Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Embracing Defeat

The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait is tilting to China. So what is Taiwan to do? Apparently, pretend to defend themselves. But call it "asymmetrical" defense so it sounds really cool:

Advanced aircraft and stealthy submarines will remain on Taiwan’s military wish-list, but in the meantime Taiwan will forge ahead with a variety of very real asymmetrical instruments of power. These instruments are under review, but they are likely to include anti-access capabilities and operations employed by countries like Iran (think small-boat swarm tactics combined with mines and missiles) and emerging technologies for conducting cyber warfare. ...

To reverse this seemingly inexorable trend and avoid being trapped by Chinese tactics, the United States needs to support a Taiwan breakout strategy. The goal should be for Taiwan to become more integrated in the fabric of the region, both economically and politically, and to maintain its sense of security as it builds relations with the mainland. With respect to military power, the United States should assist Taiwan as it continues to think through its requirements for anti-access tactics, operations, and hardware. Indeed, US officials announced this week that new arms sales to Taiwan are being considered, and it’s therefore probable that hardware aimed at building up asymmetrical, anti-access capabilities will be at the top of any list. Security in cyber space will also be vital, given that this domain has quickly become both a leading vulnerability and a stellar opportunity for defence.

What? What does this even mean?

Missile boats for coastal defense, mines, and anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles aren't really asymmetrical in my mind. They are just standard weapons to defend yourself. Mines are certainly grossly underappreciated--but they are conventional weapons. In fact, "Asymmetrical" concepts seem to miss the point that any weapon system or type of military unit has weaknesses that another weapon or type of unit must cover. That's why we embrace combined arms within the ground services and jointness between the services. It's rock, paper, scissors.

When I hear about asymmetric defenses, it almost always means that someone thinks that a country can escape the burden of defense spending by some clever device that undermines the enemy's entire expensive arsenal. Just because a country decides to use weapons other than carriers to fight carriers or weapons other than tanks to fight tanks doesn't make them asymmetric. It makes it war. Taiwan's problem isn't that it can't cope with China's growing arsenal. Taiwan has chosen not to spend the money needed:

Taiwan will not engage in an arms race with China, but will focus instead on making optimal use of its defense budget, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said in response to Beijing’s announcement of a double-digit increase in military spending this year.

Taiwan's defense burden is low, rising to 3% of GDP in 2008. Sure, this is a lot compared to Western Europeans. But Europeans don't have China looming over them and they have America on the ground with them. We spend a lot more and even that seems insufficient to maintain our advantages. Taiwan needs to spend much more.

Back to the original article, pointing to Iran as a model of success is silly. Iran's military is weak. Their power comes from support of terorrism, and appeal to Islamic solidarity, chest-tumping and poo-flinging to sound scary, and the prospect of getting nuclear weapons. While it was a long time ago, when Iran tried their asymmetrical (i.e., weak) small boats, mines, and shore-based missiles against us in 1987 and 1988 during the Tanker War portion of the Iran-Iraq War, we kicked their asses. But hey, others want the Hezbollah model for Taiwan. Which is equally stupid.

And focusing on cyber-warfare? Really? Taiwan's problem is that China's ability to invade Taiwan is growing and a smart response is to increase cyber-warfare capabilities? That will just lead to some high school-educated Chinese paratroopers storming into the high tech cyber-center where they will slaughter and overpower the college-educated cyber "warriors" busy de-friending China on Facebook.

As for the breakout strategy, I can't even guess what that is supposed to mean. How is Taiwan going to be policitally integrated into the fabric of the region unless Taiwan declares independence? That's the whole point of China denying Taiwan international ties. And economic integration is pretty advanced. So is China's. How does this help Taiwan? It hasn't so far. Even we aren't willing to just sell Taiwan what they want to buy.

Look, Taiwan's basic defense problem is preventing China from retaining a foothold on Taiwan when the guns go silent. Taiwan needs to destroy, degrade, and delay China's amphibious and airborne attacks. And if anything makes it ashore, Taiwan needs to be able to attack under enemy air attack to throw the attackers back into the sea or to wipe out airheads. If Taiwan just has to endure bombardment or blockade, they can endure that and live to fight it--especially if we or Japan have time to intervene. Invasion is the problem to defeat. Taiwan needs modern fighters, robust airfields (hardened facilities and rapid repair capabilities), minefields, the ability to quickly wreck ports and airfields that are about to be captured by the Chinese, small missile boats, land-based anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles (including anti-missile versions), well-trained, mechanized and motorized brigades, long-range surface-tosurface missiles to hit Chinese ports and airfields, submarines, and war reserve stocks to keep fighting for many months (mostly because they'll need to fight many weeks and they'll underestimate their needs and losses). These are the tools to defeat a Chinese invasion. None is a silver bullet. All acting together can defeat the Chinese. Asymmetrical defenses are folly for territorial defense.

Oh, and Taiwan needs a couple more things. One, they need time. We can punch our way through Chinese defenses to help Taiwan. If we have time. And two, Taiwan needs to know help is coming. Morale will be tough to maintain if they think they are all alone against massive China. So bottom line, Taiwan doesn't need an "asymmetrical" response that relieves Taiwan of the burden of paying for a robust defense infrastructure that has the full range of weapons that allows combined arms and joint operations to defeat the Chinese.

Or, if you really want to talk about a breakout capability, Taiwan can go nuclear. That isn't cheap. But if Taiwan doesn't want to spend the money on a military capable of defending their prosperous island democracy, that's the only means they have available.

Well, there is one more way. America could deploy forces to Taiwan again. But that is just another way of making sure our forces can arrive in time and so deter China from attacking.

There are no magic bullets. Embracing "asymmetrical" means of defense is just giving up without admitting you are giving up.