Monday, August 05, 2002

Nation Building

Part of the debates on what to do in Afghanistan and Iraq center around nation-building--occupying a state to ensure that it develops politically along lines friendly to America. Just as we did in post-war Germany and Japan, where hostile, fanatical states were molded into democracies allied to the United States. The hostility of the Bush administration to nation building flows from Somalia and Haiti where we intervened for largely humanitarian reasons (Somalia, although proving we'd help Moslems without oil was undoubtedly a factor) and politics (Haiti. Yes, the Haitians suffered under a dictator, but the electoral votes of Florida burdened by lots of Haitian refugees seemed as likely a reason); and from Bosnia and Kosovo where we provide the muscle if not the numbers for those missions. Many advocates of nation building seem motivated by the failure to intervene in Rwanda, from the success in Kosovo and Bosnia in stamping down war, and from a general aversion to using the military except when there is no obvious national interest (thereby purifying it somehow).

Let me just say that I am not a fan of nation building as a first impulse. Armies are for fighting, not policing (abroad or here) I wasn't too happy with Somalia and predicted they'd be shooting at us given enough time. Sure, the impulse to get food in was admirable, but staying to unify and pacify the country was wrong when we had no real interest to do so. Our withdrawal after 18 deaths in Mogadishu shows how little interest we had in suffering for the cause. And I really don't care to debate whether a couple score dead Americans are more important than hundreds of thousands of dead Somalis. Let the international aid agencies debate whether the deaths of hundreds of aid volunteers would have been worth it to try and feed starving Somalis without an American military presence. Still, nation building has a place when it is in our national interest. The payoff of democratic and allied Japan and Germany is too obvious not to accept this.

After we overthrow Saddam's Tikrit mafia that rules Iraq, we clearly have an interest in remolding Iraq into a democracy that will not invade its neighbors, suppress "minorities" (who actually represent 80% of the population),use poison gas, support terrorism, pursue nuclear and biological weapons, or loot the national treasury for its Sunni power base. An American-dominated occupation force will be necessary in the short run. In the long run, just as in Bosnia and Kosovo, our European allies (and Japan too, given their interest in Middle East stability) should eventually shoulder the burden of providing infantry and military police to patrol the streets. Leaving a division of American heavy armor with nearby airpower in support to watch the Iranian mullahs (assuming they don't get overthrown by the people) will be necessary even as allies take over the peacekeeping role. The European Union corps they keep talking about forming to deploy out of area should get this job.

The need to occupy Iraq and also keep forces ready to deal with Iran and North Korea or another unexpected contingency argue against an American-dominated nation-building effort in Afghanistan. Our main interest in Afghanistan was overthrowing the Taliban and crushing al Qaeda. We did both. As long as Afghanistan doesn't re-emerge as a training ground for terrorism, the precise fate and pace of Afghanistan tranquility is more of a humanitarian interest. Trying to govern the country will put us in the middle of rivalries and embroil us in a civil war. Yes, we'd like a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan, so let's try. We should send aid and create a national army and bring the warlords inside the tent; but don't take our eye off the ball--terrorism and terror-supporting states (and terrorist states) are our target.

In Afghanistan, we shouldn't be too upset if the UN presence expands but don't put America in the position of being their rescuer if things go wrong. An expanded foreign presence may just provoke unified resistance to "invaders." We didn't blanket Panama or Grenada with American troops after we invaded those states and yet we still managed to win the peace in those countries. And those who cite the examples of keeping troops in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea generations after the wars that sent them there should remember that the larger reason they remained so long was to deal with external threats. Are we really still in South Korea, Germany, and Japan because we fear that at any moment, without our calming presence, they will put on black uniforms and wax nostalgic about owning the countries that border them? We won't be in Iraq for a generation. Ten years tops, maybe less.

Still, a decade of occupation argues against occupying everybody, including Afghanistan. Our Army is too small for that. The small American ground presence in Afghanistan is big enough to keep hostile elements from massing to threaten the central government. That should be enough as we promote some kind of confederation in Afghanistan that values a stable peace.