brigade quickly on the scene to smother a small threat will keep the Army in the barracks. The initial stages of a war can be handled by Army light forces augmented by prepositioned equipment for the early stages and airlifted medium b rigades that hold the line until heavy armor can be shipped in to the theater. The Army can beef up the Marines with medium brigades or heavy armor if it turns out the battle the Marines are fighting is the first battle of a war rather than just a small s c ale incident. On the other hand, the Marines will have the numbers and skill to supplement the Army in a war that requires extra infantry or which drags on larger or longer than we hope. Both ground forces can contribute and even the Army's medium brigades, if limited in number for their bridging role, are no threat to the Marine Corps' missions.
The problem comes from the Army's determination to make the medium brigades (the Interim Brigade Combat Teams) the model for the future Army as a whole. The light armored vehicles are current-technology stand-ins for the future combat system that will equip the Army of the future, the Objective Force. As envisioned, the future combat system will not see the light of day. We simply cannot build a vehicle light enough to be airlifted in significant numbers yet as lethal and survivable as the Abrams main battle tank of today. Even if, with some magical breakthrough, we are able to do this, won't this same technology make tanks three times as heavy even more powerful than the Abrams and light future combat system? To work, such a magical future combat system would have to fight only 1990s-era armies.
If we insist on making all our armor light enough to be flown in to a distant theater, we will be creating an Army able to resist what we feared Iraq would do right after conquering Kuwait--march south immediately on Saudi Arabia. In practice, sacrificing power for speed will simply place vulnerable vehicles in combat outnumbered and on the defensive. Given the emphasis on overcoming distance, when we have to choose between maintaining the upper weight limits and providing firepower and protection for the vehicle, protection will suffer first. I guess all I'm saying is that speed of deployment was a unique need of 1990 (and one we did not have to meet) and the entire Army should not adapt to this scenario. A full spectrum military needs Army Rangers and paratroopers able to deploy quickly under fire, a Marine Corps capable of reaching a battle area quickly with its superior f irepower and forcing entry, Army heavy brigades that can crush a conventional enemy, Army medium brigades that can bridge the gap between early arriving Marines/Army light infantry and heavy armor, and Marine and Army riflemen for dismounted combat such a s urban warfare. Navy and Air Force support are of course crucial, and quite honestly, nobody out there can challenge us at sea or in the air. Such a threat is decades away at worst.
For the near term, ground threats are significant enough to keep the Army and Marines busy. Each has a role unique to its own capabilities despite some overlap in capabilities. With a real war underway and the likelihood of conventional war against Iraq soon, the Army at least does not need to search for reasons to exist. Winning wars is reason enough. As this sinks in, I imagine the chimeral future combat system will dissolve and instead we will get a new main battle tank to carry the burden of war, supplemented by a light fighting vehicle for speed of deployment and the occasional operation other than war. Go Army!
April 2003 Posts Recovered From My Email
I had saved post archives in my email before the old Yahoo!Geocities died. But years ago they seemed to be gibberish. A number were not available on the Internet Archives and I thought they were lost.
I recently checked my email archive of pre-Blogger posts and they were all legible. So I am restoring the gaps in my archives. Although I had to take a picture of a surviving graph that would not copy and paste directly. For what it's worth. Obviously all of the post permalinks are dead and artifacts of my ersatz-blog format back then. These were what I had formerly categorized as "foreign affairs."
"Note" (Posted April 25, 2003)
You know, I really am spending way less time on this site. Reading, watching Buffy the Vampire Slayer instead of cable news, playing games, starting to work on stuff for print, etc. But I'm so used to rushing lunch so I can dash something off that when I read something that I feel a need to respond to, I still can. In the long run, it may be more readily apparent. Also, traffic dropped off just as I announced I would post less. I suspect it was a simultaneous realization that we won the war rather than a reaction to my announcement. I am curious to see how traffic develops next month. Redesign for May, I think.
"Iran" (Posted April 25, 2003)
This professor thinks that coming to terms with Iran using more "imaginative" and "clever" diplomacy will convince Iran to end its nuclear program. I don't know whether to worry or be impressed with the quest for debate that leads to someone like this being at the National Defense University. I only wish our elite institutions had a similar diversity. But here is his summary:
Shrill rhetoric about an "axis of evil" and presidential doctrines granting America the right to militarily intervene wherever it perceives a problem are unlikely to stem the tide of proliferation in the Middle East or elsewhere. A more clever diplomacy of integrating Iran into the regional security architecture and global economy would provide Tehran with an incentive to adhere to its nonproliferation commitments.
His policy would snatch a defeat from the jaws of our military victory over Iraq and throttle the momentum we have to deal with Iran. His "success" would leave in place another brutal regime that enslaves its people. Real clever.
Sometimes these people really torque me off. If only the government listened to the elites in our nation's area studies programs who understand the "subtleties" of what is going on, all would be well.
I thought that is what we tried under the last administration? Yet despite our talks with so-called moderates, hitherto unknown Iranian nuclear facilities are revealed and Iran says they are going full tilt for nukes. I say add to the pressure, not lessen it. Squeeze the nutcase regime and support the real democrats who face the imported regime bully boys on the streets. The current Iranian regime is dangerous. Failure to support regime change in a charter member of the Axis of Evil will undermine the efforts of people who want a normal regime and who actually like us. I don't give a rip to support some regime faction that is only 94% loony compared to the ruling nightmare, simply because somebody has devoted their life to measuring the relative looniness of the elite over there. Since he fails to use his cleverness to note that our declared right to intervene when we see threats has some fairly narrow parameters portrays our policy far more broadly than it is. How simplistic of him.
The professor is being too clever by half. Don't study them. Overthrow them.
"Mandate of Heaven" Posted April 25, 2003)
SARS has the potential to really take off in China under the petri dish of corruption, inadequate health care, little understanding in the rural population, and government secrecy.
This article openly wonders about the impact of the epidemic on the stability of the government:
For one thing, all of the party mandarins know that in a crisis of this potential magnitude, with many Chinese lives at stake, the grip of the Communist Party itself could be shaken, bringing them all down together.
I really wonder if the "mandate of heaven" that has traditionally provided legitimacy to Chinese rulers, is about to be revoked. On top of all the other problems China is experiencing in its urbanization and modernization campaigns, a spreading epidemic could cause a tipping point to be reached. Who knows, maybe the decisive American victory over Iraq adds to the undermining of the regime.
I've never been sure whether I should worry more about Chinese strength or weakness. I'm still not.
"Well, It's a Start" (Posted April 25, 2003)
Nicholas Kristof, who I really don't care for much, at least made a stab at assessing his predictions of the Iraq War. He starts off well enough.
He notes that his predicted disaster did not happen. Yet he spends more energy jabbing at pro-war types for their predictions. He jabs at predictions way too soon. No immediate democracy in Iraq yet? Who on earth claimed that?! This will obviously take time to plant and nurture. Good grief, if he is going to take shots at pro-war advocates for our failure to achieve objectives already when some will take years, he has a target-rich environment in which to work.
He rightly hits those who thought the Iraqis would not resist and that an Afghanistan-style campaign of special forces and indigenous resistance coupled with our air power would win the day. Yes indeed, these advocates were wrong. We needed heavy armor and mechanized infantry and all the other assorted Cold War-era hardware that some think are obsolete.
Yet Kristof's main sin is in equating the few who wrongly said it would be easy with his own bloody quagmire prediction. The fact is, we won decisively, and his claim that this was not a cakewalk is ludicrous.
What standard of cakewalk does he have? In the annals of warfare, the Iraq War is easily a cakewalk. This is not to diminish our accomplishment, for our military has trained for decades to fight this well. Indeed, I under-estimated how lethal our ground forces are. I assumed (though I did not have the nerve to stab at such a touchy topic beforehand) that 200-250 dead was likely the price to win, and a few hundred more perhaps if we had to fight our way into Baghdad street by street. Chemical weapons would add to that but not as much as heavy urban combat. Even these levels I would consider a decisive victory if not a cakewalk. We actually won with significantly fewer combat deaths than we suffered expelling the Iraqis from Kuwait. It doesn't get much better than this.
Yet I won't whomp on Kristof too much. He at least made a stab at admitting error. His highly qualified 'oops' may not be much, but it is far better than anybody else. I'll at least listen to him a bit more than the rest when the next debate comes up.
I know I won't listen to Galloway (MP-Tikrit). Yeah, I know, I never did. Imagine this, Saddam paid westerners who defended him. The oil for protection program, no doubt. I'd love to see the deck of 55 on this topic.
Further, it is nice to see that the complaints that America bought its coalition can be turned right back around. This is just the beginning, I suspect.
And another. Since so many chide the idea of the coalition, claiming few sent troops; just how many people from the anti-war side went overseas to protect Iraq? Even Sean Penn didn't stay. Actually, given the praise the shields received for their "conviction" in going, you'd think the Polish contribution of special forces would get equal credit. And that's equal without even considering that Polish conviction led them to help overthrow a beastly regime while shield conviction led them to defend the Tikriti bastard's rule.
"Purges" (Posted April 24, 2003)
Yes, there certainly must be de-Baathification in Iraq. A stable Iraq with rule of law and democracy absolutely requires this.
And while we must rightly take on the trials and punishment of the high-ranking officials (and I don't know if the deck of offenders is broad enough), the lower level rank and file abusers must be tried by Iraqis.
Our dealing with the high-profile Baathists will lower the fear factor of Iraqis. It will signal a new beginning. Since we went to war in our own interest and not only (and not even primarily so) as a humanitarian mission, we have reason to punish the top offenders, too.
Yet it cannot be an American or Anglo-American, or even Anglo-Australian-American justice system. Our trials of the big dogs will allow the Iraqis to provide justice to the lower level functionaries who "just carried out orders" or worse. By having the Iraqis mete out justice it will be a sign that they are trusted with deciding the fate of their country. Just as important, it will make de-Baathification an Iraqi project and not an imposed project from America. Having gotten rid of the thugs, Iraqis will have an interest in maintaining the post-war Iraq friendly to America. We can't have the Iraqi public switching back to the strong horse in ten years if anti-American forces gain the upper hand, claiming that the purges were all our fault. Remember that Saddam got others to do his dirty work, killing his enemies and perceived enemies. While this new purge will be done with lawful processes against those proven guilty, Saddam's wisdom of binding his followers to himself by sharing his guilt applies here, too.
How far down does the purge go? I don't know. One must balance active guilt, passive guilt, and rebuilding needs. I would err on the side of going too deep since there is a huge Western-educated exile community that might come home at least for a few years to fill the gap until replacements from within Iraq can be trained. Still, this may be a task for the Iraqis themselves to carry out, advised by the allies. Yet while we should err on the deep side of purges, it should allow for some slack and even for rehabilitation for those too tainted for continued work but clean enough to avoid prosecution. Certainly, entire families must not be punished for the actions of one. We have an interest in making sure even the semi-loyalists of Saddam have an interest in working within the new system rather than plotting a return to their glory days through violence.
And by all means, target the mullahs in Iran. They will try very hard to destabilize Iraq. It is interesting that we have a ceasefire with the anti-Iranian armed group that Saddam sponsored. I wonder if we can get it to work for us. Perhaps the fact that we have a ceasefire answers that question. Mark July 9, 2003 on your calendars. May the general strike planned for that day in Iran bring down the thugs in religious garb holed up in Tehran.
"God Help Us All" (Posted April 23, 2003)
Even now, the war protesters insist that the Iraqis suffered in our invasion. The anti-war types insist we were wrong to destroy the Baathist regime that plundered Iraq for their own benefit.
I'm supposed to feel guilty for ending a regime that did this?
Thousands of people are missing in Iraq, victims of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, but a more visible legacy are the parts that are missing from people who survived. Missing eyes, ears, toenails and tongues mark those who fell into the hands of Mr. Hussein's powerful security services.
This was a good war. How people can complain about what America and our allies did in the face of world opinion that would have left this beastly regime in power, is beyond me. You're damn right I sleep just fine having advocated this war. A whole lot of people can sleep better now. God help us all if we conclude we were wrong to go to war this time.
"North Korea Next?" (Posted April 21, 2003)
With Iraq liberated, many are asking who is next? Many of those asking are worried they are: Pakistan, North Korea, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, France. Many assume a sequence of American attacks on our enemies. I think that is hogwash even as I agree there is a "next" on the list for primary focus. By some accounts, the next step is North Korea. The hawks and the doves are battling again—although I guess the hawk position is nowhere near offensive war as the solution. The doves are crippled after Iraq.
So who should be next?
France is the sentimental favorite. They've stabbed us in the back so often that we really must take official notice. Their latest affront to decency of insisting that sanctions stay on Iraq after their ceaseless efforts to lift them when Saddam wanted them off is truly monstrous. We need regime change and we must confront this latest French gambit to preserve as much of the pre-war world as they can manage despite our victory. Dare the French to veto a resolution lifting the sanctions. Just dare them. We need regime change in France so that those French who agree with us (and I know there are those who agree with us despite my hyperbole of treating France as a monolith of anti-American sentiment) can win elections. Punish the current SOBs as much as we can. Get them worrying about what we will do to them so they have less time to think about what they will do to us. But we can do this in our spare time with an undersecretary for something.
Syria is in the news since we have issued threats, but I think we all know we will not wheel left and go to Damascus. But with the Iraqi border now in friendly hands, we can apply much more pressure on Syria to behave. Except for Lebanon, which they control, the Syrians are surrounded by enemies (and maybe in Lebanon too for all I know, despite their control). They have little income without Saddam and face multiple, well-equipped enemies. They can be contained. We did the Syrian government a favor by killing off so many Islamist nutballs they shipped off to Iraq for their Jihadist duty. Now they need to keep out of Iraq despite their fears of what an example of a Baathist state becoming prosperous and democratic will do in Baathist–run Syria. No war here, but we do need to keep the pressure on quietly.
Pakistan worries it is next, but India is watching them and we still need Pakistani cooperation to keep Afghanistan settled down. Better to quietly support the anti-Islamist parties of Pakistan and push for democracy before the Islamists gain too much clout flying the banner of democracy (for exactly one election in which the Islamists win).
Saudi Arabia clearly needs some more realistic attention now that Iraq is in the win column. We don't need them for their air bases if we take over the Talill air base and other former Saddam facilities in cooperation and partnership with the new Iraqi government. We shouldn't bug out of Saudi Arabia completely, and a small staff and security force at our state-of-the-art air command center should be maintained. No need to have Qatar as the site for our only center for the near future. With our presence minimized, we can push the Saudis to end their monetary support for Wahhabi fanaticism. They didn't always support them and in the wake of the defeat of the fanatics on two battlefields, if the Saudis can ever weather the problems of suppressing them, this is it. They can take all the credit they want for getting us out. And think of the chits we'd owe the Saudis if they'd helped us out whole-heartedly against Saddam. We owe them some thanks for their decision to minimize their help and stay quiet about the help they did provide. Still, no full offensive for Saudi democracy. We must weed out extremism before we push for elections. The right order is essential to preventing another whackjob government out there. Saudi Arabia can be worse.
North Korea seems to be up next but we are pursing a US-Chinese effort to resolve the problem. For what it is worth, I think we can afford more stick and less carrot in the wake of the Iraq War. The North must know it cannot rattle sabers too credibly. Regime change under economic and diplomatic pressure may work. High-level defections may mean North Korea is vulnerable to a coup. One can hope. In any case, diplomacy is clearly the first effort here. We will not start a war. If the defectors give us good targeting information, we might try air power if all else is failing, but that could unleash a chain of reaction that we cannot hope to control with acceptable consequences.
Iran is, I believe, the next target to emphasize. First of all, it is a charter member of the Axis of Evil. Mainly, the logic applied to Iraq applies here: better to stop a non-nuclear power from getting its first nuclear bomb than to stop a nuclear state from getting its third bomb. Also, like Syria, a hostile Iran can destabilize Iraq. Since Iran is Shia, it may have more opportunities to destabilize Iraq's Shia majority. Plus, as Persian Shias, the anger of the Sunni, Arab "street" over our efforts may be quite muted. I am not arguing for invasion. But we can openly support the democrats of Iran against the regime bully boys and be prepared to send in troops and aircraft to secure or destroy nuclear, chemical, and bio sites in Iran should civil war break out. Pressure on Syria to stand down and non-military regime change efforts on Iran will help secure Iraq in the win column.
Still, absent the focus and resources needed for war, there is no reason why a number of these "nexts" can't be addressed at the same time even as we pursue al Qaeda remnants. The economy is probably the real administration priority after the dislocations caused by the tech stock bubble, 9-11, and the slow motion road to war against Iraq. Besides, our military really does need to rest. We ask a lot of them. It isn't too much to give them some time at home to see the birth of their next child.
And one small plea for those who said before the war that we are fools to think we can impose democracy on Iraq. Will they please desist from insisting we now provide this impossible feature a week from yesterday? And please refrain from calling the war a failure when we don't meet their new standard? And have a little patience with American and allied policies when we pass the one-year mark of nation-building? Just asking.
"Fallout" (Posted April19, 2003)
Although a new preemptive war by the United States in the next two years seems unlikely to me (if we are attacked, that is something else entirely), we will try to exploit our victory over Iraq with the other two members of the Axis of Evil. Iran has a population pro-American and unhappy with the regime. We have real opportunities to end the rule of the mullahs in Iran based on popular revolt. The foreign thugs recruited by the Tehran regime may make it unlikely this will be a peaceful overthrow. The Iraq experience with these Islamist mercenaries should show us this unfortunate fact.
The organized defection of high ranking North Korean military and nuclear people are a good sign here-and this started in October, before the Iraq War showed our military superiority over a military equipped with technology mostly dating from the 1980s at best. North Korea has mass enhanced with fanaticism as its main strength, with technology even older than the Iraqis. If the fanaticism has waned as the fallout of famine and poverty, the North Koreans may be very worried. The Iraq War adds to that worry. This type of internal pressure may mean we can apply pressure to isolate North Korea with only minimal humanitarian aid, and have some confidence that we can tumble their regime in time. The North Koreans must have less confidence that the military option can deliver victory for them. If regime survival really is their goal, Pyongyang must see few options open to them but concessions to us. Starvation and isolation mean that a popular revolt is probably unlikely. But the defection of high-ranking regime types means the government itself is less stable. And there are no foreign fanatics to come in and support the regime as Iraq and Iran have done. North Korea is dangerous but may be very brittle.
On the Syrian front, our pressure may be paying off with Syrian cooperation to turn over Iraqi leaders who sought refuge in Syria. We need to keep Iran and Syria from undermining a new, democratic Iraq. Syria is vulnerable to economic pressure and is unable to exploit Islamic fervor to bolster their regime-the Alawite minority in charge is viewed by many in the Moslem world as little better than a bunch of Branch Davidian cultists. Damascus probably sent off their own Islamists to die in Iraq figuring it released some steam building up and let American and British forces wipe them out, sparing Syria the need to do it. Syria is isolated and vulnerable to our own actions to support a stronger Lebanon able to end Syrian occupation.
And speaking of Iraq, since much of this action is to protect our military victory there, I sense the press is already worried that some Iraqis are protesting our presence and demanding an Islamic Iraqi government. Remember, these aren't the same people who are happy we got rid of Saddam and waved and cheered us on. We never had all the people. Some Kurds are going to be unhappy with us since they want an independent state. Some portion of the Shias are unhappy with us because they either want a separate Shia state or an Islamic unitary state. And a good chunk of the Sunnis will be unhappy with us. Oh sure, the protesters in evidence lately are happy Saddam is gone but only as a step to an Islamic republic. We never had them. We shouldn't betray the many people who want rule of law in a secular, democratic country just because a small portion of the country protests-secure in the knowledge that such protests won't land them in the now-emptied torture chambers.
Recent polls in San Francisco should be instructive. Known as a hotbed of protests, the press is filled with people in the anti-war ranks who swear they don't know anybody who is pro-war. Yet polls show 63% (I think) of city residents support the war. All I am saying is that a new panic should not follow a protest march in Iraq. It is a good sign that people don't fear arrest for something like that. As long as success against Syria and Iran prevent support of armed resistance, we have few worries. Steady now, and move forward with our plan for a post-Saddam government. Most Kurds and Shias support our actions thus far and even some Sunnis do, too. If we carry through with our stated purpose, many of those opposed will come over to the new system. The rest will be treated like the San Francisco protesters who believed they represented the majority-they will be ignored and marginalized.
The trends are good so far. Why would we reverse course now just because our press sees a new false crisis already?
"Hostages" (Posted April 17, 2003)
The United States wants to lift international sanctions on Iraq so that rebuilding can begin in Iraq. Without the Baathist thug regime in charge, why should sanctions stay?
Sadly, they may stay because some Europeans have objectives other than the well being of the Iraqi people. But we knew this already from the last twelve years of debate over what to do about Saddam. These Europeans disguised self interest as concern for the Iraqis. Now as Iraqis are liberated, old habits are hard to break, and getting money to the Iraqi people is secondary to protecting the interests of Europeans. You see, the Euros want a central role in Iraq and are banking that we will flinch from seeing destitute Iraqis long before Euro consciences are troubled:
``This issue could prove very divisive right now,'' one EU diplomat observed. ``If you lift sanctions you lift the control of the United Nations in what is going on in Iraq.''
The sanctions are the main leverage that Security Council members, including anti-war France, Germany and Russia, have to persuade Washington to give the U.N. a political role in turning shattered Iraq into a prospering democracy.
Washington wants to lift the sanctions quickly so Iraq can sell oil and pay for reconstruction, but U.N. resolutions say this depends on the world body certifying that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.
What the EU diplomat considers "leverage" we call a humanitarian problem.
But then, we Americans are so unsophisticated in the ways of the world. Feed Iraqis? Rebuild roads, power plants, and water plants? Oh no, bolstering the UN "process" so that the French, Germans, and Russians can play a bigger role is far more important.
They really do make me sick. They at least have the excuse of pursuing their interests. Why do some Americans insist on pretending the UN is a "higher" authority with more moral legitimacy than our elected, lawfully run democratic government?
Let the humanitarian institutions of the UN go to work by all means, but the UN should not be given a political role in Iraq. As an institution, it has no idea how to promote prosperity or democracy.
CORRECTION: An April 13 post is titled "Western Flank." Huh? Must have been a late night post, I really do understand compass directions better than that. It should read "Eastern Flank."
Oh, and a follow up on an earlier post. Looks like some containers we found were not the mobile chem/bio labs we think Iraq has. I am a little surprised we haven't published something yet given the hollering for it, but it is early yet. I am confident that we did not "merely" overthrow an aggressive, terror-supporting, dictatorship that killed its own citizens for fun. The evidence of weapons of mass destruction programs and stockpiles will be brought to light.
"War Over" (Posted April 14, 2003)
Major combat operations are over in Iraq. War over. Now it is cleanup time. Fighting and death may still occur, but victory is achieved.
Helluva job. I really want to hear what Special Ops boys did in this war.
Now I need to decide what to do with this blog. I'm sure as world events unfold and we try to bend events to provide for our security, the boneheaded commentary of some will send me to the keyboards. The idiocy continues even with victory (some twit on NPR moaned so loud about the admittedly unfortunate looting of a museum that you'd think she believed Saddam should have been left in power as the price of preserving artifacts), so I will feel the need to write. But I've neglected writing for profit for nearly eight months now to write here. I really must go back to giving priority to things that may go into print and which may actually earn money!
I've yet to add up the numbers on the site but I am gratified to see that volume increased quite a lot from the early months. Not a lot mind you, compared to the name sites, but I'm guessing maybe 150 hits a month, on average, with the 2003 months much better than the 2002 months.
So maybe I can go back to my original goal of updating the site once or twice a week. I'm thinking of collapsing Defense Issues with Foreign Affairs and creating a National Security Affairs page. Often, I had trouble deciding where to put something. Why decide? One page on the whole darn thing should take care of that. Digesting the lessons of the war must go on. North Korea and Iran are still there. And others too. Guest Columnist failed miserably so it goes. Maybe Landfill and Home Front get more updates. List of Annoying Things stays. I may try to serialize a book idea about basic training. I've been meaning to write about my 1988 basic training for years now. Who knows, maybe I'll get a book out of it yet. An end of Cold War account of a Guardsman's training would hook you, right?
So thanks for reading this. I'll keep going since history has not ended. Nor have my opinions on history ended. But I think it would be foolish to devote the same amount of time to this site when the main reason for beginning it, commenting on the Iraq War issue, is resolved.
And as always, as Al Bundy said, it is wrong to be French. We do have an opening on the Axis of Evil.
"North Korea" (Posted April 14, 2003)
American refusal to negotiate on Pyongyang's terms was alleged by many to be a horrible mistake. Apparently not. The North Koreans have decided that they will engage in multilateral talks to settle the crisis there.
The South Koreans think the Iraq War may have had something to do with their change in attitude.
Yet another disastrous consequence of destroying the Saddam thugocracy.
I don't know if we can through peaceful measures assure a non-nuclear North Korea or not (and assure a non-nuclear-exporting North Korea), but it at least shows that North Korean bluster does not automatically need to be met with meek surrender.
Still, I imagine North Korea still has some time as we plan to relocate our targets—er, troops—from the DMZ. I bet North Korea gets really worried when we can strike from the air without any troops in artillery range. They have time because in the logic of dealing with the nutballs with nukes and the nutballs who want nukes, the wannabee nuclear nutjubs trump the already nukejobs. Iran, therefore, is logically the next up. And our troops are conveniently nearby. This doesn't mean invasion. Our attention can take many forms. And our enemies won't like them very much either.
Of course, Iraq isn't solved yet, so some of this is premature. But we must also exploit success so too much delay is not so much prudence as it is error.
"Western Flank" (Posted April 13, 2003)
The British have moved up to al Amarah and are screening the border with Iran from al Amarah down to the Gulf. I thought I'd heard yesterday that the British were moving north, but I only saw one reference so wasn't sure. The Marines are apparently free to concentrate on the central Iraq region. This would certainly free the Army to move elsewhere. The Syrian border region to pursue the remnants seeking sanctuary with whatever gruesome weapons they can carry seems a logical destination.
"Pursuit" (Posted April 13, 2003)
Apparently, a single Marine brigade headed north to deal with Tikrit. It also seems that the last stand possible there has fallen apart. And the Marines picked up seven Americans after Iraqis turned them over to our troops.
The rather ordinary looting that accompanies a victory seems to be dying down. Hopefully, the hysteria of the press over this will too. Reporters seem to highlight this disorder as if Iraqi happiness over liberation by Americans has a life span of days-even the French managed better than this. Still focused on winning the war, there is a limit to what we can do. Given that we'd have to shoot to kill to stop the looting, there is a limit to what we should do. Yes, some Iraqis are willing to complain on TV. Shoot, you still get protesters over here loudly claiming the war is contrary to the interests of the Iraqi people. A little perspective please. MSNBC is even reporting now that looting damage is actually quite isolated! And that life is returning to normal. We're doing great.
The Marine drive north is a bit puzzling. I expected Army heavy forces to lead the way. With Brits at Basra watching the Iranians, will 3rd ID head west to seal the Syrian border and provide a warning shot across the bow to Damascus to throttle their apparent aid to Saddam's regime? They play a dangerous game and one that is not based on any moral, Arab, or Moslem solidarity. Syria backed Persian Iran against Iraq in the First Gulf War (a.k.a. Iran-Iraq War) and even contributed troops to the Persian Gulf War of 1991 to eject the Iraqis from Kuwait.
Although I doubt we will initiate another war until at least 2005, could we cross the border in hot pursuit of Iraqis who have retreated with their weapons of mass destruction into Syria? If the British, Marines, 173rd AB brigade, the 82nd AB brigade combat team, and an armored cavalry regiment (light) stabilize Iraq, that would leave 3rd ID, 4th ID, and 101st AB to bring Syria into line. I doubt we would but the threat is there. And the Syrians would have to believe that a full Army corps could make it to Damascus. I wouldn't be surprised to see special forces and air strikes destroy identified Iraqi targets in Syria if Damascus doesn't stand down. Why they don't have the sense God gave them to keep a low profile and avoid our attention I do not know.
The Iraq War is pretty much done. I don't know when it will officially be declared over but the collapse of Tikrit marks the end for all practical purposes.
Lot of work still to be done in post-war Iraq, of course. And more to be done generally. North Korea and Iran appear quite worried. Cuba too.
"A Hundred bin Ladens?" (Posted April 12, 2003)
The war against Iraq was supposed to unleash terror attacks on America, enrage the Arab and Moslem "street" and inspire jihadists to fight us.
Nothing major has happened, certainly not a repeat of 9-11, that the al Qaeda thugs claimed would be launched as soon as we invaded.
Instead of mass protests, the "street" is quiet.
The jihadists who flocked to Iraq in the expectation of a glorious victory over America have fled home-those who survived. Instead of being inflamed to fight harder, they were discouraged and headed home.
Not really. Why is it that people over here assumed that a thrashing victory could not have a good effect on our enemies? Why is it that anti-war types insisted that we could not respond to attacks and threats against us without inspiring more attacks? Were they mesmerized by the chants and threats-so outside their logical, reasonable world? Did they think that these were not normal people, capable of fear? Capable of being defeated?
Fear, as General Sherman said, is the beginning of wisdom. The Confederacy gave up in 1865. We saw crushing defeat change Germans and Japanese after 1945. We saw Soviet Russians turn their back on communism after the stunning collapse there. Why wouldn't people who see this crushing display in Iraq of American power-especially after Iraqi boasts that the street believed-decide that taking on America isn't so glorious after all? They also have the convenient excuse of seeing happy Iraqis celebrating the fall of Saddam's regime. Why fight against such power when the Iraqis don't want them to fight for them?
It is human nature to be willing to sacrifice your life for a greater good-a greater victory. It is something else entirely to give up your life in almost certain defeat. The would-be jihadists only see certain defeat. Ineffective military action can certainly inspire further resistance, but conquering the champion of the jihadists who promised so much is not ineffective.
Some, of course, see a plot with a betrayal by Saddam to deliver victory to America. Others see a Saddam plan in effect to bring eventual victory. How long they can hold onto this fantasy of thinking the destruction and defeat of the Iraqi military is part of a plan I do not know.
Our jihadist enemies have been discouraged by our victory. Some will still fight us, but the many who wanted to jump on the victory bandwagon will now go home and get a job. We must encourage this attitude. In time, the sting of defeat will fade and if the street sees weakness again, they will think about fighting us again.
This is why we must continue the war against terror on all fronts. We must push the autocratic regimes to reform, stop their propaganda, and provide freedom and economic opportunities.
Simply smashing Saddam's awful regime, with its plans of domination and death to Americans is a great victory even in isolation. But if we don't win the wider societal war, we will need to fight such a war again against someone else. Maybe in 2 years. Maybe in 5 or 10. But eventually. And the next enemy may learn from Saddam's many mistakes and deny us the relatively clean victory we achieved.
"Out of the Balkans" (Posted April 11, 2003)
The Russians are pulling their troops out of Bosnia and Kosovo. After racing into Kosovo in 1999 after the Serbs capitulated to ensure a Russian presence in that region, the Russians are apparently turning their backs on the historic Russian interest in the Balkans. The nearly $27 million per year that the forces cost Moscow is apparently considered unproductive for what Russia gets.
I am personally amazed. Maybe because our military probably spends that much annually on mulch for our bases. It is symbolic of how much Russia can interfere with our pursuit of our interests. I hope we can be allies or friends, but unless the Russians are willing to exchange nukes, their days of being our enemy—or even a thorn in our side—are over.
Time for the Russians to move on and consider how they deal with real opponents like China. And for them to stop marching in the streets over Iraq when they are still butchering Chechens. You'd think they would decide they have let the French have the wheel for long enough. Their joy ride is over, I guess. I hope the Russians get out at the St. Petersburg summit.
But for now, the Balkans are becoming part of Europe. The Russians have given up on stopping that outcome.
Now we need to split away the Germans from the French and leave the French to plot world domination with their mini-me Belgium in their secret underground lab beneath some gleaming new EU office building in Brussels. No need to withdraw from Europe in frustration. Our main enemy is France, after all. We will win there, too.
"War Predictions" (Posted April 11, 2003)
Ok, another round of self-assessment.
I correctly questioned the ferocity of the Special Republican Guards. They did not turn Baghdad into a Stalingrad-on-the-Tigris. I didn't predict their collapse so I guess I only get partial credit on this, but I was right to say that they were pampered torturers and not elite fighters.
I failed by thinking it was possible for the U.S. military to hide significant amounts of troops in the region. Up until the final offensive to reach Baghdad, I thought we'd see hitherto unseen heavy brigades enter combat. We took Baghdad with what we could see.
I forecast that speed would be the antidote to the potential problems we would face invading Iraq. That indeed seems to be the case.
I underestimated the Kurd-Turk hostility that would impede a northern front based on a shallow Turkish invasion of northern Iraq. Whether the delays that might have been overcome with a more robust northern front will prove critical is not yet known. Also, it will always be sheer conjecture as to whether 4th ID would have blitzed down to Baghdad through masses of Iraqis in the heart of Saddam's Tikriti clan like 3rd ID did through the deserts west of the Euphrates. I think not.
I'd like to say that my failure to predict the ferocious but ineffective fedayeen resistance in the cities should at least in part be excused by my failure to predict that the Iraqis would recruit foreign jihadists for their ranks.
Oh, and I predicted that if Iraq succeeds in becoming a democracy despite a lack of democratic traditions, as critics of democracy in Iraq have loudly proclaimed, people would discover them. The discovery of democracy's roots in Iraq has begun.
And let me add another prediction: Scott Ritter retires to France, where pro-Saddam and anti-American views (as well as an attraction for jail bait) is tolerated and even embraced. You heard it here first.
"Embedded Reporting" (Posted April 11, 2003)
There have been numerous complaints that American reporters embedded with American fighting units in Iraq reported as—how can I put this delicately—as Americans proud of our soldiers.
Perhaps we can examine the effects of the last dozen years of embedding reporters in Saddam's regime. The control exercised by the Saddam regime prevented them from reporting the truth and the acceptable lies they broadcast led too many in America to believe the reports were the truth.
The author concludes his tale of atrocities and lies with this:
I felt awful having these stories bottled up inside me. Now that Saddam Hussein's regime is gone, I suspect we will hear many, many more gut-wrenching tales from Iraqis about the decades of torment. At last, these stories can be told freely.
What price was paid for maintaining a "presence" there? Was it really worth spreading lies in order to have a photograph or a film clip? How did their reports constitute "news" rather than propaganda? How much better would our debate have been over war with Iraq if we had been provided a better picture of what was going on inside Iraq? Perhaps there would have been a larger debate over policy and a smaller debate over facts. I'm probably way over-optimistic here, but any improvement would be welcome.
Our media must really have a soul searching over whether it is better to report what they can truthfully from abroad rather than play by a regime's rules while embedded in the beast's lair. Cuba would be a nice place to start that debate.
"Triumphalism" (Posted April 11, 2003)
Since Iraqi resistance in Baghdad has collapsed, pro-war commentators have been engaged in an orgy of I-told-you-so programs and articles. I am sorely tempted to jump in all the way.
But I cannot in good conscience. For the most part.
Oh sure, the big-headed moral superiority attitude that the anti-war crowd copped really bugged me. I can respect arguments against the war. I never disputed anybody's right to make them. War is certainly a debatable point. And we did debate this war—at length. But the assumption by the anti-war crowd that the pro-war side was immoral and their "voice in the wilderness" was standing up for the Iraqis was out of bounds. So fine, let the record show that the Iraqi people were freed "not in their names." But next time there is a debate on what we must do, maybe the NIONists will try debating instead of hurling the "war monger" insult.
But the bad things they said would happen, could still happen. Yet as each day passes, the chance that one of them might tip the balance toward the side that we should not have acted grows smaller.
I guess the biggest problem I have with the anti-war crowd (left and right) was their failure of imagination. This was based on their lack of knowledge about warfare and our military in particular. The anti-war protesters were good at imagining all the bad things that could happen should we attack. And truth be told, they were right. I too, predicted what might have happened and my list was at least as extensive as theirs. The lack of imagination part came with their failure to see that we could take actions to negate or overcome those potential bad things. We have so far succeeded brilliantly in forestalling all those bad things.
This war is not over. Nor is the broader war to prevent a nuclear 9-11. But when our plan goes up against their plan, don't bet the mortgage on theirs.
But at least we now know what Janeane Garofalo meant when she said "we" would be "doomed" if America invades Iraq. The "we" referred to the Hollywood NIONists who claimed moral superiority for opposing a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. With rights come responsibilities. Nobody argued the stars had no right to speak their minds. They did loudly and often. It is repugnant that any of them should now bemoan that the public holds them responsible for their advocacy. They forgot that we like them for their performances—not their opinions on matters of vital national security. That holds true even for actors who play presidents on TV.
I'd say they are suffering from shucks and awww.
There. I hope I can leave this topic and move on. Our dead deserve more than becoming a point for winning a debate. We have won. I am happy for that. And I am happy that the price we have paid is not as great as it might have been. But it was sure worth it. The anti-war side could make it easier on me if some step forward to say that so much of what the said has been proven wrong. If they do, and if God forbid we must debate another war in two years, I promise I won't insist that their errors since 9-11 mean they are wrong in 2005. People's lives will depend on a good debate.
"Al Qaim" (Posted April 11, 2003)
Heavy fighting between American and British special forces and Iraqi is going on near the Syrian border. The ferocity of Iraqi resistance and the history of weapons of mass destruction at the site hints at what they may be defending. The U.S. has a problem getting heavy armor out there but we need to stomp that resistance down fast before they decide to use whatever they are defending. We are airlifting heavy armor in small numbers into northern Iraq. We can sure do it out there too I imagine. And that Stryker task force I suspect we could move. It may be light but it is under armor and mobile.
With Mosul and Kirkuk fallen, and Iraq's V Corps surrendered, Tikrit is the last major bastion. Al Qaim and the entire Syrian border generally is a critical goal now too. Otherwise just die-hards are left, and apparently they are mostly from outside Iraq.
It is funny how the Taliban, Iranians, and Iraqis used foreigners to fight, apparently knowing that their own people aren't "reliable." Funny too how despite all the protests that there is Moslem solidarity with the Afghanis or Iraqis, the people of those countries don't actually matter to the wider Moslem world. The Moslem world, or at least the jihadist loonies, prefer them as destitute, abused, dictatorships that "stand up to America" and give the jihadists psychological satisfaction. Iraqis and Afghanis be damned, apparently. The world will be a lot better off when the call for jihad in Cairo to defend some whackjob dictator in a Moslem country gets the same reaction as a call in Detroit for Christians to go to Serbia to defend the Christian west from the Moors.
On to Tikrit.
"Dexter's Laboratory?" (Posted April 10, 2003)
Well, it seems that a huge underground complex lies beneath an Iraqi nuclear facility, the Al Tuwaitha nuclear complex. One the inspectors visited but apparently without finding this. And radiation detectors are going berserk.
But I'm sure we excavated and built the entire facility in the last few days to make it seem like the Iraqis were still pursuing nuclear weapons.
We may have been in far more peril than even the pro-war side thought. Even I didn't think Iraq had more than the organization, technicians, and scientific talent in stasis waiting for the opportunity to restart their nuclear program.
And we may have found one of those mobile chem/bio labs.
But that was probably made in Detroit, and airlifted in.
The smoking guns will not remain hidden too much longer. Iraqis who hope to get on our good side are probably in a race to show us the goods before somebody else does.
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.
Cheering Iraqis.
Children's prison.
Violations of the laws of war as standard operating procedure.
Foreign jihadists in their own Lincoln brigades fighting for a hideous regime.
Oh yeah, it must be really hard to maintain the moral superiority of the anti-war side at this point. Or do we give Iraq back to Saddam's heirs?
Clearly, we underestimated the Minister of Information: the Iraqis really have won this war. It just took a Coalition victory to achieve it.
On to Tikrit.
"Saddle Up" (Posted April 9, 2003)
The real and heartwarming jubilation of the Iraqi people as we liberate Baghdad does not mean the war is over. An American officer, on his third war, said that he feels no happiness. He notes that he cannot when he sees death, and want, and destruction. I cannot possibly say I know better since I have seen no wars and no death. I was a reservist radio operator. A REMF. What can I possibly say to this man?
Yet I can say something. I do think I know better. About this anyway.
Does a surgeon focus on the blood and the cutting and the pain of an operation? Does the surgeon think of the huge bill the patient runs up in the operation? The fright of the family as they sit in the waiting room, eager for news that their loved one will be ok? Of course not. The surgery is not bloody violence, cutting a person for no reason. It is not the heartless theft of money and the imposition of fear for no reason.
The operation saves a life. The surgeon is not a cruel man for this. Nor a thief.
That American officer has the right to be happy about what he has done in our name. He can be proud that he freed an entire nation. I am certainly proud of him.
Yet the job is not done. Tikrit beckons. Third ID needs to saddle up and head north. Elements of 1st MEF and 101st AB need to drive north while leaving mostly Marines to police up Baghdad and Army troops further south. The Army is airlifting heavy armor to 173rd AB brigade in the north. I don't think we should wait for 4th ID to strike north to Tikrit. That will just give the Iraqis time to regroup and lash out in defeat with whatever chemical weapons they have nearby. We must pursue the enemy and destroy any still resisting. No time to let up, troopers.
If 3-7 Cavalry leads the advance, we may not need anybody else.
These are historic times and this is a good day. Iraqis are emerging into the light from their long imprisonment. Anybody who would deny the justice of freeing the Iraqi people simply because Americans and British led the way are unworthy of debating.
On to Tikrit.
"Ted Rall is Still an Idiot" (Posted April 9, 2003)
He is so ridiculous that I generally don't read him. A rarity, in fact. But with our troops victorious, I went to click on his last column to enjoy his complete misreading of Iraq. I think it is worth quoting some of Rall's April 2nd column at length:
Certainly, there are Iraqis--we don't know how many--who oppose Saddam. But history is clear: even Iraqis who want "regime change" don't want it imposed by an invading army, much less one from a nation whose devastating sanctions have killed hundreds of thousands during the last 12 years. The Iraqis know that we don't belong there, that we're there to steal their oil, that we can't be trusted. Like it or not, this is why they're fighting for the Baath Party.
Invading armies are only greeted as liberators under one circumstance: when they're kicking out another invader. History is clear on this. At the conclusion of World War II, cheering throngs greeted Allied tanks in France, Belgium and Holland. There were no such scenes in Germany or Japan. True, these original Axis of Evil nations ultimately went democratic, but not until after they'd been pounded into submission.
"Freedom"? Operation Iraqi Decimation is more like it.
Regardless of their political affiliations, patriotic Iraqis prefer to bear the yoke of Saddam's brutal and corrupt dictatorship than to suffer the humiliation of living in a conquered nation, subjugated by Allied military governors and ruled by a Hamid Karzai-style puppet whose strings stretch across the Atlantic. As much as they may loathe Saddam, they're proud of their country, culture and rich history. The thought of infidel troops marching through their cities, past their mosques, patting them down, ordering them around, disgusts them even more than Saddam's torture chambers.
This is reality—from today:
Saddam Hussein (news - web sites)'s rule over the capital has ended, U.S. commanders declared Wednesday, and jubilant crowds swarmed into the streets here, dancing, looting and cheering U.S. convoys. A Marine tank recovery vehicle helped residents topple a towering statue of Saddam in a sweeping, symbolic gesture.
It is like Paris 1944 but without those annoying French people spoiling the happy mood.
We pretty much know how many Iraqis oppose Saddam. They're the ones tearing down the Saddam statues and cheering American troops riding through Baghdad.
Why Ted Rall has a column in something with more subscribers than a Fort Worth ANSWER chapter newsletter I do not know.
"Peace Department?" (Posted April 9, 2003)
Rep. Kucinich wants to establish a peace department.
We have one—it's called the Department of Defense.
"Urban Blitzkrieg" (Posted April 9, 2003)
The regime in Baghdad is crumbling. Scattered resistance will not alter the fact that Baathists have lost Baghdad. Cries are going out that the casualties from our urban blitz are excessive and that world opinion, Arab opinion in particular, will not forgive us. The assumptions and conclusions are wrong.
We probed and raided and found Iraqi defenses lacking. We decided to bounce the city rather than lay siege. Would fewer Iraqis have died if we had sealed off the city? With death squads punishing disloyalty; and regime thugs hoarding all the food, water, and medicine? Would giving the thugs time to recover their will to fight after the pasting they took really have lowered casualties? Ours and theirs? Clearly, winning fast lowers casualties by ending the damn war. How this can be overlooked is beyond me.
As for the rest of the world not forgiving us? Are they to refuse "forgiveness" in the face of happy Iraqis? The Moslem world seems to have no problem forgiving the French, the Soviets, and the Russians for their brutal wars against Algerians, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. And they slaughtered Moslems for years. The Russians are still doing it. Indeed, the Moslem street seemed to forgive Iraqi slaughter of Iranians and Iraqis with ease.
The Moslem world will learn to see the bright side of ending Saddam's despotism. They may even draw hope that their own misery can be ended.
Honest to God, the stories of Iraqis finally free to express their feelings brought tears to my eyes. This war is not "just" one in our national security interests—it is just. And we did it in the face of moralists who claimed leaving Saddam's regime in power was the right and moral thing to do. In the face of the near universal disapproval of leaders of western religions. Against world opinion. And we did it with fewer casualties than I thought possible. In three weeks. America's determination to lead others who believed as we did is to be commended for sticking to the goal of overthrowing Saddam's regime. The coalition of the willing is also the coalition of the right. The coalition of doing the right thing, that is. I eagerly await the news of the planned anti-war protests this weekend.
The war is not over yet. The Saddamites may yet try a last stand in Tikrit. Some might yet launch chemical weapons in a last spasm of murder. Get the Patriots to Baghdad by all means. When the rulers think the people have "betrayed" them, the Saddam thugs could unleash chemicals on their favorite target—Iraqi civilians. The best quote I've read today? From this article:
"I'm 49, but I never lived a single day," said Yusuf Abed Kazim, a Baghdad imam who pounded the statue's pedestal with a sledgehammer. "Only now will I start living. That Saddam Hussein is a murderer and a criminal."
They can finally live.
This has been a good war.
"An Easier Solution" (Posted April 8, 2003)
As American forces subdue Iraqi resistance in Baghdad, Iraq's so-called Information Minister has routinely denied our presence. Said the good minister, from an AP story:
"There is no presence of American infidels in the city of Baghdad" Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf asserted outside Baghdad's Palestine Hotel on Monday.
Really, despite Osama's anger at America's presence in the Gulf, wouldn't we have all saved a lot of effort and blood if the Islamofascists had simply copied the minister's attitude?
Of course, as with al-Sahhaf, the Wahhabis could have fallen back on their secondary defense when confronted with reality—it is all part of the plan to win.
Or maybe al-Sahhaf is sending a subtle message that he does not consider the Americans in Baghdad to be infidels. Maybe he is just trying to get on our good side.
I at least would be happy if the press stopped discussing his daily flight from reality as an attitude of "defiance." They give the lying spokesman for a murderous regime the air of honor with that description. This article specifically comments on his "flair" with words.
Far from being annoyed, I welcome his "defiance." With so many actually believing his words over ours, when the Iraqi regime collapses it will seem all the more dramatic to the many people who have bizarrely placed their hopes for honor in Saddam's resistance to our invasion.
"Bastards" (Posted April 8, 2003)
Our forces, members of 1st MEF, freed children who had been imprisoned, some as long as five years, for refusing to join Saddam's children's brigade:
Around 150 children spilled out of the jail after the gates were opened as a US military Humvee vehicle approached, Lieutenant Colonel Fred Padilla told an AFP correspondent travelling with the Marines 5th Regiment.
"Hundreds of kids were swarming us and kissing us," Padilla said.
"There were parents running up, so happy to have their kids back."
"The children had been imprisoned because they had not joined the youth branch of the Baath party," he alleged. "Some of these kids had been in there for five years."
The children, who were wearing threadbare clothes and looked under-nourished, walked on the streets crossing their hands as if to mimic handcuffs, before giving the thumbs up sign and shouting their thanks.
Do the protesters still out in the streets of San Francisco even see anymore? Can evidence change their minds? Shall we turn around, withdraw from Iraq, and return Iraq to the hands of worthless pieces of human garbage that would imprison children for failing to salute their hideous dictator and murdering governing party? Well?!!
"War on Terror" (Posted April 8, 2003)
Saddam may be dead now, after the B-1 strike yesterday. The facts of this attack are probably irrelevant to the course of the war. The Iraqis are falling fast and the momentum of their defeat will not be deflected or speeded up if Saddam no longer gives orders.
The loyalists of Saddam fight hard—I did not know if they would. But we do at least see that the title of "elite" often tagged to Saddam's most loyal is a crock. They die in large numbers with virtually no effect on American forces who strike inward at Baghdad. They fight, but they do so with virtually no military skill.
As we crush the regime, we overrun the terror camps of Ansar al Islam and the state hijacking training camp near Baghdad. Osama calls for Moslems to strike in defense of the butcher Saddam's regime.
Even as we prosecute the war against Saddam with victory in sight, we have yet another indication that the dire predictions of foes of war are falling. Many said that world opposition to war against Saddam would cripple cooperation in the war against al Qaeda. Germany, whose opposition to war was strident and unswerving, has come to an agreement with America on cooperation in law enforcement to prosecute the war on terror.
The Iraqis have but a little time left to pull a surprise that will inflict casualties on our forces. Soon, the remnants of Saddam's defenders will be broken completely or killed. I imagine we are talking days and not weeks. We shall see.
"Battle for Baghdad Continues" (Posted April 7, 2003)
A full brigade of the 3rd ID has raided into Baghdad again. The Marines have used their AAVs to cross the Tigris in their eastern assault on Baghdad. This is why the Marines need those AAVs. I have been surprised that they have not needed this capability yet in the war, but the failure of the Iraqis to blow their bridges is the real surprise. The press is shocked by the use of the AAVs to cross the river. This is why the Marines have them. Still, the ride north was a hairy one for these AAVs. It would have been nice to have transported them north on trucks for this use and use Bradleys for the attack north.
Plus the Brits are seriously working on Basra.
Outstanding
"Battle for Baghdad" (Posted April 5, 2003)
A U.S. task force (a battalion of armor and mechanized infantry) raided through southwest Baghdad. It was apparently a great success, but I honestly don't understand why a unit that rolled through the city with such ease did not try to hold what it took. I am no expert on urban warfare, but I hope we don't have to retake that ground later at great loss of life. I also worry about the people who waved at us, believing we were freeing them. Will the Saddam security people take their revenge? How will these people feel seeing us march in and then let the thugs back?
But perhaps surrounding the city is taking priority now. And maybe holding the areas would just prompt Iraqi artillery fire and civilian deaths. And we do have to work on lines of communication security. And special ops people are in the city doing their work quietly. Plus we may be talking to Iraqis in the capital. I will not complain. There is too much I do not know. We are in the beginning of week three and we are probing the Iraqi capital! I'd say the Iranians, who tried at high cost for 6 years to batter their way to any Iraqi city, are very impressed. And afraid. Good.
The war isn't over by a long shot, but it still qualifies as a cakewalk as far as I am concerned. I hope this success holds.
The fantasy briefings given by the Iraqis about how the war is going are getting downright sad. And encouraging. How can the leadership of Iraq exercise effective command when their data is so wrong? Seriously, this is Berlin bunker '45-level collapse. They really may have no idea how badly they have been beaten. Just like in '91 when they had no idea where American forces were in Iraq when they sat down to agree to a ceasefire.
Into Baghdad.
"Exhibit No. 527…" (Posted April 4, 2003)
… of something the enemy says that inspires no outrage, but if we even hinted at something like that, whoa, haul out your adjectives of outrage:
With thousands of frightened residents fleeing Baghdad and U.S. troops in control of its airport, the Iraqi information minister promised Friday that his nation's military would launch an "unconventional" counterattack against the coalition troops.
"We will do something which I believe is very beautiful," said Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf at a Baghdad news conference, adding that the Iraqis planned to strike back "in an unconventional way." Asked if that meant the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, he quickly said no.
"What I meant are commando and martyrdom operations in a very new, creative way," al-Sahhaf said.
Something "very beautiful." Something "creative." Lovely, eh?
The biggest outrage, of course is the European outrage at the "religious" basis of our war (apparently, "evil" is a word only used by Bible-thumping creationists) while ignoring the calls by too many in the Islamic world to impale Americans on scimitars as a religious duty.
Then we have to "understand" their rage.
"Bombing Iraq" (Posted April 4, 2003)
Joanne Grady Huskey, who survived the US embassy bombing in Kenya, is horrified that we are bombing Iraq to liberate the country. She said in the Washington Post:
As a member of one family that survived a bomb, I can tell you from the bottom of my heart: Bombing will never be the solution. Do you think the Iraqi families you are bombing today are going to get up and thank you and want to know more about our great country? You are wrong.
Contrast this with what some would-be shields discovered inside Iraq:
European Journal of International Law (March 23): "A group of American anti-war demonstrators who came to Iraq with Japanese human shield volunteers made it across the border today with 14 hours of uncensored video, all shot without Iraqi government minders present. Kenneth Joseph, a young American pastor with the Assyrian Church of the East, told UPI that the trip 'had shocked me back to reality.' Some of the Iraqis he interviewed on camera 'told me they would commit suicide if American bombing didn't start. They were willing to see their homes demolished to gain their freedom from Saddam's bloody tyranny. They convinced me that Saddam was a monster the likes of which the world had not seen since Stalin and Hitler. He and his sons are sick sadists. Their tales of slow torture and killing made me ill, such as people put in a huge shredder for plastic products, feet first so they could hear their screams as bodies got chewed up from foot to head.'" (from The Weekly Standard website)
I am sorry that this woman experienced this bombing. But must an entire nation of Iraqis be imprisoned, impoverished, and abused so that she does not have to have the memories of her horrible experience dredged up? Does she not see the difference between her experience—with an Islamofascist nutjob trying to kill her, a free citizen of a free country—and our focused (but not always 100% accurate) bombing that seeks to free a terrorized and bloodied people? Can she not see that her bombing interrupted a normal American life of shopping malls, and letters to the editor, and PTA meeting, and all the other precious activities that we take for granted; and that the Iraqi experience of bombing is promising to end their "normal" life of death squads, and torture, and privation, and sickness, and despair of a future for their children? Can she not see this?! There sure is a lot of misunderstanding going on here, as she notes.
She is wrong.
"Iraqi Chemicals" (Posted April 4, 2003)
So where are the Iraqi chemical strikes? The initial failure to use them may have been largely prompted by a strategic decision that Saddam's best hope for survival was to endure and hope the Arab, Moslem, and European streets would bolster French and Russian attempts to save the regime. Despite the failure of the Iraqi military to significantly delay or attrite our forces on the way to Baghdad, it is possible that the regime may still think this strategy can work. As long as Baghdad holds, the regime can survive as long as no chemicals are used or discovered.
In addition, the delay of using them makes it less likely they will be effective in stopping us. Unless an atomic bomb is located in the now-Baghdad International Airport and is set to blow, weapons of mass destruction will not be very effective at this late date. Commanders who might use them now know that carrying out orders to use them will lead to very bad things happening to them. Getting an order to use chemical weapons may be the signal to that officer to dump the boots and run. Even the loyal guys who watch over the chemicals may decide it is unwise to unleash them and our retaliation.
Another possibility for the failure to use them may be organizational. During the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons were held back under centralized control on the theory that their use should be a political decision from the highest level when there is no choice but to use them if the Iranians were to be stopped from breaking through the Iraqi lines. This method was fairly ineffective, with authority to use and implementation coming long after the best time militarily for their use. In addition, this method made it tough to coordinate chemical use with the armed forces to maximize the effects.
Later in the war, decision-making for use chemical use was passed down to corps commanders who could also integrate chemical use into battle planning more effectively. This worked quite well from the Iraqi point of view.
But over the last 12 years, the hands controlling chemical weapons have not been those who seek to use it the most effectively. They have been held by those who seek to hide them in the darkest corners of Iraq. Dispersing them. Burying them. Never letting anybody even think they know where they might be. Perhaps the mindset that allowed the Iraqis to hoodwink the inspectors is boomeranging to our benefit today as these custodians of death cannot change their mindset from hiding chemicals to using them. If so, we may owe a debt of gratitude to the inspectors and to the French and Russians who gave the Iraqis hope that they could hide them long enough to escape sanctions and scrutiny.
Yet the war is not over yet. Setbacks may meet us yet. Real setbacks—not the faux failures to meet the expectations of an unseen plan that have animated the media in week two of the war.
I hope not. That would not change the outcome of this war. Only our level of casualties. Sadly, the thugs of Iraq will consider that a reasonable alternative to surviving as the regime.
"Human Shields" (Posted April 3, 2003)
Were I a human shield in Baghdad (assuming I get the lobotomy and suck out the sense of morality that such a decision would require), I would get real worried that the people I was supposedly shielding might get a tad angry once the regime starts collapsing around me. It would be funny if they had to flee to American troops for safety.
"Our Rescued PFC" (Posted April 3, 2003)
She apparently fought on after being wounded until she ran out of ammo. Broken limbs, shot, and stabbed. A rear echelon type, too. You bet there is a movie out of this. I'll watch it. Good for her. I only hope the fame doesn't do her more damage. She should stick to her plan of going to college and becoming a teacher. It would be nice to know that some day, down the line, a teacher will explain how this country is worth fighting for.
Way to go.
"In For the Kill" (Posted April 3, 2003)
We apparently dropped the power in Baghdad. As our troops get set to go in, it is good to have it nice and dark. Our regulars, that is, since special forces are fighting in the city already.
Fifth Corps and 1st MEF are closing on the city from the southern approaches.
Iraqi regulars in the north may break in the face of U.S.-Kurdish advances and in the absence of more Republican Guards to enforce their presence on the battlefield.
Special forces in Ramadi and north of Baghdad to interdict leadership trying to flee. They are raiding palaces too.
Iraqis claim we are not even 100 miles from Baghdad. The scenes inside Iraqi command bunkers may resemble Berlin in April 1945, as the Baathists still alive issue orders to non-existent divisions. And the ones who are sent south expecting no Americans until they are 100 miles from Baghdad will be slaughtered as they run into American troops just outside the city.
It is worth it to try and bounce the city on the run while the Iraqis are panicked and frightened refugees from the Republican Guard fleeing into the city can spread a little panic with the news that we can't be stopped. Remember, retreating troops have every reason to inflate the threat they are running from to justify their flight. If we truly meet tough resistance, we can pull back and do it the slow, careful way. But it is worth it to try to take the city fast, given all the other threats in the world.
Into Baghdad.
"War Really Is the Answer" (Posted April 3, 2003)
Najaf is reported to be just like Paris in 1944. The people are greeting us with cheers. Anti-liberation protesters in this country continue to demand "no war". I guess it is time to ask them, shall we give the country back to the Saddamites? Are you people seriously arguing that our forces, who are at the gates of Baghdad and fighting inside there even now, should stop, wheel about, and come home? Should we really let down the people of Iraq again? For months, the anti-liberation side has asked how we—the Australians, British, and Americans primarily—could attack when world opinion is against the war? Well, even aside from the small matter of ensuring American security without conceding a veto to foreign states, I guess now we can add the people of Iraq to those who support the overthrow of Saddam. What did I say in the face of world opposition? We do this for our safety and for the sake of the Iraqis. Now, what do the protesters say in the face of jubilant Iraqis?
Probably not too damn much.
You don't need numbers to be right. You sure as hell don't need the French.
We must keep our word to the Iraqis to deliver the opportunity for peace, freedom, and rule of law—and yes, even democracy. God knows they deserve it. Their nightmare really is ending at long last.
"Jihad" (Posted April 2, 2003)
Saddam's regime wants the war against the Coalition to be a jihad between the Arab/Moslem world and America. Volunteers are eager to head to Iraq in order to do their duty as they see it to the greater glory of Allah.
Idiots.
Didn't they try this in Afghanistan? Oh yeah, lots of volunteers flocked there to do their religious duty. And when the Taliban regime got wasted, the local Afghanis turned on the foreign jihadists and killed them or imprisoned them. The ingrates!
Such is the glory of jihad when you face the strongest military power on the planet after it decides it is not going to just sit and take the civilian casualties and terrorist strikes on our military that the jihadists claim is war.
Welcome to your jihad.
It is logical that Saddam (or his successors) would try this. They tried it in 1980 and for the next 8 years. The Iraqis hoped the Iran-Iraq War (the real First Gulf War) would be a war between the Arab world and the Shia Persians. Funny thing is, the Arab world had no desire to get sucked into the Khomeini meat grinder that killed Iraqi soldiers and sucked the Iraqi treasury dry. When one side is getting their butt whipped something fierce, I guess the allure of jihad isn't quite what the boys in Baghdad hoped it would be. Saddam failed in his attempt to make his war of aggression and ambition a war of the Arab world against Iran. Indeed, Syria backed Iran through the entire war and Libya backed Iran for much of the war. In fact, more of the Arab world backed America to fight Saddam in 1991 than ever sided with Saddam in the 1980s. Shoot, we have more support, now, than Saddam ever got.
So, notwithstanding Arab and Moslem world help for us today, can Saddam inspire the jihad against us? How on earth will Saddam make this a glorious struggle when we are smashing the Iraqi armed forces and they are only wearing us out as we get tired of pummeling them? And we are not even in Saddam's personal axis of evil, "the Jews, Persians, and flies," which God should not have created according to Saddam. Such a lovely family sentiment to pass on to the kids.
If a bunch of foreign nutballs want to sign up for the final battle to defend Saddam, more power to them—saves us the trouble of hunting them down. I am sorry they are so foolish and blind to reality but I won't cry too long for people who are determined to die for no good purpose. And when the Iraqi government surrenders unconditionally, the Iraqis will hunt down the foreign jihadists in a symbolic refuting of their Saddamite past. By killing the foreigners, they will cleanse themselves of the Baathists and move on in the new world.
The Iraqis have a shot at a better life when this is over. I hope they seize the opportunity.
I hope to God the new world will be better for the entire Arab and Moslem worlds, too. I really do. They deserve a better life than a steady stream of paranoid fantasies that leave them mired in poverty, authoritarian rule, and torture, periodically interrupted by mass deaths in futile wars designed to bolster their fantasy life of foreign oppression and plots.
It will certainly be a better world for us when the call to jihad is met with incredulous disdain rather than the foolhardy enthusiasm that it gets today. I know it is fashionable to say our war will create a hundred bin Ladens, but the Wahhabi kooks out there have more to worry about their murderous impulses creating a hundred Tommy Franks.
On to Baghdad.
"Saddam's Game" (Posted April 2, 2003)
This article assumes Saddam has a greater objective than "merely" preventing the American conquest of Iraq.
I don't know, it sure looks an awful lot like Saddam is getting the snot kicked out of him.
But still, the author has a point that we should not approach this from a Western view of victory and defeat. After all, Saddam has rather successfully portrayed his punching bag role in the 1991 war as a great victory because he survived it with Iraq and his regime intact.
So what of the author's speculation? He thinks Saddam seeks domination of the anti-Western wing of the Arab and Moslem worlds. He thinks that he can lose the war, even fleeing Iraq, and still gain the aura of surviving a war against America. He points to the 1973 war as a losing war that created pride. Second, he thinks that a prolonged guerrilla war against us after the surrender will make America and Britain tire of governing Iraq. Third, he thinks Saddam's loyalists will emerge in conventional warfare to defeat us in a combination of Somali urban warfare and North Vietnam's 1975 offensive that crushed Saigon.
I'm sorry, but this is rot.
Keep in mind that Saddam hoped his war against Iran would lead to his domination of the Arab and Moslem worlds in addition to leadership in the Gulf region. Oops.
The 1973 war surprised the Israelis with initial success and showed that Arab armies could inflict defeats on Israelis. The war ended with a ceasefire before Israeli forces could completely whomp Syria and Egypt. In this war, we are going to Baghdad to destroy the regime and rebuild it. There will be no glory there and I cannot imagine Saddam finding sanctuary anywhere after this is over if he still lives.
As for guerrilla war. Keegan points out that Iraq is poorly suited for guerrilla warfare. And who will supply them? There is no foreign power that will be shipping weapons to Iraqis thugs. And without outside help, insurgencies quickly become police problems. The new Iraqi government will put these thugs down in time.
As for the offensive? Not bloody likely. Just where will the Saddam loyalists organize a mechanized army to march on Baghdad like the North Vietnamese did in 1975? And given the spectacularly bloody failure of the death squads thus far in city combat against us, just how will be be Blackhawk Downed?
Really, the post-war can go wrong. Indeed, we have not won this war yet so much could still go wrong. But the author's scenario of doom is simply too unrealistic to base our plans.
We are winning this war.
"Troop Strength" (Posted April 1, 2003)
I don't feel like piling on about the troop strength issue. Some critics say we have insufficient troops in Iraq. I think we needed more heavy armor with the Army thrust to the west, but I can't say overall troop strength is too small. Let me go by memory here, but I think way back at the beginning of this blog (the luxury of a blog is that I don't have to go check) I called for two heavy divisions (6 heavy brigades), one air assault division (3 brigades), one light division (2 brigades), an armored cavalry regiment, one-plus Marine division (4 brigades) and a British brigade. I think I may have mentioned a brigade of the 82nd AB division. Over time, I speculated on variations but this is a decent representation of the force I believed sufficient to overwhelm the Iraqis. This totals 9 heavy brigades (including the equivalent of a heavy brigade in the Marine component and one British heavy unit) and 9 light brigades.
We actually have in action one heavy division (4 heavy brigades), one very large Marine division (say, six brigades), one air assault division (3 brigades), a British division (3 brigades), and two parachute brigades. Odds and sods are there too for garrisons and self protection so I won't count them (I assumed similar forces would be there in my scenario) as part of the assault force. This totals 7 heavy brigades (including 2 Marine heavy equivalents) and 11 light brigades.
Overall we are 2 heavy brigades short and 2 light brigade over what I expected would overwhelm the Iraqi army. The key to my discomfort is that we have only 4 heavy brigades in the main thrust against the Republican Guards on the west. I'd prefer to have seven heavy brigades as the core of the thrust into the Republican Guards to have a margin of error in case of setbacks. We can still win-and I expect us to win-but I'd feel better with a stronger western Army thrust.
But I can't get over-excited over the troop strength totals. And I won't snipe over that issue.
We are winning handily and I expect this force to win decisively.
"Unconditional Surrender" (Posted April 1, 2003)
The Iraqis apparently floated the negotiations rumors to make his people think we are not going to Baghdad to kill or arrest Every Saddam thug in the country. We made it clear that we are there until we have Saddam's head on a pike, so to speak.
Really, today's news stories give me the impression that the Iraqis are starting to crumble. Collapsing resistance in the south. Civilians cheering Army troops advancing north to Karbala. People in the south beginning to openly cooperate with the Coalition. Republican Guards losing troops and equipment at a high rate. Republican Guards pulling out of the north where they keep the two regular corps up there on the line, in order to reinforce the south. Saddam was a no-show after a promise of an appearance. And the Iraqis seem to be escalating their threats in their impotence to actually stop us.
And we rescued one of our soldiers from the Iraqis. Hooah!
I'd love to see a U.S. armored thrust through the Ramadi gap but I'm starting to think we are going to plow north through the Karbala gap. Pity. Would have been nice to cut off the Republican Guards so they could not retreat to Baghdad.
"Europe" (Posted April 1, 2003)
A good article on European-American relations. Yes, reward the European states that sided with us. Friends must know that we remember friendship. None of this let bygones be bygones crud for those who opposed us beyond what allies are supposed to do. Reach out to Germany and work to treat the last year as an aberration that we can fix. Treat the neutrals with respect and work to pull them to us—but not the generosity for our friends. Make France and their smaller allies pay for opposing us and abandoning their alliance with us. They feel they don't need us now that the Soviets are gone? Fine, that is their right. We don't have to like it. That is our right. Do it quietly though, you know—speak softly and carry a big stick?
We need a prosperous and friendly Europe. We resisted the Kaiser, Hitler, and Soviet Russians to preserve this vital goal. I see no reason we should run like a Frenchman in a thunderstorm just because the French, Belgians, and Greeks are trying to turn the continent into an Anti-American Theme Park.
"Arrogance" (Posted April 1, 2003)
And we are arrogant? We say you must obey international agreements that you actually ratify; and should follow their provisions even when you want out. Belgian law provides universal jurisdiction for war crimes to be tried in Belgian courts! Is it any wonder we don't want to join the ICC? We had the Holy Grail of international law fetishists in the Persian Gulf War—a UNSC resolution authorizing war—and an accident of that war gets us indicted for war crimes? Oh, the Euros will go talk to the North Koreans, or give the Chinese a pass for their crimes, and ignore the Russian mass murders in Chechnya, and think Castro is just fine and dandy, and even think nothing of Iraqi war crimes or any other whackjob out there killing people for fun and profit, but Americans get indicted by the Belgians. They say they get to decide international norms of behavior. And they judge us the worst offender.
Unfreakingbelievable.
"Right and Wrong" (Posted April 1, 2003)
Oh, as long as I'm righting and wronging my war expectations. Wrong: XVIII Airborne Corps would command the main offensive from the west while V Corps was essentially the feint up the direct road to Baghdad. Right: The offensive on the ground would begin more or less at the same time as the air campaign. I suspected the ground campaign might start before, but hedged that a more conservative approach would start the air attack first for several days—a week if we were ultra-conservative. We started the ground offensive after the initial decapitation strike and some light bombing but before the start of the heavy air attack.
