Friday, April 29, 2005

Quality People

I am quite heartened to read that one old lesson of warfare has really sunk in because of the Iraq War and the fight against the insurgents in Iraq after major combat operations ended:

The army was also relieved to see that their long, and costly, investment in training, and careful selection of recruits, was working. This angle never got much press, it never does. And despite ample historical evidence, generals are always tempted to shortchange training in favor of new gadgets. At least you can show off the hardware to Congress, when you go begging for more money. No one has yet found a way to show off training, short of an actual war. And even then it’s difficult. But this time around, many more generals, and civilians in the Pentagon, became believers.

In 1997, the Association of the United States Army published my "The First Gulf War and the Army's Future" as a Land Warfare paper. It was about lessons from Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 for the Army. I stated (pp. 14-15, sorry--not online):

Iraq's failings highlight the advantages the United States Army derives from its modern equipment and realistic training. Although there appears to be a consensus among military strategists and policy-makers that the United States must maintain its technological edge, the troops must be trained and motivated to take advantage of that technology. The critical advantages provided by highly trained soldiers with good morale are not easily quantifiable in peacetime. The lack of quality becomes quantifiable, indirectly, when one counts the burned-out armored vehicles of an army whose troops did not know how to use their equipment and who lacked the will to fight on in adversity.

The Importance of this invisible edge that the United States Army works hard to maintain cannot be overestimated. The disasters that can follow from incorrrectly
believing you have a trained army are appalling. Iraq's experience in 1980--having its presumed blitzkrieg lead to a grinding eight-year war of attrition, heavy casualties and debt, and the long-term mistake of trying to reverse the losses of the 1980s by invading Kuwait in 1990--should serve as a warning to us.


I'm very happy to read that this lesson has taken hold. It may be forgotten in the future as it often is, but for now we are on the right track. Well-trained soldiers, Marines, airmen, and sailors are the high tech weapon we must rely on for victory.