Thursday, March 15, 2018

Wait a Bit to Judge Syria

Huh?

American expeditions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya―and probably Syria, too―have led to stalemate, exhaustion, anarchy, or political defeat. The Russians, waging true coalition warfare with their Iranian, Syrian, Hezbollah, Shiite, and Turkish allies, have succeeded in achieving their primary war aims.

I see we have more of the boundless praise for an enemies' results and excessive criticism of our outcomes, which annoys me so much.

Iraq started as a hostile state that sponsored terrorism, wanted WMD, invaded allies, and was a brutal regime to its own people.

American-led intervention created an imperfect ally that at least is not brutal to large classes of people, fights terrorists at our side, does not pursue WMD, is not a threat to our Gulf allies, and is willing to host American forces. And the American effort in Iraq continues through five administrations (Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43, Obama, and Trump). That's continuity and not exhaustion.

Iraq is an imperfect ally but Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea were hardly stellar allies early after the wars that turned them into prosperous allies. Give Iraq some time before judging.

I don't see stalemate, exhaustion, anarchy, or political defeat.

Afghanistan started as a brutal Islamist government that hosted al Qaeda which struck us big on September 11, 2001.

American-led intervention created an imperfect ally that has not been a sanctuary for terrorists to plan attacks on America. Afghans fight at our side to kill terrorist enemies. If there is stalemate, it is at least a stalemate that keeps Afghanistan from being a sanctuary for terrorists to hit us. And perhaps our regional strategy will finally get Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban which contributes to the stalemate.

I don't think stalemate must continue and don't see exhaustion, anarchy, or political defeat.

Libya? I'll grant that there is a lot of anarchy and a good deal of stalemate, but this war seems to have been waged on behalf of Europe that was eager to do something. And a civil war was already raging. So the anarchy problem is not on America. It started before the intervention and the Europeans didn't seem interested in post-war intervention.

But efforts continue to solve the anarchy and stalemate of Libya. So I don't see exhaustion or political defeat.

As for Syria, we beat ISIL! And stalemate that at least protects eastern Syria to help Kurds escape Assad's control and shields Iraq is not too bad. Even if Assad survives he is much weaker and the costs of winning may yet be too much to endure. If seeking revenge for past Assad regime killing of American troops is a goal, we'd done that. Also, I don't see anarchy as much as I see multiple powers controlling different regions, with Assad's allies mostly dominant in the western core region. If Assad's victory there is a political defeat for America that is fair enough. But we never made a serious effort to defeat Assad and I wouldn't invest much in that objective.

If you count Russia's presence in Syria as a political defeat, that is true. But Russia's achievement came before we geared up the effort against ISIL. Defeating ISIL surely helped Assad, but are you seriously arguing we had no interest separate from Assad's fate to defeat ISIL? So it is hardly a critical political defeat. I certainly don't see exhaustion as much as I see limits on what we will commit for our limited aims. That is a form of pre-exhaustion for the level of commitment we might make, but it doesn't say we can't achieve objectives at this level.

What about Russia?

Yes, they have Assad in western Syria secured. And that gives Russia bases. This is indeed a success. Although how long the bases or forces located there would last in a war and what good they'd do is another question. And will Assad survive the civil war? If he does, will he serve Iran more than Russia and eventually harm Russian interests in Syria?

And Russia is kind of pre-exhausted given the low limits they place on paying a price in order to avoid opposition at home. And Assad, while winning, has not won yet and has suffered massive casualties and economic damage to get this far. Can Russia continue to back their position with a low level of commitment?

Plus, Iran--with its Hezbollah and Shia foreign legion allies, is an ally of the moment with different objectives, as is Turkey. And by backing Iran and Turkey--which will not remain Russian allies in all likelihood--Russia has alienated Sunni Arab states that view Iran as a threat and still remember being run by Turkey with less than fond memories.

Let's not even bring in Israel which has its own interests.

And are Syria's Sunni Arabs going to remember Russia's terror bombing with admiration?

So let's wait at least a bit before we conclude Russia doesn't have to face the problems of stalemate, exhaustion, and political defeat. Or even anarchy, for that matter.

To be fair, the author does say that the Russian success is qualified ("so far") and does note the tensions with competing powers with different goals, but that's a big asterisk to add to an argument about Russia's superior approach to the Middle East, isn't it? And the ability to jump ahead to conclude American defeat seems to ignore such nuance, eh?

Honestly, I'd at least like to be judged by the same standards as foes for measuring success, okay?

And as an aside, I was not taken surprise by Russia's intervention in 2015. I had speculated about that before the Russians moved in. Not that I predicted Putin would take the step when he did. But the possibility was long on my radar.