Monday, August 27, 2012

Preservation of Favoured Policies in the Struggle for Power

Our left side of the aisle has gone through an interesting evolution in thinking on coping with hostile states with rulers who want weapons of mass destruction. What will the next phase of their opinion look like?

In 1998, a Democratic administration both struck Saddam's Iraq over four days despite admitting that they didn't think it would do more than delay Saddam's WMD progress by more than a year; and signed legislation making regime change in Iraq our official policy. Liberals seemed fine with this.

In 2002, in the debate on Iraq, liberals opposed invading Iraq to depose Saddam (some figured we could support a revolt or coup), arguing that Saddam was contained and couldn't possibly get nukes under our watchful eyes and sanctions.

Today, liberals oppose striking the mullah-run Iran, arguing that Iran will eventually get nukes and it isn't worth the price to simply delay that nuclear future; and don't see any point in overthrowing the regime.

That's pretty amazing. To go from supporting thug regime change and accepting even the short delay of a thug getting WMD, to opposing efforts to remove a thug regime and acceptance that the thug's desire to get WMD is too strong to do anything about.

In 2002, liberals also added to their arsenal of inaction the worry that the chaos of destroying Saddam's regime would allow chemical weapons--hitherto guarded by Saddam's forces--to spread to terrorists inside and outside Iraq's borders. (I will refrain from charging them with lying about Saddam's WMD.)

Now we are told that force is the last option for dealing with Iran's nuclear program. But that last excuse for inaction will inevitably be put into play once Iran does in fact go nuclear. You can already see it in action today regarding Pakistan's nukes:

Retired Pakistani Brigadier-General Asad Munir, who formerly served in the senior ranks of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, says that all nuclear installations -- whether civilian or military -- are guarded with elaborate security arrangements.

He says that Western countries' concerns that nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands have been put to rest.

So far, they seem secure. But the worry lingers. And we require the current government and military to remain securely in power to keep the nukes safe, of course. That's very convenient for the current rulers, no?

And in Syria, where revolution threatens to topple the Assad regime or force it to contract its realm, worries over chemical weapons are high:

Al-Qaeda has declared common cause with Syria's rebels and is operating in the country. That raises the danger that if one of the places where WMD is stored fell behind rebel lines, the international terrorist organization might have a chance to get them.

So far, the fear of Syria's collapse hasn't prevented the West from at least tepidly supporting the revolt. I suppose Assad's promise not to move chemical weapons actually has a deterrent function against Western intervention by leaving the weapons vulnerable to rebel (and maybe jihadi) capture by refusing to move them to secure locations within the Alawite community.

The article raises a number of issues I've raised, but I have to object to one expert saying that Hezbollah wouldn't want Syrian chemical weapons because Hezbollah has condemned "indiscriminate" Israeli tactics and wants to be a legitimate political player. Please. Hezbollah boasts of their ability to indiscriminately bombard Israeli civilians. Iran has shown that wanting to kill Jews in large numbers and being a legitimate member of the glorious international community are not incompatible.

Oh, and let me digress a bit more over the claim that Saddam subdued a Kurdish revolt in 1988 by using chemical weapons at Halabja. Saddam's success in crushing organized Kurdish resistance in 1988 was based not so much on chemical weapons but on the many troops freed from frontline duty against Iran by the ending of that war. Also, it only suppressed resistance for a time rather than decisively end it.

One can only hope that there is another phase of liberal attitudes toward disarming thugs with WMD ambitions. If President Obama decides to attack Iran, we will see them returning to something closer to the 1998 version.

If Romney is the one with that duty, on the other hand, I can guarantee that Code Pink and International ANSWER will once again get loving coverage from our media. And the most nuanced of our big-brained foreign policy thinkers will worry about the security of Iran's nuclear assets should we strike Iran or risk chaos in Iran by supporting resistance, and argue that holy nuance requires us to accept the lesser of two evils by supporting a thug regime that securely holds its WMD.

UPDATE: I would be remiss if I didn't mention that one of the authors of Strategypage, who I respect as an analyst, says Iran would welcome a strike and so we should not do it.

I respectfully respond that the wishes of nuts should not be Gospel. Osama bin Laden welcomed an American military response to 9/11. Saddam believed he did not have to back down in 2003 because an American attack would not dethrone him.

Both miscalculated and both are dead.

Iran surely welcomes ineffective military force. Let's make sure it is effective, eh?

And I'll repeat that I'll accept more time as the result of an imperfect military solution than seeing Iran go nuclear sooner.