Monday, December 30, 2013

Paying for Survival

Assad is on offense in a core Syria in the west that encompasses the capital region, the Alawite homeland, and the lines of communication between those two poles. Now Assad just has to pay for the war. Oil and gas would do that.

Syrian oil production has plummeted 90% with the loss of eastern oil fields and gas production is half of pre-revolt levels. While in the short run Iran is paying for Iraqi oil to sustain Assad's war, in the long run Iran wants Assad to pay for his regime and so does Assad.

Remember, Assad is winning within his core Syria, following a script I laid out two years ago:

Syria has too few loyal troops to control the entire country of 23 million people. At some point, they are going to need to concentrate on holding the core regions of Syria to maintain the regime even if the price of maintaining the regime is territory. ...

Outposts at other critical locations outside that zone could become the focus of conflict if the opposition can exploit abandoned zones and turn them into liberated zones. What will Syria's Kurds do out in the far northeast of Syria?

Syria would probably need to use air power to hit the abandoned zones to try to keep them from becoming liberated zones that are launching pads for attacks into the core zones. And Russia is willing to sell cheap Yak-130 aircraft useful for such missions and is willing to veto UN Security Council resolutions that might seek to punish Syria for bombing civilians.

At that point, Syria would need to consolidate their power in their core zones and then expand ground power to begin expanding their controlled zones. Would Iran send forces to help? If not, Assad will have to call on a lot of sacrifice from his minority supporters to provide recruits to fight the majority Sunnis. Even the well off won't be able to avoid sending their sons into the security forces.

Unless the protesters lose the will to resist, it seems that the situation has to evolve into a civil war with each side holding its own territory. Assad doesn't have the horses to hold everywhere against anything but token resistance. If armed resistance continues to grow, Assad is going to have to write off peripheral areas, at least temporarily, to hold what he needs to maintain his regime in power.

That's pretty much how it is playing out. Iran isn't sending troops, but it has sent advisers and arranged for troops from Hezbollah and a Shia foreign legion. And Iran has helped organize militias to fight for Assad.

If Assad is to hold his core Syria (that isn't secured yet, I hasten to add) in the face of mounting loyalist casualties or even ask his demoralized army to go on offense to reconquer all of Syria, he'll need money to fund those objectives.

That's where Russia comes in:

Damascus signed an oil and gas deal with a Russian company Wednesday which will allow for the first-ever exploration off Syria's coast.

The agreement was signed by Syrian Oil Minister Suleiman Abbas, Syria's General Petroleum Company and the Russian Soyuzneftegaz company, according to an AFP reporter present at the signing.

Granted, this will take time. But defeating the insurgency--if Assad can pull that off rather than just securing a core Syria--will take time, too. Assad can't know for sure that Iran will be able to fund his regime and supporters for long enough to reconquer all of Syria.

Besides, Iran really just needs western Syria to be a conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon to face Israel. So Assad's objectives diverge from Iran's minimum objective.

This war is still going on. Assad, Iran, and Russia are acting like it is.

Pretending like Assad has already won and so it is futile to influence the war is simply giving up and ensuring Assad can survive.