Friday, June 26, 2020

Conditional First Use

Is Russia's nuclear weapons use doctrine aimed at China?

Russia's standard for using nuclear weapons is:

--arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and/or its allies (i.e. a launch on warning)

--use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against Russia and/or its allies

--attack by an adversary against critical government or military sites of Russia, disruption of which would undermine nuclear force response actions (i.e. a so-called decapitation strike against the political and military leadership)

--aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

As an aside, yeah, I worry about that launch-on-warning trigger. Which is why I opposed muddying the water between our strategic and tactical nukes.

America isn't going to nuke Russia in a first strike. America isn't going to use any other type of WMD on Russia. America isn't going to attempt a decapitation strike on Russia. America is in no position to invade Russia let alone threaten the existence of the Russian state.

What about China?

I don't think China is in position to launch a first strike unless China has way more nukes than we think they have. I don't see China launching any other WMD--other than pandemics--at Russia. And I don't see China as having the capability of launching a decapitation strike.

But the last one is interesting. If China invades Russia to capture the land that Russia took from China in the 19th century is that a threat to the very existence of the Russian state?

Not technically. But it would be a threat to Russia's pretense to be a global power in Europe and Asia if Russia lost that territory.

If Russia is reduced to a regional European great power, does that meet the criteria? When Putin has said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a horrible historical event, that might be the case.

Is this standard aimed at China?

And a more interesting question is whether a public nuclear doctrine statement is designed to get people to assume Russia has a strategic nuclear force that needs a doctrine.